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I. INTRODUCTION
IATHOUT A DOUBT, 1999 and 2000 will be remembered
TIas years of remarkable developments in aviation liability
law. Topping the list of major developments was the momen-
tous drafting in May 1999 in Montreal, Canada of a new multi-
lateral convention to govern the liability of airlines in
international aviation accidents. The 1999 Montreal Conven-
tion establishes a unique system of airline liability, one that is
radically different from the 1929 Warsaw Convention that it will
hopefully replace. It is expected that the new convention may
be ratified and enter into force in the United States and other
nations within a few years.
Despite our more than sixty-year history with the 1929 Warsaw
Convention, this treaty has continuously fascinated us with its
difficult issues of treaty interpretation. Courts still grapple with
such fundamental issues as the proper definition of willful mis-
conduct and the circumstances under which damages for
mental injuries are permitted. Only in 1999 did the Supreme
Court finally resolve the issue of whether the Warsaw Conven-
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tion cause of action for passenger injury or death is exclusive, an
issue that had long divided the lower courts, some of which,
ironically, were originally of the view that the Warsaw Conven-
tion did not even create a cause of action. We have come a long
way in our understanding of this deceptively complex
document.
Another key development in aviation law is the passage on
April 5, 2000, of the Wendell H. Ford Aviation Investment Re-
form Act for the 21st Century ("AIR21"), a comprehensive
reauthorization of the Federal Aviation Administration and Air-
port Improvement Program, which provides substantially more
money for safety programs relating to airport facilities and per-
sonnel and aviation security and addresses various liability, com-
petition, environmental, and passenger rights issues. Among its
significant highlights is an amendment to the Death on the
High Seas Act', which now permits recovery of damages for loss
of a decedent's care, comfort, and companionship in aviation
accidents on the high seas.
There was plenty of interesting case law in 1999 through 2000,
including a decision defining the territorial scope of the Death
on the High Seas Act; additional case law narrowly limiting the
preemption of state law under the Airline Deregulation Act; a
growing body of case law governing liability from the handling
of in-flight medical emergencies; and a Third Circuit decision
concerning the preemptive effect of FAA regulations. Issues of
federal preemption continue to divide the federal circuits, mir-
roring debates in our Congress about the proper role of federal
law in tort law.
Admittedly, not all recent case law is novel, momentous, and
remarkable; but any annual survey of the law should be thor-
ough at the risk of being over-inclusive. We hope this article
offers the aviation practitioner that much-needed thorough
review.
II. THE MONTREAL CONVENTION OF 1999
The International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO) 2 con-
vened an international conference in Montreal, Canada in May
1 46 U.S.C. app. §§ 761-767 (1994).
2 ICAO is a United Nations agency charged with developing international air
transport standards and regulations for its 185 member states. It also administers
the Convention for the Unification of Certain Rules for International Carriage by
Air at Warsaw, Poland 1929, 49 stat 3000, T.S. No. 876, reprinted in notefollowzing49
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1999, with the ambitious goal of drafting and approving a new
international Convention to replace the Warsaw Convention of
1929 and its several amending protocols and modifying intercar-
rier private agreements.
On May 28, 1999, representatives from over fifty countries, in-
cluding the United States, approved a new "Convention for the
Unification of Certain Rules for International Carriage by Air."'
If formally ratified by the governments of at least thirty nations,
the treaty will come into effect among the signatory nations and
be known as the Montreal Convention of 1999. It is hoped that
the treaty will come into force by the year 2001. Belize, Macedo-
nia, and Japan have already ratified the new convention on Au-
gust 24, 1999. President Clinton has signed the 1999 Montreal
Convention and has submitted it to the Senate for ratification.
By the time this Convention convened in Montreal in May of
1999, the pillars of the Warsaw Convention, uniformity and lia-
bility limits, had already toppled.4 Everyone involved in the
drafting of the new Convention understood that liability limita-
tions were no longer welcomed and could no longer be justified.
The Montreal Convention is an entirely new treaty and not
another amendment to the 1929 Warsaw Convention. Article 55
specifically states that this Convention supercedes the Warsaw
USCA § 40105 (1997), popularly known as the Warsaw Convention and related
treaties.
3 Convention for the Unification of Certain Rules for International Carriage
by Air, done May 28, 1999, ICAO Doc. 9740 [hereinafter Montreal Convention].
There are six official language texts of the Montreal Convention: English, Arabic,
Chinese, French, Russian, and Spanish. The Convention will enter into force on
the sixtieth day following the date of deposit of thirty instruments of ratification
and will enter into force as between those states that have deposited an instru-
ment. See id. at Chapter VII cl. 6.
4 As a result of subsequent protocols to the 1929 Warsaw Convention and spe-
cial private intercarrier agreements modifying the treaty, different versions of the
Warsaw Convention govern today, depending on the countries and the carriers
involved and the date of the accident: 1) The unamended 1929 Warsaw Conven-
tion; 2) the Warsaw Convention amended by the 1955 Hague Protocol; 3) the
Warsaw Convention modified by the 1966 Montreal Intercarrier Agreement, ap-
plicable in the United States for international travel involving a stop, departure,
or destination in the United States; 4) the 1929 Warsaw Convention or the 1955
Hague Protocol, as modified further by the 1996 International Air Transport As-
sociation (IATA) Intercarrier Agreements on Passenger Liability; and 5) the War-
saw Convention amended by Montreal Protocol No. 4 and the 1955 Hague
Protocol, with or without the further modifications of either the 1966 Montreal
Agreement or the 1996 IATA agreements, depending on the particular carrier
and the date of the accident. It is easy to see that the only hope for uniformity
and predictability was to draft an entirely new treaty.
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Convention and its protocols and special intercarrier agree-
ments.5 The new Montreal Convention gathers and incorpo-
rates changes that have occurred to the Warsaw Convention
over the last seventy years and includes some entirely new provi-
sions. These changes range from cargo regulation,6 to moderni-
zation of documentation,7 to an additional jurisdictional forum,
to, most notably, the elimination of any damages limitations for
injury and death cases and strict liability to a certain amount.
A. THE PASSENGER CAUSE OF ACTION UNDER ARTICLE 17
Article 17 of the Montreal Convention provides:
The carrier is liable for damage sustained in case of death or
bodily injury of a passenger upon condition only that the acci-
dent which caused the death or injury took place on board the
aircraft or in the course of any of the operations of embarking or
disembarking.8
To a large degree this language mirrors the Warsaw Conven-
tion Article 17 language. There is still the presumption of liabil-
ity upon proof of an "accident" and proof of the prerequisite
bodily injury or death. An earlier draft of Article 17 of the Mon-
treal Convention would have expressly included liability for
"mental injury" and would have expressly excluded liability for
"injury resulting solely from the state of health of the passen-
ger."' This draft language was dropped from the final version.
The question will still remain whether psychic injuries that ac-
company, but do not flow from, a bodily injury, are compensable.
The question will also remain whether an injury like post-trau-
matic stress disorder, which has physical and mental compo-
nents, is a bodily injury under Article 17. The new Convention
5 The scope of the treaty is the same as the 1929 Warsaw Convention. It will
affect all international air travel between signatory nations or roundtrip travel to
and from a signatory state with a stop in another country. See Montreal Conven-
tion, supra note 3, at art. 1.
6 The Convention incorporates the provisions of the 1961 Guadalajara Con-
vention, which was never in force, and the Montreal Protocol No. 4 which relates
to cargo. See id. at arts. 4-15.
7 The Convention also relaxes the prior, now outdated, requirements as to the
contents of passenger documentation (passenger ticket and baggage check) and
the cargo air waybill. See id. at arts. 3, 5.
s See id. at art. 17(1).
9 Draft Convention for Unification of Certain Rules for International Carriage
by Air, done May 3, 1999, DCW Doc. No. 4.
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does not answer these questions.'" The fact that there was a
failed attempt to exclude liability for injuries resulting from the
state of health of the passenger suggests that the treaty's drafters
do consider that events involving the carrier's negligence in
handling an in-flight medical emergency may constitute an acci-
dent within the scope of Article 17.
Article 17 of the Montreal Convention continues to require
an "accident" as a condition to liability, and "accident" remains
undefined. The case law that has developed to define "acci-
dent" as "an unexpected or unusual event or happening that is
external to the passenger"' ' will, therefore, remain relevant. In-
deed, with the removal of the Article 22 limitation of liability, it
is now the carriers who will probably call for a narrow reading of
"accident," while plaintiffs will urge for a broad reading.
The new Article 17, like its predecessor, does not address the
damages law to be applied in passenger cases. Prior case law on
this point, particularly Zicherman v. Korean Air Lines Co., 12 will
continue to govern. Thus, the forum court selects the applica-
ble national damages law pursuant to its choice of law rules.
The applicable choices of substantive law in United States courts
are either state law or foreign law for air crashes that occur over
land'" or the Death on the High Seas Act, foreign law, or gen-
eral maritime law possibly supplemented by state law, for air
crashes over water.' 4
1 A statement was added to the working papers of the convention to the effect
that "bodily injury" is still included in Article 17, but acknowledging that in some
countries damages for mental injuries are allowed in certain circumstances and
the convention is "'not intended to interfere with this development."' See Sean
Gates, The Montreal Convention of 1999: A Report on the Conference and on What the
Convention Means for Air Carriers and Their Insurers, TIF AvIATION QUARTERiL 186,
189-90 (1999). The author notes that this language can be interpreted to mean
that individual states can interpret "bodily injury" to include pure mental injury.
See id.; see also Ruwantissa Abeyratne, Mental Injury Caused in Accidents During Inter-
national Air Carriage-A Point of View, TuE AviAriON QUARTERLY 206, 207-10
(1999) (mental injury can be a damage recognized under the new convention
and under the existing convention).
1 Air France v. Saks, 470 U.S. 392, 405 (1985). Recently, the Supreme Court
criticized the Second Circuit's narrow construction of "accident" and stated that
the Saks definition should be flexibly applied. See El Al Israel Airlines, Ltd. v.
Tseng, 525 U.S. 155, 165 n.9 (1999).
12 516 U.S. 217, 231 (1996).
'3 See, e.g., Pescatore v. Pan Am. World Airways, Inc., 97 F.3d 1, 12 (2d Cir.
1996).
H See, e.g., Zicherman, 516 U.S. at 229-32 supra note 12; cf. Pub. Adm'r v. Angela
Compania Naviera, 592 F.2d 58, 60-61 (2d Cir. 1979) (applying general maritime
law to action involving death in foreign territorial waters).
[ 6
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Article 29, like Article 24 of the 1929 Warsaw Convention, re-
stricts passenger claims under Article 17 to the terms and condi-
tions of the new treaty. This cause of action is therefore
exclusive and preempts any cause of action based on local law.'"
B. JOINT AND SEVERAL LIABILITY
Article 17 of the new Montreal Convention, like Article 17 of
the Warsaw Convention,' 6 creates joint and several liability on
the part of the carrier. The passenger or the passenger's estate
can look to the carrier for complete compensation, leaving to
the carrier the burden to seek contribution or indemnity from
third parties at fault.
C. ELIMINATION OF DAMAGES LIMITATIONS AND ADOPTION OF A
Two-TIERED COMPENSATION SCHEME
The Montreal Convention sets forth a unique two-tiered com-
pensation scheme. Article 21 provides for strict liability up to
100,000 Special Drawing Rights (SDRs). For amounts in excess
of that, the carrier can be exonerated if it proves its non-negli-
gence or that the damage was solely due to third-party fault. Ar-
ticle 21 provides:
1. For damages arising under paragraph 1 of Article 17 not
exceeding 100,000 Special Drawing Rights for each passenger,
the carrier shall not be able to exclude or limit its liability.
2. The carrier shall not be liable for damages arising under
paragraph 1 of Article 17 to the extent that they exceed for each
passenger 100,000 Special Drawing Rights if the carrier proves
that:
(a) such damage was not due to the negligence or other
wrongful act or omission of the carrier or its servants or agents;
or
(b) such damage was solely due to the negligence or other
wrongful act or omission of a third party.
Article 21 (2) (a) replaces the "all necessary measures" defense
set out in the Warsaw Convention's Article 20(1). Article 20(1)
of the Warsaw Convention provides that "[t]he carrier shall not
15 The same is true with the Warsaw Convention. See El Al Israel Airlines, 525
U.S. at 176 supra note 11.
l6 See Cortes v. Am. Airlines, Inc., 177 F.3d 1272, 1304-05 (11th Cir. 1999), cert.
denied, 120 S. Ct. 980 (2000) (carrier is jointly and severally liable to passengers or
their estates under Article 17; state statutes on proportionate liability are inappli-
cable to a Warsaw Convention carrier).
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be liable if he proves that he and his agents have taken all neces-
sary measures to avoid the damage or that it was impossible for
him or them to take such measures.'
' 7
The question arises whether the "all necessary measures" de-
fense is more difficult for the carrier to prove than the non-neg-
ligence defense under Article 21(2) (a) of the Montreal
Convention. An analysis of the Warsaw Convention minutes and
the case law interpreting the "all necessary measures" defense
leads to the conclusion that Article 20(1) was meant to exoner-
ate a carrier who took all those measures which could have been
foreseen as reasonable and useful to avoid the damage, except-
ing those that were impossible to take. Because of the burden-
shifting of Article 20(1), in practical effect, it means that the
carrier must know all of the facts and circumstances leading to
the accident, be able to identify the exact cause or all possible
causes of the accident, and then with the advantage of hindsight
identify and prove that it took all reasonable measures that
could have been useful to avoid the accident. 8 The carrier's
burden under the Warsaw Convention, then, is to prove that it
was in no way negligent. Carrying this burden is a difficult thing
to do in an air crash, especially when it presupposes that the
carrier can piece together all the events leading to a crash and
prove that not one mistake or omission by the carrier occurred
that could have avoided the damage. Another way to look at it is
that the carrier must prove that that the accident was wholly be-
yond its control."' While the Montreal Convention adopts lan-
guage that appears more relaxed-"damage was not due to the
17 Convention for the Unification of Certain Rules Relating to International
Carriage by Air, Oct. 12, 1929, art. 20(1), 49 Stat. 3000, 3019, 137 L.N.T.S. 11
[hereinafter Warsaw Convention].
18 See GEORGE-rE MILLER, LIABILITY IN INTERNATIONAL AIR TRANSPORT 58-62
(1977) (explaining that the origin of the Article 20(1) "all necessary measures"
defense is the common-law shipping carrier's "due diligence" defense). The min-
utes to the 1929 Warsaw Convention state that under Article 20 the "carrier will
be able to establish that he is in no way at fault and that he has taken all the
useful measures to avoid the damage .. " SECOND INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCE
ON PRIVATE AERONAUTICAL LAw 252 (Robert C. Horner & Didier Legrez trans.
1975) (1929) ("all that can be asked for the carrier is to take reasonable mea-
sures to avoid the damages"). See also Mfrs. Hanover Trust Co. v. Alitalia Airlines,
429 F. Supp. 964 (S.D.N.Y.), affd, 573 F.2d 1292 (2d Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 435
U.S. 971 (1978); Rugani v. K. L. M. Royal Dutch Airlines, 4Av. Cas. (CCH) 17,257
(N.Y.C. Ct. 1954); Am. Smelting & Ref. Co. v. Phil. Air Lines, Inc., 4 Av. Cas.
(CCH) 17,413 (N.Y. Ct. 1954).
I!, This is the approach taken in France. See Preyvolo c. Air France (1973) 27
RFDA 345 (Trib. Corn. Nice, 7 May 1973).
2000] DEVELOPMENTS IN AIATION LIABILITY LAW 31
negligence or any other wrongful act or omission of the car-
rier"2'-this "non-negligence" defense may be just as difficult as
the "all necessary measures" defense, because the carrier must
still prove that the accident was beyond its control and nothing
it could have done would have avoided the accident.
D. ADVANCE PAYMENTS AND AUTOMATIC REVIEW OF TIER ONE
PAYMENT AMOUNTS
Under Article 28 of the new Montreal Convention, carriers
may be required by national law to make advance payments
without delay to passengers or their representatives in death
cases. Any such required payments will not constitute a recogni-
tion of liability and may be offset against any amounts subse-
quently paid as damages by the carrier.
The drafters of the 1999 Montreal Convention avoided the
need for constant amendments and "special contracts" regard-
ing the tier one payment amount by requiring in Article 24 that
the Article 21 tier one monetary limits be reviewed every five
years and adjusted for inflation.
E. PASSENGER'S CONTRIBUTORY FAULT
While the new Article 21 defense is unavailable in the first tier
of liability for 100,000 SDR's, and the carrier is strictly liable for
that amount, the carrier is not, however, absolutely liable, be-
cause it may raise the defense of the passenger's contributory
fault. Article 20 of the 1999 Montreal Convention reads:
If the carrier proves that the damage was caused or contributed
to by the negligence or other wrongful act or omission of the
person claiming compensation, or the person from whom he or
she derives his or her rights, the carrier shall be wholly or partly
exonerated from its liability to the claimant to the extent that
such negligence or wrongful act or omission caused or contrib-
uted to the damage .... This Article applies to all the liability
provisions in this Convention, including paragraph 1 of
Article 21.2 l
Article 20, nonetheless, should rarely be applicable, because
passengers do not cause international air crashes. A possible
factual scenario in which a carrier may try to invoke this provi-
sion is when a passenger's injury or death is caused by the pas-
senger's failure to heed safety instructions, such as failure to
20 Montreal Convention, supra note 3, at art. 20.
21 Id.
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wear a seatbelt. One difference between the new Article 20 and
its predecessor under the Warsaw Convention is that the prede-
cessor expressly referred to forum law for a determination of the
effect of a passenger's fault. The new treaty does not indicate
what law should apply to determine the effect of contributory
negligence. Presumably, the forum law, including the forum's
choice of law rules, will be applied to resolve these issues.
F. COURT COSTS AND LEGAL EXPENSES
Article 22(6) of the new convention also provides that, if al-
lowed under forum law, the court may award plaintiff court
costs and legal expenses, including attorney's fees, plus interest,
in circumstances in which the plaintiff recovers an amount
greater than the carrier's written settlement offer made within
six months of the accident or prior to commencement of suit.
G. PUNITIVE DAMAGES
Article 29 of the new Montreal Convention explicitly states,
"[P] unitive, exemplary or any other non-compensatory damages
shall not be recoverable. '2 2 The Warsaw Convention does not
address the availability of punitive damages, nor was the subject
raised at the 1929 Warsaw conference. United States courts
have grappled with the question of whether punitive damages
are available under the Warsaw Convention, and three federal
circuit courts of appeal have held that punitive damages are pro-
hibited by Article 17, which creates a cause of action for only
compensatory damages. 23 Other non-compensatory damages
22 Id. at art. 29.
23 The Second, Eleventh, and District of Columbia Circuit Courts have inter-
preted Article 17 as permitting only compensatory damages. See In re Air Disaster
at Lockerbie, Scotland on December 21, 1988, 928 F.2d 1267, 1270 (2d Cir.
1991), cert. denied, 502 U.S. 920 (1991); Floyd v. E. Airlines, Inc., 872 F.2d 1462,
1483 (11th Cir. 1989), rev'd on other grounds, 499 U.S. 530 (1991); In reKorean Air
Lines Disaster of September 1, 1983, 932 F.2d 1475, 1490 (D.C. Cir. 1991), cert.
denied, 502 U.S. 994 (1991). In Zichernan, 516 U.S. at 225, supra note 12, the
Supreme Court held that the Convention does not specify what damages are al-
lowed or prohibited and leaves that issue to forum court determination, pursuant
to the forum's choice of law rules. Zicherman described Article 17, however, as
creating an action for compensation. See also Pescatore, 97 F.3d at 14, supra note
.13, (reaffirming the earlier pre-Zicherman holding in Lockerbie that Article 17 pro-
hibits the recovery of punitive damages in all cases); In reAir Crash Disaster Near
Roselawn, Indiana on October 31, 1994, 960 F. Supp. 150, 153 (N.D. Il. 1997)
(upholding pre-Zicherrnan cases and stating that Article 17 prohibits the recovery
of punitive damages).
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could include pre-judgment interest, when the law treats them
as punitive in nature.
H. ADDITION OF THE FIFTH PLACE OF TREATY JURISDICTION
Article 28 of the Warsaw Convention provides for four possi-
ble places for suit: the country in which the carrier has incorpo-
rated, the country of the carrier's principal place of business,
the country in which the ticket was purchased, or the country of
the final destination. A perceived injustice to the treaty was that
a passenger could not sue in his or her own domicile unless that
domicile coincided with one of the four places in Article 28.
This was true even if the carrier had a substantial business pres-
ence in the passenger's domicile. This problem has now been
corrected.
Article 33(1) of the 1999 Montreal Convention allows an ac-
tion to be brought in a fifth jurisdiction, the place where the
passenger has or had his or her principal and permanent resi-
dence at the time of the accident, provided the carrier provides
service to that location with its own aircraft or on another car-
rier's aircraft pursuant to a commercial arrangement, such as a
code share agreement. The United States Department of Trans-
portation (DOT) insisted upon the addition of the "fifth juris-
diction," the passenger's principal place of residence. Indeed,
the absence of this provision from the 1996 IATA Intercarrier
Agreements21 caused delay in the approval of those agreements
by the DOT.
24 In 1996, the International Air Transport Association (IATA), a trade organi-
zation of international air carriers, took the lead in drafting special intercarrier
agreements that modified the Warsaw Convention by waiving the Article 22 lim-
ited liability provisions for passenger cases and provided for strict liability up to
100,000 Special Drawing Rights, unless a carrier specifies a lower amount. For
liability for amounts in excess of that, the carrier reserved its right to assert the
defense under Article 20 that the carrier had taken all necessary measures to
avoid the accident. The agreements render Article 25, requiring proof of the
carrier's "willful misconduct" as a condition to full liability, irrelevant. The IATA
agreements collectively consist of one umbrella agreement and a choice of imple-
menting measures, all of which contain the waiver of the Article 22 limits For
passenger cases and strict liability up to a certain amount, before recourse can be
had to the Article 20 "all necessary measures" defense. The IATA agreements
otherwise vary, however, with respect to certain optional provisions. By 1998, all
U.S. international carriers and most major foreign airlines had signed the IATA
umbrella agreement and adopted some implementing agreement and/or incor-
porated the waiver of Article 22 in their tariffs. The United States DOT approved
the IATA intercarrier agreements in January of 1997. See further discussion infra
Part III.B.
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I. TICKET DELIVERY
Under Article 3 of the Warsaw Convention, the delivery of a
paper ticket to the passenger is absolutely required as a quid pro
quo for the limited liability provision of Article 22. Failure to
deliver a ticket bars the carrier from asserting Article 22. Under
the Montreal Convention, Article 3 no longer provides a sanc-
tion for failure to deliver a ticket or otherwise preserve the flight
information.
J. RECOURSE AGAINST THIRD PARTIES AT FAULT
The Warsaw Convention never addressed the issue of the car-
rier's recourse over third parties at fault. The case law always
presumed that domestic law applied on this issue. In the 1996
IATA Intercarrier Agreements, IATA inserted language reserv-
ing the carrier's right of recourse against third parties. The
open question whether the carriers act as volunteers under the
1996 IATA agreements when they waived the limits of Article 22,
without legal compulsion to do so, creates doubt, however,
whether they retain any right to contribution or indemnity from
third parties at fault for payments arguably made as volunteers.
Moreover, rights of recourse exist as a matter of law or pursuant
to a bilateral contract. One party cannot unilaterally create a
right of recourse.
Under the Montreal Convention, there are no limits on com-
pensation and a carrier is legally obligated to pay damages. The
carrier is not a volunteer, and Article 37 preserves any right of
recourse the carrier may have under law.
K. STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS
The Warsaw Convention two-year statute of limitation under
Article 29 is now found at Article 35 of the Montreal
Convention.
L. ACTS OF AGENTS AND SERVANTS OF THE CARRIER
The Warsaw Convention refers to the carrier's liability for the
acts of its agents in Articles 20 and 25. It has always been pre-
sumed that this covers servants (or employees) of the carrier as
well. The more complicated issue has been whether the car-
rier's servants, agents, and independent contractors, when inde-
pendently sued, are entitled to assert the Warsaw Convention
defenses, conditions to suit and damages limitations applicable
to the carrier. Case law developed from the Second Circuit's
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seminal case, Reed v. Wiser,2 has held that the carrier's servants,
agents, and independent contractors are entitled to assert the
defenses, limitations, and conditions to suit of the Warsaw Con-
vention, provided the servant, agent, or independent contractor
performed a service in furtherance of the transportation con-
tract or a service that the carrier is required to perform under
the Convention. 6
The Montreal Convention makes the carrier vicariously liable
for the acts of "servants or agents. ' 27 While the new Montreal
Convention, like the Warsaw Convention, applies only to "carri-
ers" (which term is still not defined), it is presumed that Reed v.
Wiser and its progeny will still be relevant.
III. LIABILITY OF AIR CARRIERS UNDER THE 1929
WARSAW CONVENTION
A. THE UNITED STATES ADOPTS THE 1975 MONTREAL
PROTOCOL No. 4
In 1996, the IATA trade organization of international carriers
took the lead in drafting a series of intercarrier agreements in
which the carriers voluntarily waived the damages limitations of
Article 22 of the Warsaw Convention, thus rendering Article 25
of the treaty irrelevant. Under Article 25, the carrier could not
avail itself of the Article 22 cap on damages if it had committed
"willful misconduct. '28 By 1998, all U.S. and most foreign inter-
national carriers had signed and implemented the 1996 IATA
Intercarrier Agreements. Under these agreements, by waiving
Article 22, the carriers essentially became strictly liable under
Article 17 for full compensatory damages, unless the carrier
proved, pursuant to Article 20, that it had taken all necessary
measures to avoid the accident, a nearly insurmountable bur-
den. Under the IATA agreements, no passenger or plaintiff
need prove the carrier's "willful misconduct" in order to obtain
full compensation from the carrier, who, under Article 17, is
jointly and severally liable.
With the passenger liability limits now out of the way, thanks
to the IATA agreements, the United States took further steps to
25 555 F.2d 1079 (2d Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 922 (1977).
26 A recent case applying the defenses of the Warsaw Convention to an inde-
pendent contractor is Waxman v. C.I.S. Mexicana de Aviacion, S.A. de C.V., 13
F. Supp. 2d 508, 515 (S.D.N.Y. 1998).
27 Montreal Convention, supra note 3, at art. 17.
28 Warsaw Convention, supra note 17, 49 Stat. at 3020, 137 L.N.T.S. at act 25.
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reform and modernize the Warsaw Convention. To that end,
the United States Senate ratified Montreal Protocol No. 4 in No-
vember 1998, and the protocol went into force in the United
States on March 4, 1999. Montreal Protocol No. 4 has the effect
of also binding the United States to the 1955 Hague Protocol
amendments to the Warsaw Convention. So far, forty-seven
states have ratified Montreal Protocol No. 4.2')
The Montreal Protocol No. 4 primarily affects reform in cargo
cases but also adopts the Hague Protocol's substitution of War-
saw Article 25(1) language. The new Article 25 delineates the
conduct or omission of a carrier that will be sufficient to break
the limited liability under Article 22(1) and no longer uses the
term "willful misconduct." '  Montreal Protocol No. 4 also
adopts the Hague Protocol limit of liability of $16,600 for pas-
senger injury or death. This limit, however, will have no effect
in the United States because all U.S. airlines and a majority of
foreign air lines have signed and implemented the 1996 IATA
Intercarrier Agreements, which became effective in the United
States in February 1998 for those carriers that were already sig-
natories to the IATA agreements.' Any foreign airline that has
not signed the IATA agreement must nonetheless still adhere to
the 1966 Montreal Agreement, which raised the Article 22 limit
to $75,000 for travel involving a stop, departure, or destination
in the United States. Montreal Protocol No. 4 would never have
been ratified by the U.S. Senate if its Article 22 had not been
rendered moot by the IATA agreements, or at least the Montreal
Agreement. 12 Montreal Protocol No. 4 should not affect any
post-IATA agreement passenger injury or death case.
29 See Appendix A to this paper.
30 See infra Part III.H.
M Montreal Protocol No. 4 was adopted during the 1975 ICAO meeting held
in Montreal but was not ratified by the United States until after the 1996 IATA
Intercarrier Agreements were in effect. Since 1975, the Senate has had the op-
portunity to ratify Montreal Protocol No. 4 but has refused to do so because of
dissatisfaction with the passenger liability limits imposed by the companion Mon-
treal Protocol No. 3. See S. Rep. No. 105-20, at 2-3, 6 (1998).
312 The ratification of Montreal Protocol No. 4 was really an endorsement of its
reform to cargo rules. The United States has consistently fought liability limita-
tions and would not have agreed to reduce the limit to $16,600 at this late date.
In fact, the Senate and the Administration were confident that the 1996 IATA
Intercarrier Agreements had rendered the liability limit of Montreal Protocol No.
4 meaningless and that its ratification therefore would have no effect on passen-
ger cases. See id. at 13.
2000] DEVELOPMENTS IN AVIATION LIABILITY LAW 37
B. THE EFFECTIVE DATE OF THE 1996 IATA INTERCARRIER
AGREEMENTS WAIVING ARTICLE 22
The 1995 IATA intercarrier umbrella agreement calls for car-
riers to take action to waive Article 22 and implement other
mandatory provisions of the umbrella agreement by signing an
implementation agreement and filing new tariffs, or simply by
filing new tariffs that incorporate, at a minimum, the mandatory
terms of the umbrella accord. 3 The 1996 IATA intercarrier im-
plementing agreement states that the agreement would become
effective when the Director General of JATA declares the agree-
ment in effect on November 1, 1996, or on such later date as all
requisite government approvals have been obtained. The IATA
organization sought the approval of the U.S. Department of
Transportation (DOT). The DOT approved the IATA agree-
ments in January 1997. The European Commission approved
the agreements in February 1997. On receiving these approvals,
the Director of IATA, on February 14, 1997, declared the agree-
ments in effect for those carriers that had already signed and
accepted the agreements.3 4 An issue that has arisen is the
proper effective date of the IATA agreements. Another issue is
whether Article 22 was already waived, pending governmental
approval of the IATA agreements.
Recently in In re Air Crash at Agana, Guam on August 6, 1997, 15
a California district court ruled that for carriers that had already
signed the IATA Intercarrier Agreements, the effective date of
the waiver of Article 22 is February 14, 1997, the date that the
IATA Director declared the agreements in effect upon having
received DOT approval. In this case, which involved a crash of a
Korean Airlines plane, the court ruled that the approval of the
Korean government was not also required for the IATA Article
-3 The IATA intercarrier agreements consist of several documents referred to
herein collectively as the 1995 IATA Intercarrier Agreement. There is the 1995
IATA Intercarrier Agreement on Passenger Liability ("A") signed in Kuala
Lumpur on October 21, 1995; the Agreement on Measures to Implement the IIA
("MIA") opened for signature in May of 1996; and the separate implementing
agreement drafted by the Air Transport Association (ATA), a trade association of
American carriers, which has been called the Agreement on Passenger Liability
("IPA"). The Department of Transportation ("DOT") has approved all three
agreements. Carriers who have signed the IIA, but not the MIA or the IPA, can
create their own implementation plan by filing their conditions of carriage with
the DOT.
34 As of June 30, 1999, 122 carriers signed the IIA and 90 carriers signed the
MIA. See Appendix B to this paper.
35 MDL 1237, CV 97/7023 HLH; CV97-8657 et al. (C.D. Cal. 1998).
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22 waiver to become effective. The court noted that there was
no indication that any foreign carrier signatory to the IATA
agreements took the position that its own country's tariff author-
ity had to approve the IATA agreements before the agreements
became effective.
In Berlin v. Delta Air Lines, Inc., 6 the court examined whether
the effective date of a carrier's waiver of Article 22 could be the
date the carrier signed an implementing agreement to the IATA
intercarrier accord, and therefore could be earlier than the date
of the DOT approval and announcement by the IATA Director
on February 14, 1999. Plaintiff sought discovery to show that
Delta's waiver of Article 22 occurred prior to September 26,
1996, the date of plaintiffs injury, and occurred almost four
months before IATA's announced effective date of the agree-
ments. The Delta tariff in effect on that date, however, included
the Montreal Agreement $75,000 limitation and a statement
that no employee of the carrier could waive a contract provision.
The court also took note of a press release stating that ATA and
IATA were filing documents with the DOT for approval of the
attached waiver. The plaintiff argued that Delta had nonethe-
less already waived Article 22, despite the lack of DOT approval.
The court permitted plaintiff leave to renew its application for
discovery. In the renewed application plaintiff would have to
show that, as a matter of law, Delta was legally permitted to waive
the Article 22 liability limitation without prior government ap-
proval and was permitted to waive a tariff provision in effect in
September 1996 in light of the "filed rate doctrine or its ana-
logues under present statutory and case law."37
It is noteworthy that Article 22 of the Warsaw Convention per-
mits a carrier to agree to higher liability amounts. Presumably,
the plaintiffs argument was that, assuming Delta had signed the
JATA agreements by September 26, 1996, Delta's waiver of Arti-
cle 22 occurred immediately upon signing the agreement, even
though the carrier had not yet obtained the required DOT gov-
ernment approval to withdraw from the Montreal Agreement.
If such is the case, the carrier would have waived Article 22 com-
pletely but still would be bound by the Montreal Agreement,
which completely waives the Article 20 "all necessary measures"
defense for all amounts of liability. The distinction to be made
maybe that while the carrier does not require U.S. governmental
36 No. 98 CIV. 6263, 1999 WL 269678 (S.D.N.Y. 1999).
37 Id. at *1.
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approval to waive the limited liability provisions of Article 22, it
does require governmental approval to withdraw from the Mon-
treal Agreement and file new tariffs that readopt the Article 20
defense.38 A different result occurred in Prince v. KLM-Royal
Dutch Airlines, 9 there the district court ruled that although the
carrier KLM had signed the IATA intercarrier agreement, and
the DOT had approved the agreements, prior to the accident,
the Article 22 waiver did not govern the case because KLM had
not filed new tariffs incorporating the terms of the IATA inter-
carrier agreements.4"
C. DEFINING AN INTERNATIONAL FLIGHT
Courts are frequently asked to determine what constitutes "in-
ternational transportation" under Article 1 of the Warsaw Con-
vention. Article 1 makes the Convention applicable to
international transportation and defines it as transportation in
which the departure and final destination occur in two states
that are signatories to the Convention or in which the departure
and final destination occur in a signatory state and there is an
intermediary stop in another state.
Courts have long concluded that a domestic leg of an interna-
tional flight is a part of the international transportation. Thus,
an accident occurring during a domestic flight that is part of the
international itinerary is governed by the Convention. In one
recent case, Haldimann v. Delta Airlines, Inc.,4 a plaintiff was in-
jured when an aircraft engine caught fire on the domestic por-
tion of an international flight. The plaintiff had separate tickets
in separate booklets for the domestic and international portions
of her trip. On the domestic portion of the trip, the plaintiff
had remained in the United States for more than one month.
Plaintiff had arranged the entire trip through a Swiss travel
agency, and her tickets for all legs of the trip were issued and
paid for on the same date and carried the same record number.
38 It appears that the DOT agrees that the filing of new tariffs is not required
to effectuate a waiver of Article 22. When the DOT issued its conditional ap-
proval of the IATA agreements on November 6, 1996, it stated that the agree-
ments were self-executing and that tariff filings were unnecessary to implement
the waiver of liability limitations. See Order Approving Agreements 96-11-6, 1996
WI_ 656334 (Dep't of Trans. Nov. 12, 1996). The primary effect of filing the
tariffs is to withdraw from the Montreal Agreement.
39 107 F. Supp. 2d 1365 (N.D. Ga. 2000).
40 Id. at 1371-74.
4 168 F.3d 1324 (D.C. Cir. 1999).
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The court held that the contract of transportation, considered
as a whole, was for international transportation.42 The Warsaw
Convention applied.
D. DETERMINING TREATY RELATIONSHIp BETWEEN ADHERENTS
Difficult questions arise when different versions of the Warsaw
Convention apply in the two countries that form the interna-
tional transportation and one of those countries has ratified
only the Hague Protocol, an amended version of the Conven-
tion, while the other has ratified only the original, unamended
Warsaw Convention. The question that arises is whether the two
countries are in a treaty relationship with each other. The Sec-
ond Circuit, in Chubb & Son, Inc. v. Asiana Airlines,43 has ruled
that the two countries are not in a treaty relationship. In Chubb
& Son, the United States had ratified the Warsaw Convention
but not the 1955 Hague Protocol. The other state involved in
this flight, the Republic of Korea, had ratified only the 1955
Hague Protocol. Plaintiff Chubb brought an action against
Asiana for loss of part of a shipment of computer chips shipped
from Seoul to San Francisco. Chubb argued that under the
1929 Warsaw Convention, the limitation of liability provision
could not apply because the air waybill did not contain the
"agreed stopping places." Article 3 of the unamended treaty
voids the limited liability provision if the air waybill fails to con-
tain certain requirements, among them the "agreed stopping
places." The airline responded by noting that the Hague Proto-
col amendments to the Warsaw Convention, adopted by the Re-
public of Korea, eliminate the requirement to state the "agreed
stopping places" on the air waybill. The defendant argued that
plaintiff was relying on a treaty provision which no longer consti-
tuted a part of the treaty agreement or relationship between the
two nations.
The district court had held that South Korea's adherence to
only the Hague Protocol had the effect of binding Korea to only
those portions of the 1929 Warsaw Convention that had not
been amended by the Hague Protocol and, of course, to the
1. at 1326.
4. 214 F.3d 301, 309 (2d Cir. 2000). The underlying events to this litigation
occurred before the Montreal Protocol No. 4 came into effect in the United
States in March 1999. The Montreal Protocol No. 4 has the effect of binding the
United States to the Hague Protocol as well.
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1955 amendments in the Hague Protocol.44 The court then
concluded that the treaty relations which existed between the
two countries consisted only of those portions of the Conven-
tion that were common to both countries, namely only those
portions unamended by the Hague Protocol. Thus, because the
provision in Article 8(c) of the original treaty regarding the air
waybill had been amended, Article 8(c) of the Warsaw Conven-
tion was therefore not a part of the treaty relations between the
two nations. In other words, the only portions of the Warsaw
Convention that were enforceable were those which had not
been amended by the Hague Protocol. The airline's failure to
include the "agreed stopping places" on the air waybill, there-
fore, did not prevent it from taking advantage of the Article 22
limitation of liability. In contrast, the district court held, the
limitation of liability provision of the Convention was only re-
worded in the Protocol and the same liability limitation was re-
tained. Consequently, this provision still constituted a part of
the agreement between Korea and the United States, entitling
the Carrier to take advantage of its protection.
Plaintiff Chubb pointed out that the court's holding had the
result of creating a fictional "third hybrid treaty" that neither
the United States nor Korea had ratified. The plaintiffs posi-
tion was supported by the Vienna Convention on the Law of
Treaties,45 which at Article 40(5) (b) provides that a state which
becomes a party to an amended treaty shall nonetheless be con-
sidered "a party to the unamended treaty in relation to any party
to the treaty not bound by the amending agreement." The Vi-
enna Convention could be interpreted as making the two states
parties to the entire unamended treaty, not merely the portions
of the unamended treaty not affected by a later protocol. The
Second Circuit reversed the district court, holding that there
was no treaty relationship at all between the United States and
Republic of Korea since the Republic of Korea had never ad-
hered to the original treaty, the only treaty the United States
had ratified.46 The Second Circuit rejected on several grounds
the district court's application of a hybrid treaty, one containing
only those portions of the Warsaw Convention unamended by
the Hague Protocol. It held that a hybrid treaty cannot apply
44 See Chubb & Son, Inc. v. Asiana Airlines, 96 Civ. 5082 (LAP), 1988 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 14767, at *17-*18 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 22, 1998).
45 U.N. Doc. A/CONF. 39/27 (1969), reprinted in 63 Am. J. INT'L L. 875, 888
(1969).
46 See Chubb & Son, 214 F.3d at 312.
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because no such treaty has been ratified by any country. Sec-
ondly, applying a hybrid treaty encroaches upon the treaty-mak-
ing powers of the political branches. In the United States, only
the President has the power, with the consent of the Senate, to
make a treaty binding on the United States. The courts can only
interpret, not make, treaties.
The Second Circuit also rejected the plaintiffs argument that
under Article 40(5) (b) of the Vienna Convention, in ratifying
the Hague Protocol, the Republic of Korea had also agreed to
be bound by the Warsaw Convention for carriage between itself
and a signatory of only the original Warsaw Convention. This
view is accepted by legal commentators on the Warsaw Conven-
tion. 47 Applying the treaty interpretation rules of the Vienna
Convention, which the Second Circuit found to be authoritative
customary law among nations, the court found Article 40(5) (b)
ambiguous as to what it means to "'become[ ] a party to the
treaty.' ''s The Second Circuit adopted the view that Article
40(5) (b) applies only to a state that adheres to the original
treaty after it has been amended by fewer than all signatories,
but does not apply to a state that adheres to an amended treaty
only. The court further noted that Article XXIII(2) of the
Hague Protocol provides that "[a]dherence to this Protocol by
any State which is not a Party to the Convention shall have the
effect of adherence to the Convention as amended by this Proto-
col." Thus, the court concluded that adherence to the Hague
Protocol does not implicitly mean adherence to the Warsaw
Convention. As a consequence, South Korea and the United
States are signatories to different Conventions and are not in
treaty relationship with each other; therefore, no version of the
Warsaw Convention governed the plaintiffs loss of cargo. More-
over, the case was remanded to the district court to determine
whether any other ground existed for federal jurisdiction.
The Chubb decision may be an important one for the Supreme
Court to resolve, especially given the Second Circuit's acknowl-
edgment that there is ambiguity in Article 40(5) (b) of the Vi-
enna Convention as to whether those states that become parties
to an amended treaty are in any treaty relationship with those
states that are signatories to only the unamended treaty. The
Second Circuit's result-finding no treaty relationship at all be-
47 See RENJ H. MANKIEWICZ, THE LIABILITY REGIME OF THE INTERNATIONAL AIR
CARRIER 2 (1981).
41 See Chubb & Son, 214 F.3d at 310.
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tween the United States and South Korea-may not be what the
framers of the Hague Protocol had in mind when they opened
up the Hague Protocol for signature in 1955, allowing states
which were not signatories to the 1929 Warsaw Convention to
join the-Warsaw system by adhering to the amended Hague Pro-
tocol version. It is likely that because of the uniformity on nu-
merous issues that the Warsaw system prescribes and its system
of limited liability, the signatory states assumed that there would
always be some treaty relationship between adherents to differ-
ent versions, with the version applicable between the states al-
ways being whichever version of the two preceded the other.
In Mingtai Fire & Marine Insurance Co. v. United Parcel Service,4"
the Ninth Circuit was asked to determine whether adherence to
the Warsaw Convention by China also binds Taiwan. In Mingtai,
a package shipped from Taiwan to San Jose, California was lost
en route by defendant United Parcel Service ("UPS"). Plaintiff
alleged that the package contained over $83,000.00 worth of
computer chips and sued under the Warsaw Convention for the
lost cargo. UPS argued that the Warsaw Convention did not ap-
ply to Taiwan and therefore its liability was limited to the
$100.00 released value provided by the air waybill.
The Ninth Circuit concluded that the Warsaw Convention ap-
plies only to shipments between signatory states, and Taiwan was
not a signatory to the Convention. The difficult question the
court had to resolve was what effect to give to the fact that the
United States established relations with China in 1979 and der-
ecognized Taiwan, and the fact that when China signed the War-
saw Convention, it declared that the Convention "'shall of
course apply to the entire Chinese territory including
Taiwan. "'50
The court found that these issues involved political questions.
It therefore deferred to the Executive Branch's position on the
effect that the derecognition of Taiwan had on international
agreements between this country and Taiwan.5'
The court reviewed a State Department publication "Treaties
in Force" and found that the State Department listed both
China and Taiwan separately as to treaties in force between each
of those countries and the United States. The court noted that
49 177 F.3d 1142 (9th Cir. 1999), cert. denied, 120 S.Ct. 374 (1999).
50 Id. at 1144 (quoting CHRISTOPHER N. SHAWCROSS AND KENNETH M. BEAU.
MONT, AIR LAW A17 (Peter Martin et al. eds., 4th ed. 1977) (1997 Supplement)).
51 Id. at 1146.
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even after the United States had severed diplomatic relations
with Taiwan in 1979, the Executive Branch directed that all ex-
isting international agreements between the United States and
Taiwan continue to remain in force.52 Finally, the court relied
heavily on the Executive Branch's position, stated in its amicus
brief and at oral argument, that China's status with the United
States did not affect Taiwan's own separate position with respect
to the Warsaw Convention. The court ruled that China's adher-
ence to the Convention did not bind Taiwan, and because Tai-
wan was not a Warsaw Convention signatory, the treaty did not
apply to the lost cargo. The damages were properly limited as
set out in the air waybill.53
E. T171E ARTICLE 17 CAUSE OF ACTION FOR PASSENGER
INJURY AND DEATH
1. Supreme Court Decides Exclusivity Issue
In 1999, the United States Supreme Court in El Al Israel Air-
lines, Ltd. v. Tseng"4 resolved a conflict among the courts on the
issue of whether the Warsaw Convention creates an exclusive
cause of action for events within its scope that preempts state
law causes of action. The Supreme Court held that the scope of
the Article 17 exclusive cause of action was for injuries or deaths
sustained during an international flight or in the course of em-
barking or disembarking from such flight. If any of the condi-
tions to Article 17 liability are not met, and Article 17 therefore
provides no recovery, the plaintiff cannot resort to local law for
a remedy.5 For example, if an injury takes place in the course
of a flight but does not qualify as an Article 17 "accident,'56 that
injured passenger cannot seek compensation under a state law
cause of action. Similarly, if the event causing the injury is an
accident within the meaning of Article 17, but the plaintiff can-
not prove the requisite Article 17 "bodily injury," the plaintiff
cannot recover under the treaty and may not seek damages
under an alternative state law theory of liability.
52 Id. at 1145.
53 1(. at 1146.
54 525 U.S. 155 (1999).
55 Id. at 160.
56 The term "accident" is not defined in the treaty. The Supreme Court has
broadly defined it as "an unexpected or unusual event or happening that is exter-
nal to the passenger." Air France v. Saks, 470 U.S. 392, 405 (1985). Tsengempha-
sized the need to apply this definition of "accident" flexibly. Tseng, 525 U.S. at
166 n.9.
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The Tseng case arose out of an intrusive search of a passenger
conducted by the carrier's employees before the passenger was
allowed to board a flight from New York City's Kennedy Airport
to Tel Aviv. As a result of the search, the passenger allegedly
suffered psychic and psychosomatic injuries. Because she failed
to allege any "bodily injury," she could not recover under Article
17 of the Convention, which requires proof of a bodily injury or
death. The Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit, however,
ruled that the incident was not an "accident" within the mean-
ing of Article 17 and therefore fell outside of the Convention,
even though the plaintiff was clearly in the course of embark-
ing.57 The appeals court allowed plaintiff to pursue a state law
claim. The Supreme Court reversed. Looking to the language
and drafting history of the Convention, the Court concluded
that for injuries sustained within the scope of Article 17-during
flight or during embarkation or disembarkation-the Conven-
tion provided the exclusive cause of action. Any failure to meet
the conditions of liability imposed by Article 17-lack of proof
of an accident or failure to allege bodily injury or death-barred
plaintiff's recovery.5H
The Court noted that allowing state law claims when plaintiff
could not prove an Article 17 "accident" or a "bodily injury"
would thwart a cardinal purpose of the Convention: to achieve
uniformity of liability rules governing claims arising from inter-
national air transportation. The court added that a ruling
would also compromise a complementary purpose of the Con-
vention-to accommodate or balance the interests of passengers
and the interest of the carriers. Allowing a passenger to pursue
a state law claim for incidents within the scope of Article 17
would upset this careful balance. The Supreme Court noted,
however, that the Convention's preemptive effect on local law
extends no further than the substantive scope of Article 17.
Therefore, a passenger injured before embarking or after dis-
embarking, when the terms of Article 17 do not operate, could
still maintain a state law claim. The Court also observed that the
Second Circuit had narrowly defined "accident," ruling that the
intrusive search of a passenger did not meet the Air France v.
Saks test of an unexpected or unusual event external to the pas-
senger. Because certiorari was not sought on that issue, the Su-
57 See Tseng v. El Al Israel Airlines Ltd., 122 F.3d 99, 104 (2d Cir. 1997), rev'd,
525 U.S. 155 (1999)
51 See Tseng, 525 U.S. at 161.
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preme Court did not rule on this holding, although it was
clearly critical of the Second Circuit's analysis of "accident."59
The Supreme Court reminded the lower courts that "accident"
must be defined flexibly.60 This is all the more critical now that
the Article 17 cause of action is deemed to be an exclusive cause
of action.
The impact of Tseng was discussed in Donkor v. British Airways
Corp.6 Plaintiff Donkor was a citizen of Ghana traveling on a
passport from Ghana. She had purchased a ticket from Ken-
nedy Airport in New York City to Charles DeGaulle Airport in
Paris. The ticket required a stop in the United Kingdom in or-
der to meet a connecting flight to France. The plaintiff alleged
that she was told by British Airways that she would not need a
transit visa in order to make the connecting flight.
A fellow passenger became ill during plaintiff's flight, and the
pilot made an unscheduled landing in Gander, Newfoundland,
before continuing the now very delayed flight to the United
Kingdom. Plaintiff missed her connecting flight. Upon arrival
in the U.K., plaintiff was detained by British Immigration and
later deported. Plaintiff filed suit in state court, characterizing
her claim as one "based in negligence, breach of contract, per-
sonal injury, wrongful detention, assault and loss of personal be-
longings. '6 2 British Airways removed the action to federal court,
alleging that it was governed by the Warsaw Convention and fur-
ther moved for summary judgment, arguing preemption of the
state law claims under the Airline Deregulation Act of 1978.63
The Donkor court recognized that the Supreme Court in
Tseng"4 had held that if a claim is covered by Article 17, the Con-
vention provides the exclusive remedy. The court concluded,
however, that defendant British Airways had not proven that the
claim was within the scope of Article 17.65 The court noted that
in the Second Circuit the factual determination of whether or
not a plaintiff's injury occurs during embarkation or disembar-
kation is determined under the three-part test set out in Day v.
Trans World Airlines.6 6 Defendant submitted no evidence that
Ml See Tseng, 525 U.S. at 166 & n.9.
ho Id. at n.9.
Oil 62 F. Supp. 2d 963 (E.D.N.Y. 1999).
62 Id. at 965.
65 The Airline Deregulation Act is discussed infra at Part VI.
64 El Al Israel Airlines, Ltd. v. Tseng, 526 U.S. 155 (1999).
65) See Donkor, 62 F. Supp. 2d at 969.
6 528 F.2d 31, 33 (2d Cir. 1975).
2000] DEVELOPMENTS IN AVIATION LIABILITY LAW 47
plaintiff was still under the physical custody and control of the
airline, as required under Day. Defendant, therefore, failed to
meet its burden to support removal on the basis of an exclusive
cause of action governed by the Warsaw Convention. The court
concluded that removal was improper and remanded the case to
the New York state court.
67
In Alleyn v. Port Authority ,68 the court applied the three-prong
test set forth in Day69 to determine if a passenger injured while
on an escalator in the terminal was still disembarking when the
accident occurred, so as to create a cause of action under the
Convention. The plaintiff had just deplaned and had not yet
reached the common terminal area. The plaintiff was still
under the control and direction of Delta employees. Given
these facts, the court held that Delta was liable under Article 17,
because the plaintiff was still disembarking.
In Moses v. Air Afrique, TM plaintiff alleged that he was accosted
by three Air Afrique ground crew when he attempted to retrieve
his luggage in the baggage claim area. The court held that
there was no Article 17 cause of action because "[a]t this point
in his travels, [plaintiff] cannot be said to have been under the
control or direction of Air Afrique.'
One very troublesome case to arise from Tseng is Brandt v.
American Airlines,72 in which the district court held that Tseng
also preempts a cause of action arising from federal anti-discrim-
ination statutes, in this case the Air Carrier Access Act
("ACAA"). 73 In other words, according to Brandt, carriers in-
volved in international transportation are exempt from compli-
ance with federal anti-discrimination laws. This result is highly
questionable. The federal anti-discrimination laws are federal
statutes, equal in stature under the Supremacy Clause to federal
treaty obligations. They are also of great public importance,
based as they are on fundamental notions of justice and consti-
tutional rights. Indeed, foreign carriers and domestic carriers
67 See Donkor, 62 F. Supp. 2d at 974.
68 58 F. Supp. 2d 15 (E.D.N.Y. 1999).
69 The Day court adopted a three-prong test to determine whether a specific
accident occurred during the course of embarking or disembarking. The Day
test examines where the plaintiff was when the accident occurred, what the plain-
tiff was doing, and under whose direction the plaintiff was acting. See Day, 528
F20 at 33..
70 No. 99-CV-541 (JG), 2000 WL 306853 (E.D.N.Y. 2000).
71 Id. at *7.
72 No. C 98-2089 SI, 2000 WL 288393, at *4 (N.D. Cal. 2000).
73 49 U.S.C. § 41705 et seq. (1994).
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are how both expressly prohibited from subjecting a person in
air transportation to discrimination on the basis of race, color,
national origin, religion, sex, or ancestry,"4 now that the Air Car-
rier Access Act was expressly extended to apply to foreign carri-
ers. It could not have been the intent of the Supreme Court in
Tseng to exempt all carriers involved in international air trans-
portation from liability under these statutes. Undoubtedly, this
important issue will be the subject of appellate review.
2. Accident Under Article 17
In the case of an assault by one passenger injuring another
passenger, an issue to be resolved is whether the assault which
caused the passenger's injury is an "accident" giving rise to lia-
bility under Article 17 of the Warsaw Convention. In Air France
v. Saks,75 the Supreme Court provided a flexible definition of
the term "accident" and concluded: "[L] iability under Article 17
of the Warsaw Convention arises only if a passenger's injury is
caused by an unexpected or unusual event or happening that is
external to the passenger. This definition should be flexibly ap-
plied after assessment of all the circumstances surrounding a
passenger's injuries." In El Al Israel Airlines, Ltd. v. Tseng, the
Supreme Court held that any injury sustained during flight or
the operations of embarkation or disembarkation is exclusively
governed by the Convention. Given the exclusive nature of the
Convention's cause of action, the Tseng court reminded lower
courts that the definition of "accident" in Air France v. Saks must
be applied flexibly.
In determining whether an assault-type injury has been
caused by an Article 17 "accident," some lower federal courts
have focused on whether the cause of the injury is "a characteris-
tic risk of air travel" or whether it bears a "relation to the opera-
tion of the aircraft." Using this qualification to the Air France v.
Saks definition of "accident," some courts find that absent some
air carrier complicity in the event leading to the assault/injury,
an assault of a passenger by another passenger is not an "acci-
dent" and, therefore, the air carrier is not liable under Article
17. However, where the acts or omissions by airline personnel
have facilitated or furthered the injuries of a passenger, these
74 See Wendell H. Ford Aviation Investment and Reform Act for the 21st Cen-
tury (AIR 21), Pub. L. No. 106-181, § 706, 114 Stat. 61, 157-58 (2000).
75 470 U.S. 392, 405 (1985).
M 525 U.S. 155, 161 (1999).
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courts have found liability under Article 17. These two ap-
proaches are exemplified in two recent cases.
The Court of Appeals for the First Circuit in Langadinos v.
American Airlines, Inc. 77 addressed the issue of whether a tort
committed by a fellow passenger qualifies as an "accident"
within the meaning of Article 17 of the Warsaw Convention.
The Court stated that not every tort committed by a fellow pas-
senger is a Warsaw Convention "accident" and that where airline
personnel play no causal role in the commission of the tort,
there is no "accident.
7
The case arose out of a flight on American Airlines from Bos-
ton to Paris. Plaintiff Gregory Langadinos alleged he was as-
saulted by another passenger who had been served an excessive
amount of alcohol. Plaintiff brought an action against Ameri-
can based upon state law and the Warsaw Convention, claiming
that prior to the assault, American served additional alcohol to
the offending passenger despite knowing that he was intoxi-
cated and that his behavior was "erratic" and "aggressive."
American moved to dismiss the action, arguing that the state law
claim was preempted by the Warsaw Convention and that a tort
committed by a fellow passenger is not an "accident" within the
meaning of Article 17 of the Warsaw Convention. The trial
court agreed and dismissed the action. Plaintiff appealed only
the dismissal of the claim based upon the Warsaw Convention.
The court of appeals recognized that the Supreme Court's
definition of "accident" in Air France v. Saks was broad enough to
permit recovery for torts committed by fellow passengers. How-
ever, the court of appeals stated the standard for liability under
Article 17 as follows:
Of course, not every tort committed by a fellow passenger is a
Warsaw Convention accident. Where the airline personnel play
no causal role in the commission of the tort, courts have found
no Warsaw accident. On the flip side, courts have found Warsaw
accidents where airline personnel play a causal role in a passen-
ger-on-passenger tort.
7 9
The court of appeals found that the plaintiffs claim survived
this standard. The court explained:
He has alleged that (1) [the offending passenger] appeared in-
toxicated, aggressive and erratic, (2) American was aware of this
77 199 F.3d 68 (1st Cir. 2000).
78 Id. at 71.
79 Id. at 70-71, (internal citations omitted).
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behavior and (3) despite this awareness, American continued to
serve him alcohol. Serving alcohol to an intoxicated passenger
may, in some instances, create a foreseeable risk that the passen-
ger will cause injury to others.8°
The court stated, however, that Langadinos could not prevail
simply by proving that American served the offending passenger
excessive alcohol. He would also have to establish that he suf-
fered a compensable injury and that American's service of alco-
hol to the assailant was a proximate cause of his injury.
Nevertheless, the appeals court reversed the decision of the trial
court because it was unable to determine, on the basis of the
facts presented, whether American should bear causal responsi-
bility for the alleged assault, noting that "[i] n this case, discovery
will be required before such an assessment can be made."'" Ac-
cordingly, the court of appeals found that Langadinos had
stated a valid claim under the Warsaw Convention and reversed
the decision of the trial court dismissing the case..
The plaintiffs' bar would argue that the First Circuit miscon-
strued the Article 17 "accident" requirement as interpreted in
Air France v. Saks. All that Saks requires is proof of an unex-
pected, unusual event external to the passenger, which this as-
sault surely was. Under Article 17, this is sufficient to engage the
Article 17 presumption of carrier liability. Under Article 20 of
the Convention, the burden then shifts to the carrier to show
that it took all necessary measures to avoid the accident or that
such measures were impossible to take. Whereas Article 20
clearly shifts the burden to the carrier to show its complete lack
of any causal role, Langadinos incorrectly places the burden on
the plaintiff to show some causal role on the part of the carrier.
The decision by the First Circuit in Langadinos addresses essen-
tially the same question that was before the Court of Appeals for
the Second Circuit in Wallace v. Korean Air,8 2 namely, whether a
sexual assault of a passenger by another passenger during the
course of international transportation by air is an "accident"
within the meaning of Article 17 of the Warsaw Convention.
Unlike Langadinos, in Wallace it was undisputed that no acts or
omissions of Korean Airlines caused or contributed to the as-
sault or injury.
8( Id. at 71.
81 Jd.
82 214 F.3d 293 (2d Cir. 2000).
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Wallace involved an action against Korean Air Lines by a pas-
senger arising out of a sexual assault by a fellow passenger. The
trial court dismissed the action, finding that the sexual assault
did not constitute an Article 17 "accident." The lower court
stated that the definition of "accident" should focus on whether
the cause of injury is "a risk characteristic of air travel," or
whether it bears a "relation to the carrier's operation of the air-
craft" as "injuries unrelated to the foreseeable risks of air travel
and unrelated to the operation of aircraft fall outside the scope
of Article 17. ' 83 In applying this test, the court found "that sex-
ual molestation such as that alleged by plaintiff is not a risk char-
acteristic of air travel or related to the operation of an
airplane. '8 4 Thus, the court held that Korean Air Lines should
not be held responsible for such actions because it was "not in a
special position to develop defensive measures or insure against
such incidents. "85
Plaintiff appealed the dismissal of the case to the Second Cir-
cuit, arguing that sexual molestation or assault by another pas-
senger is an "unexpected or unusual event or happening that is
external to the passenger" and as such falls within the Saks defi-
nition of "accident." Plaintiff further argued that because the
flight was governed by the 1966 Montreal Agreement, under
which the carrier waived the Article 20 defense that it had taken
all necessary measures to prevent the harm or the measures
were impossible to take, the carrier should have been held
strictly liable for $75,000.86 Plaintiff pointed out that the con-
cern of the district court, that accepting the Saks definition with-
out any qualifications would make carriers strictly liable for
assaults that were unforeseeable and unpreventable, was mis-
placed. Korean Airlines was strictly liable in Wallace only be-
cause the carrier voluntarily waived its Article 20 necessary
measures defense. Had Article 20 not been waived, the carrier
would have been able to defend against the presumption of car-
rier liability for an Article 17 "accident" by establishing either
that all reasonable measures had been taken to avoid one pas-




86 In pre-IATA Intercarrier Agreement cases, to recover amounts exceeding
$75,000, the plaintiff would have to establish the carrier's "willful misconduct"
under Warsaw Convention Article 25. See Warsaw Convention, supra note 17, 49
Stat. at 3020, at art 25.
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senger from assaulting another or that the measures were im-
possible to take.
The Second Circuit in Wallace reversed the district court, but
its opinion avoided answering whether Saks only requires proof
of an unexpected, unusual event external to the passenger or
also requires proof of a risk characteristic to aviation. The
Court ducked the issue by holding that sexual assaults are a risk
characteristic of air travel, which says little for the morality and
civility of our society.87 Judge Pooler's concurrence, however,
addresses the issue directly. She concluded that Saks does not
require proof of a risk characteristic to air travel."8
Whether an in-flight medical emergency constitutes an Article
17 accident is also debated. Industry standards require an air-
line to make an unscheduled landing in the case of an in-flight
medical emergency requiring immediate hospital care, and fail-
ure to do so may result in liability. Nonetheless, in McDowell v.
Continental Airlines, Inc.,"9 the court reluctantly concluded that
the crew's failure to make an unscheduled landing was not an
"accident" under Article 17 and was therefore not actionable
under the Convention. Furthermore, because the medical
emergency occurred in-flight, the court also held that under El
Al Israel Airlines, Ltd. v. Tseng"° any state law claim was pre-
empted.9 ' In McDowell, a passenger suffered a heart attack and a
nurse and cardiovascular surgeon who were on board attempted
to treat the passenger. The surgeon found that the aircraft's
medical kit was inadequate to treat the patient and advised the
flight attendant that it was very important to get the patient on
the ground and to a hospital as soon as possible. The pilot did
not make the unscheduled stop and continued on to the sched-
uled destination, Nassau.
In concluding that there was no Article 17 "accident," McDow-
ell relied on the Eleventh Circuit case Krys v. Lufthansa German
Airlines. 92 Kiys found that a failure to make an unscheduled
landing for a medical emergency is not an Article 17 "accident,"
because the plaintiffs injury was caused by the plaintiffs own
internal reaction to the usual, normal, and expected operation
87 See Wallace, 214 F.3d at 299-300.
1( M. at 300-01 (Pooler, j., concurring).
R" 54 F. Supp. 2d 1313, 1320 (S.D. Fla. 1999).
90 525 U.S. 155 (1999).
91 McDowell, 54 F. Supp. 2d at 1321.
92 119 F.3d 1515 (11th Cir. 1997), cert. denied, 522 U.S. 1111 (1998).
2000] DEVELOPMENTS IN AVIATION LIABILITY LAW 53
of the aircraft."3 McDowell was bound by the Eleventh Circuit's
ruling in Kys. The Krys opinion can nonetheless be criticized
for its failure to consider that the unexpected, unusual event
external to the passenger, which satisfies the definition of acci-
dent under Air France v. Saks,"4 is the flight crew's breach of its
duty to land the plane to get the sick passenger to a hospital.
Under generally accepted tort principles, a carrier having cus-
tody of passengers does have a special duty to render assistance
because the passenger is deprived of normal opportunities to
seek help. ' 5
McDowell noted that Krys had softened the impact of its inter-
pretation of "accident" by ruling that the plaintiff was able to
recover under state law. The McDowell court acknowledged that
Tseng overrules Krys on this issue.96 McDowell was open in its crit-
icism of the Krys decision and Krys's construction of "accident:"
An airline crew who attempts to aid a passenger and does some-
thing that would fall under the current definition of "accident"
opens the airline up to liability. However, if the crew completely
ignores the passenger and continues the flight as if nothing had
happened, the airline is completely immune from any liability. "7
The court went on to criticize this result as a "dissolution of
an airline's duty of care to its passengers" and suggested that
this could not have been the Senate's intention in ratifying the
Warsaw Convention.9" Feeling bound by precedent, the court
reluctantly granted the carrier's summary judgment motion.
McDowell did not consider that in Tseng the Supreme Court
criticized the appellate court in that case for its narrow construc-
tion of "accident" and emphasized that the definition of "acci-
dent" in Saks should be applied flexibly. Tseng, therefore,
creates an opening for reexamination of prior cases that applied
a narrow construction of accident, perhaps in order to allow
state law to provide a remedy.
193 See id. at 1521.
,I 470 U.S. 392, 405 (1985).
95 See Restatement (Second) of Torts §§ 314, 314A (1964). Section 314A states
that "a common carrier is under a duty to its passengers to take reasonable action
(a) to protect them against unreasonable risk of physical harm, and (b) to give
them first aid if it knows or has reason to know that they are ill or injured, and to
care for them until they can be cared for by others."
96 McDowell, supra note 87, 54 F. Supp. 2d at 1320.
97 Id.
98 Id.
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In Rajcooar v. Air India Ltd.,' '9 the district court held that fail-
ure to render adequate medical care to a passenger suffering a
heart attack during boarding was not an Article 17 "accident"
because it was not an unexpected or unusual event external to
the passenger. Plaintiffs would argue that the court failed to see
that the heart attack is not the accident; rather, the accident-
the unexpected, unusual event external to the passenger-is the
failure of the carrier to respond adequately to the distress of a
passenger under its control.
An issue discussed in Grimes v. Northwest Airlines, Inc."' was
whether an altercation between a passenger and a Northwest
employee resulting in the passenger's arrest constituted an "ac-
cident" under Article 17. The court, applying the Saks defini-
tion of "accident," held that an Article 17 "accident" had not
occurred because the passenger's own behavior caused the ar-
rest, including his refusal to leave the airplane without a police
escort. "I'
The two issues of what constitutes an Article 17 "accident" and
the exclusivity of the Warsaw Convention cause of action under
Tseng were addressed in Asher v. United Airlines.112 In Asher, a
husband who was traveling with his wife and a business associate
bought two business class tickets for travel from Washington
Dulles Airport to Milan, Italy. Because his wife suffered from
advanced rheumatoid arthritis, the husband gave his wife his
business class seat. The husband's business associate was up-
graded to first class and the wife invited her husband, who had
been sitting in her coach seat, to join her in the now-vacated
business class seat next to her. The husband and wife sat in bus-
iness class for most of the flight.
About two hours from landing, a flight attendant noticed a
discrepancy in the seating chart and awoke the wife, demanding
in an allegedly aggressive manner that she return to coach.
Upon arrival in Milan, Italy, a United Airlines representative
stopped the plaintiffs, collected their tickets and passports and
instructed them they could not leave the airport until they paid
$2,000, the difference in the price of a coach and business class
fare. The United Airlines representative threatened to call the
99 89 F. Supp. 2d 324, 328 (E.D.N.Y. 2000).
100 No. CTV. A. 98-CV-4794, 1999 WL 562244 (E.D. Pa. 1999).
101 Id. at *3.
102 70 F. Supp. 2d 614 (D. Md. 1999).
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police if plaintiffs did not pay. The plaintiffs paid the $2,000
fare increase and later filed suit.
The parties agreed that the Warsaw Convention applied. The
first issue was whether or not there was an Article 17 "accident."
The court noted the plaintiff had failed even to allege that the
events complained of constituted an accident as defined in
Saks. 10 3 Moreover, the plaintiff conceded that all her injuries
were nonphysical. Because the events occurred in-flight, how-
ever, Tseng precluded any recovery under state law.'" 4
Plaintiffs alternatively argued that United Airlines committed
willful misconduct under Article 25(1) and that this willful mis-
conduct created an independent ground for recovery outside
the Convention. The court rejected this interpretation, because
Article 25 "merely lifts the monetary limitation liabilities of Arti-
cle 22" and does not create a separate cause of action.1" 5
By contrast, in Carey v. United Airlines, Inc.,106 the District
Court of Oregon concluded that Tseng required a flexible appli-
cation of the definition of "accident." The court held that an
Article 17 "accident" did occur when the flight attendant had a
heated argument with the plaintiff, threatened to have him ar-
rested, prevented him from changing seats with his children, in-
terfered with his ability to attend to his children's ear aches, and
humiliated him, causing him to sustain emotional distress.1 17
However, because the plaintiff alleged no physical injury, his
claim for damages were dismissed under authority of Eastern Air-
lines, Inc. v. Floyd,' which requires proof of physical injury. Re-
gardless of whether the flight attendant's conduct amounted to
willful misconduct, the failure to allege physical injury was a bar
to the suit.109
In Toteja v. British Airways,110 the plaintiffs claimed that they
sustained swelling in their legs due to the inadequate amount of
leg room in the economy class seating. The court dismissed
plaintiffs' claims, holding that there was no Article 17 accident.
103 Id. at 617.
104 Id.
105 Id. at 619-20.
106 77 F. Supp. 2d 1165 (D. Or. 1999).
107 Id. at 1170-71.
108 499 U.S. 530 (1991). See infra Part III.E.3.
10 See id. at 1175-76.
1"0 Civil No. JFM-99-815, 1999 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 17374 (D. Md. 1999).
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3. Article 17 Requirement of Death or Bodily Injury
Litigants have long debated whether or not a plaintiff may
recover under the Warsaw Convention for purely emotional in-
juries. In 1991, the Supreme Court held in Eastern Airlines, Inc.
v. Floyd' that the Article 17 language "bodily injury" required
proof of some physical injury and excluded recovery in a case
where the passenger sustained a purely psychic injury. The
Court held that there could be no recovery without a physical
injury or physical manifestation of injury, but left open the ques-
tion of whether there could be recovery for psychic injuries that
accompany a physical injury. 1 2 The Floyd decision provoked a
series of difficult questions. What is a physical manifestation of
injury? Does it include psychosomatic injuries, that is, somatic
symptoms caused by a psychological stressor? Does Article 17
allow recovery for a psychological injury that accompanies a
physical injury but results from the terror experienced during
the accident and does not flow from the physical injury? Or,
does Article 17 allow recovery for only that mental suffering that
results directly from the prerequisite physical injury? Floyd did
not resolve these questions, and the lower courts continue to be
in conflict.
In Grimes v. Northwest Airlines, Inc. 1 ' a wife alleged that she
sustained emotional injuries after her husband was injured dur-
ing an altercation over seating with a member of the flight crew
and was later arrested. The district court held that the plaintiff
could not recover for her injuries, because an Article 17 "acci-
dent" had not occurred, and because the Warsaw Convention
does not permit recovery for "purely mental or emotional inju-
ries."" 14 In Grimes the plaintiff did not allege any physical inju-
ries. Had the court found an Article 17 "accident" causing
bodily injury to the husband-passenger, the question the court
would have faced was whether the wife could recover for her
emotional distress, given the proof of an Article 17 injury to a
passenger.
Article 17 does not limit who may recover damages in the
event of injury or death to a passenger. Article 24 leaves that
111 499 U.S. 530, 552 (1991).
112 Id. at 552. In Langadinos v. Am. Airlines, Inc., 199 F.3d 68 (1st Cir. 2000),
the court expressed no view whether the plaintiff in that case-who was assaulted
by an intoxicated passenger who forcefully grabbed his testicles-could also re-
cover for his emotional distress. The court left the question to another day.
No. C1V. A. 98-CV-4794, 1999 WL 562244 (E.D. Pa. 1999).
Id. at *2.
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question to forum law determination.' 15 In Diaz Lugo v. Ameri-
can Airlines,"6 the court held that a husband was entitled to re-
cover damages for his emotional injuries and loss of consortium
resulting from injuries his wife sustained when coffee was spilled
on her lap. The husband and wife were traveling together.
In Alvarez v. American Airlines, Inc.,' 17 the plaintiff sued the car-
rier for injuries suffered during an emergency evacuation of an
international flight, claiming both physical and psychological in-
juries. Defendant moved for summary judgment dismissing all
psychologically-based injuries. The court acknowledged that the
plaintiff suffered physical injuries to a knee during the evacua-
tion and ruled that plaintiff was entitled under Article 17 to seek
recovery for these injuries. 1"' Additionally, the plaintiff was di-
agnosed as suffering from post-traumatic stress disorder
("PTSD"). The court acknowledged that PTSD included physi-
cal aspects (elevated heart rate, profuse sweating, and anxiety
attacks, for example) but ruled that under Floyd a direct causal
relationship must exist between the physical injury-in this case
the injured knee-and the PTSD, including the physical aspects
of plaintiff's PTSD. " 9 Because the plaintiffs PTSD resulted from
his reaction to the terror of the accident, and not from his knee
injury, the court held that plaintiff could not recover damages
for PTSD, even though PTSD includes physical injuries.1 21 Par-
tial summary judgment was awarded.
The court rejected plaintiff's argument that Article 17 only
requires a physical injury or death as a condition to liability, and
that once that condition is met, Article 17 allows recovery for all
damage sustained in the accident, whether physical or psycho-
logical, if allowed under the applicable domestic law. Under
plaintiff's view, the nexus required is between the psychological
injury and the accident, not between the physical injury and the
psychological injury.
115 See Zicherman v. Korean Air Lines, Co., 516 U.S. 217, 228 (1996) (stating
that Article 24 and Article 17 are pass-throughs to local law on the questions of
who may sue and for which damages).
116 686 F. Supp. 373, 376 (D. P.R. 1988).
117 No. 98 Civ. 1027 (MBM), 1999 WL 691922 (S.D.N.Y. 1999), reargument de-
nied, No. 98 Civ. 1027 (MBM), 2000 WL 145746 (S.D.N.Y. 2000).
118 Id. at *4-*5.
119 Id. at *5.
120 See Alvarez v. Am. Airlines, Inc., No. 98 Civ. 1027 (MBM), 2000 WL 145746,
at *3 (S.D.N.Y. 2000).
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By contrast, in Weaver v. Delta Airlines, Inc.,12 1 the court ruled
that the plaintiffs evidence, that PTSD is an injury to the brain
that affects the nervous system, was sufficient to create a triable
issue of fact that PTSD is a physical injury. The defendant's mo-
tion for summary judgment dismissal under Floyd was therefore
denied. The court acknowledged that the plaintiffs PTSD in-
jury allegedly resulting from an emergency landing manifested
itself in ways "that are similar to the 'injuries' previously found
not compensable" by other courts applying Floyd 122 but con-
cluded that the precise question was a medical one, not a legal
one. The court also acknowledged that its holding may result in
"more valid actions under the Warsaw Convention ... attributa-
ble only to the increased sophistication of medical science. 123
In Carey v. United Airlines, Inc., ' 4 the District Court of Oregon,
after concluding that a flight attendant's humiliating treatment
of the plaintiff was an accident under Article 17, dismissed plain-
tiff's claim for emotional distress on the ground that plaintiff
admittedly sustained no physical injury. Relying on Terrafranca
v. Virgin Atlantic Airways125 and Alvarez, the court based its dis-
missal on the grounds that physical manifestations of injury,
such as nausea, cramps, sleeplessness and nervousness, are insuf-
ficient to satisfy Floyd.12 1
F. RECOVERY OF DAMAGES AND APPORTIONMENT OF LIABILITY
UNDER ARTICLE 17
In 1996, the Supreme Court in Zicherman v. Korean Air Lines
Co. 1 7 held that Article 17 of the Warsaw Convention, making
the carrier liable for "damage sustained" in the event of an acci-
dent, did not dictate what damages are recoverable. Instead,
held the Court held, Article 17, in combination with Article 24,
was a mere "pass-through" to domestic damages law selected
under the forum's choice of law rules. In Cortes v. American Air-
12, 56 F. Supp. 2d 1190 (D. Mont. 1999).
122 1(. at 1192; see, e.g., Terrafranca v. Virgin Atlantic Airways Ltd., 151 F.3d 108
(3d Cir. 1998) (holding that plaintiff's post-traumatic symptoms of insomnia,
weight loss, and anorexia were not physical injury but rather only physical mani-
festation of injury, which must be caused by an Article 17 physical injury to be
compensable under Floyd).
123 Weaver, 56 F Sup/p. 2d at 1192.
124 77 F. Supp. 2d 1165 (D. Or. 1999).
125 151 F.3d 108 (3d Cir. 1998).
126 No. 98 Civ. 1027 (MBM), 1999 WL 691922 (S.D.N.Y. 1999).
127 516 U.S. 217 (1996).
20001 DEVELOPMENTS IN AVIATION LIABILITY LAW 59
lines, Inc.' 28 a Warsaw Convention case arising out of the Decem-
ber 20, 1995 crash of an American Airlines flight near Cali,
Colombia, the Eleventh Circuit applied the conflict of law rules
of Florida, the jurisdiction in which the district court sat. The
Eleventh Circuit ruled that under Florida's adoption of the Re-
statement (Second) Conflict of Laws test, the district court did
not err in applying Florida damages law to a case involving a
Colombian decedent and Colombian beneficiaries.' 29 The deci-
sion is noteworthy first of all because it applies state choice of
law rules, rather than federal choice of law rules.130 It is further
noteworthy because the appellate court did not apply Colom-
bian law, even though the accident occurred in Colombia and
the decedent was a Colombian domiciliary. The court found
that Colombian law was difficult to interpret and apply. The
court concluded that, on the other hand, Florida damages law
could apply based on the facts that the flight departed from
Florida, Florida is the American Airlines hub for Latin America,
the pilots were domiciliaries of Florida, and interstate interests
would not be impaired by that choice.'
Additionally, the Eleventh Circuit in Cortes considered
whether the "pass-through" to state law on the issue of damages
mandated by the Court in Zicherman also required the court to
apply Florida's apportionment of liability laws. The Florida ap-
portionment statute provides that defendants are jointly and sev-
erally liable for pecuniary losses, but liable for nonpecuniary
losses only in accordance with their proportionate share of lia-
bility. The court ruled that the apportionment statute was in-
consistent with Article 17 of the treaty, which makes the carrier
jointly and severally liable for "damage sustained."'1 2 State law
that is inconsistent with treaty provisions is preempted by the
treaty. Thus, the court refused to apply the apportionment stat-
ute. The court held, however, that the carrier could pursue a
contribution cause of action against other potential tortfeasors
independent of the Warsaw Convention even if the carrier were
128 177 F.3d 1272 (11th Cir. 1999).
129 Id. at 1303.
130 Other courts have also applied state choice of law rules. See, e.g., Pescatore
v. Pan Am. World Airways, Inc., 97 F.3d 1 (2d Cir. 1996). But some courts have
held that a federal choice of law rule should apply to Warsaw Convention cases,
in recognition of the fact that it is a right of action created by a federal treaty. See,
e.g., Bickel v. Korean Air Lines Co., 83 F.3d 127 (6th Cir. 1996), vac. on other
grounds, 96 F.3d 151 (6th Cir. 1996), cert. denied, 519 U.S. 1093 (1997).
13' See Cortes, 177 F.3d at 1302-03, 1306.
132 Id. at 1304-05.
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to be found liable for willful misconduct under Article 25. Will-
ful misconduct, held the court, did not bar a contribution
action.
By contrast, in In Re Air Crash at Little Rock, Arkansas, on June 1,
1999,': the district court of Arkansas held that a Warsaw Con-
vention carrier that has become a signatory to the IATA intercar-
rier agreements,' 4 which makes the carrier liable for full
compensatory damages without regard to the convention's will-
ful misconduct requirement under Article 25, is liable to the
passenger in contract, not tort, and is therefore not a joint
tortfeasor under Arkansas law.'1 5 According to the court, be-
cause the carrier was liable solely on the basis of the JATA con-
tractual agreement, it could not seek contribution from third
parties since contribution is limited to joint tortfeasors."'
G. ARTICLE 20 ALL NECESSARY MEASURES DEFENSE
Article 20 allows the carrier to exonerate itself from liability if
it can prove that it took all necessary measures to avoid the dam-
age, excepting those that were impossible to take. In Obuzor v.
Sabena Belgian World Airlines, 7 the question was whether the car-
rier was liable for passengers' delay damages when the carrier's
failure to make a connecting flight in Brussels caused the pas-
sengers' five-day delay in reaching their final destination of La-
gos. Following established case law,'3 8 the court interpreted "all
necessary measures" to mean "all reasonable measures" and
held that it would not have been reasonable to delay the depar-
ture of the Brussels to Lagos flight, since this would have caused
delay to other passengers who had already reached Brussels on
time. Plaintiffs were unable to suggest any alternative that
would not, in turn, have caused damage to other passengers.
H. ARTICLE 25 UNLIMITED COMPENSATORY LIABILITY FOR
CARRIER'S WILLFUL MISCONDUCT
In the wake of the 1996 IATA Intercarrier Agreements waiving
Article 22 and the hopeful ratification of the 1999 Montreal
Convention, the need to prove the carrier's willful misconduct
133 109 F. Supp. 2d 1022 (E.D. Ark. 2000).
134 See discussion supra at Part Ill. B.
13 Little Rock, 109 F. Supp.2d at 1025.
136 Id.
137 No. 98 CIV 0224 (JSM), 1999 WL 223162 (S.D.N.Y. 1999).
138 See Manufacturers Hanover Trust Co. v. Alitalia Airlines, 429 F. Supp. 964
(S.D.N.Y. 1977).
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to receive full compensation under applicable damages law is on
the eve of extinction. Article 25 is still currently relevant, how-
ever, because the 1996 IATA Intercarrier Agreements have not
been interpreted as retroactive. Article 25 is still relevant to pas-
senger cases involving accidents occurring prior to the effective
date of the carrier's adoption of the 1996 IATA Intercarrier
Agreements. Also, not all carriers have signed the IATA agree-
ments or otherwise acted to waive Article 22. Finally, Article 25
is still relevant in cargo cases.
One litigation in which the accident pre-dates the IATA agree-
ments involves the American Airlines crash in Cali, Colombia on
December 20, 1995. The District Court for the Southern Dis-
trict of Florida ruled that plaintiffs had met their burden of
proving as a matter of law that the flight crew of Flight 965 had
committed willful misconduct in knowingly descending into
dangerous mountainous terrain from an off-course position.' 9
The district court applied the Eleventh Circuit's definition of
willful misconduct in accordance with domestic law concepts as
set forth in Butler v. Aeromexico.140 Butler had defined willful mis-
conduct as either "the intentional performance of an act with
knowledge" that harm would probably result or an act commit-
ted in reckless disregard of the probable consequences or a de-
liberate violation of a duty.141 The plaintiffs had moved for
summary judgment relying on the definition of willful miscon-
duct as acting in reckless disregard of the consequences, which
plaintiffs argued could be proved according to an objective, rea-
sonable person standard by showing that the pilots knew or
should have known that they were acting in a manner that
would probably lead to injury. Defendant American Airlines,
however, argued that the reckless disregard test for willful mis-
conduct required proof of subjective or actual knowledge by the
pilots that their acts would probably lead to harm. The district
court ruled that while reckless disregard appears to be an objec-
tive standard, the plaintiffs had nonetheless met their burden of
proving both subjective and objective reckless disregard. 4 ' The
defendant appealed to the Eleventh Circuit, arguing that reck-
l.9 See In reAir Crash Near Cali, Colombia, 985 F. Supp. 1106 (S.D. Fla. 1997),
rev'd in relevant part, affd in part, sub nora. Cortes v. Am. Airlines, 177 F.3d 1272
(11th Cir. 1999), cert. denied, 120 S. Ct. 980 (2000).
11 714 F.2d 429 (11th Cir. 1985).
141 Id. at 430 (quoting Koninklijke Luchtvaart Maatschappij N.V. v. TuIller, 292
F.2d 775, 778-79 (D.C. Cir. 1961)).
142 See In reAir Crash Near Cali, Colombia, 985 F. Supp. at 1129, 1138.
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less disregard, as a test for willful misconduct under Article 25,
required proof of the pilots' subjective knowledge of the proba-
ble risk of harm.
The Eleventh Circuit appeal had been argued but was still
pending when the Senate in November 1998 ratified Montreal
Protocol No. 4 ("MP4"), which amends Article 25 by replacing
the willful misconduct standard with the language "intentionally
or recklessly with knowledge that damage would probably re-
sult."' 4 The Eleventh Circuit concluded that Article 25 of MP4
was a clarification amendment to the original treaty and re-
quired proof of the crew's subjective knowledge of probability of
harm.144 The court held that MP4 clarified that this subjective
test was always intended by the treaty's original drafters. As ap-
plied to the facts of American Airlines' crash into mountainous
terrain in Cali, Colombia, the court held that Article 25 of the
treaty could only be satisfied if the circumstances permit an in-
ference that in knowingly descending, the flight crew must also
have known that the aircraft was significantly off course. Al-
though it was clear that the pilots actually knew they were some-
what off-course, and should have known that they were wildly
off-course, the court nonetheless ruled that the evidence did not
support the conclusion "that the only reasonable inference was
that the pilots knew that they were significantly off course. ' 45
While noting that such a conclusion would certainly be sup-
ported by the evidence, the court ruled that it was error for the
district court to have reached that conclusion as a matter of
law. 1 4 6
According to the plaintiffs, the history of the Warsaw Conven-
tion negotiations demonstrates that the drafters did not intend
that plaintiffs had to prove willful misconduct according to a
subjective test for knowledge of probability of harm. Moreover,
the weight of precedent in foreign courts is that Article 25 of the
treaty can be satisfied by proof of very gross negligence or objec-
tive recklessness. Plaintiffs also pointed out that the Second Cir-
143 Montreal Protocol No. 4 To Amend The Convention For The Unification
of Certain Rules Relating to International Carriage by Air Signal at Warsaw on
October 12, 1929. As amended by the Protocol done at the Hague on September
28, 1955, Signed at Montreal on September 25, 1975, T. Doc. No. 95 2 (B).
144 Cortes v. Am. Airlines, Inc., 177 F.3d 1272, 1291 (11th Cir. 1999), cert. de-
nied, 120 S. Ct. 980 (2000).
145 Id. at 1293.
146 Id. The Eleventh Circuit also held that a carrier's willful misconduct under
Article 25 does not bar a claim for contribution by the carrier against other
tortfeasors. Id.
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cuit has applied an objective test for recklessness,147 the
standard normally applied in tort law and consistent with the
interpretation of Article 25 by the Executive Branch. 41
To some courts, the issue of how to interpret Article 25 turns
on a choice of law analysis, especially on the issue of the carrier's
vicarious liability under Article 25(2) for the wrongful acts of its
servants. Prior to Zicherman v. Korean Air Lines Co.,1 49 courts in
the United States did not look beyond the Warsaw Convention
itself and national law in interpreting Article 25. After
Zicherman, the Second Circuit ruled that the forum court should
apply its choice of law rules and select the applicable domestic
law to answer the Article 25(2) question of the vicarious liability
of the carrier for the illegal acts of employees. 151
The Ninth Circuit addressed this issue in Insurance Co. of North
America v. Federal Express Corp.' 5 The court was asked to deter-
mine whether Federal Express could be liable under Article 25
for the employee theft of a large shipment of computer chips
shipped by Federal Express from Canada to California. The
court examined what law to apply to determine both the Arti-
cle 25(2) question of vicarious liability and the Article 25(1)
question of the carrier's willful misconduct "in accordance with
the law of the court to which the case is submitted."'' 52
To determine which jurisdiction's law applies to these ques-
tions, the court relied on the rule in diversity cases that a federal
court must apply the substantive law of the forum in which it
sits, including the forum's choice of law rules. The court be-
lieved that the Zicherman decision mandated that state choice of
law rules apply, even though the litigation involved a federal
treaty. The court noted that Zicherman "admonished lower
courts to refrain from developing federal common law 'under
cover' of advancing the goal of uniformity in Warsaw Conven-
tion cases." 153
147 See, e.g., Tug Ocean Prince, Inc. v. United States, 584 F.2d 1151, 1164 (2d
Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 440 U.S. 959 (1978).
148 See S. Rpt. No. 105-20, at 52-53 (1998).
149 516 U.S. 217 (1996).
150 See, e.g., Brink's Ltd. v. South African Airways, 93 F.3d 1022 (2d Cir. 1996),
cert. denied, 519 U.S. 1116 (1997).
151 189 F.3d 914 (9th Cir. 1999).
152 Id. at 919.
153 Id. at 920. It is submitted that the Zicherman case, however, involved the
question of damages, which is not governed by the treaty at all. The drafting
minutes demonstrate that the drafters intentionally failed to cover this issue, leav-
ing the matter of damages wholly to national law. By contrast, Article 25 is a key
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The court then applied California's governmental interest test
to determine if California state law or Canadian law should ap-
ply. The court noted that no true conflict existed between Ca-
nadian and California law. Because of California's strong
interests in having its laws applied, the court applied California
tort law to hold that Federal Express was not liable for its em-
ployee's theft, which served only the employee's personal
interests.
Similarly, in Asher v. United Airlines,'54 the District Court of Ma-
ryland held that Maryland state law should apply to determine
what constitutes willful misconduct under Article 25(1). The
court applied Maryland law, even though Maryland applies lex
loci delicti and the conduct occurred over the Atlantic Ocean and
in Europe, not in Maryland. Applying Maryland law, the court
held that the airline did not commit willful misconduct when its
employees insisted that the plaintiffs, a husband and wife travel-
ing together, pay for business class passage and threatened
plaintiffs with arrest and confiscating their passports after the
wife moved to business class and enjoyed the amenities without
purchasing a business-class ticket. Under Maryland law willful
misconduct requires proof that the defendant's acts were "per-
formed with the actor's actual knowledge or with what the law
deems the equivalent to actual knowledge of the peril to be ap-
prehended, coupled with a conscious failure to avert injury. '
The court likened it to gross negligence.' 56 The court held that
there was no willful misconduct, because it was the plaintiffs
own improper actions in taking an unpaid-for business class seat
which resulted in any injury she suffered.' 57
In Hermano v. United Airlines, 58 the court held that plaintiff
failed to present a genuine issue of material fact regarding the
airline's willful misconduct. The plaintiff alleged that the car-
provision of the treaty and does expressly govern the issue of the carrier's liability
for full damages in cases of willful misconduct. The drafters could not have in-
tended the lack of uniformity as to Article 25 that the Ninth Circuit's decision
permits.
154 70 F. Supp. 2d 614 (D. Md. 1999).
155 hi. at 619 (quoting Wells v. Polland, 708 A.2d 34, 44 (Md. Ct. Spec. App.
1998)).
156 Id. at 619.
157 I. It is submitted that the court overlooked the fact that while the airline
may have been entitled to ask for the payment of the difference in price between
coach and business class, that right did not immunize the airline from liability for
the manner in which it sought the payment.
158 No. C 99-0105 SI, 1999 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 19808 (N.D. Cal. 1999).
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rier intentionally misrepresented that the plaintiff had a gun in
his baggage, causing him to miss his flight. In contrast, the
court concluded that the carrier's employees' belief that the
plaintiff did have a gun in his baggage was sincere; therefore,
there was therefore no showing of willful misconduct." 9
I. ARTICLE 28(1)
1. Third-Party Claims for Indemnification or Contribution
Few cases have considered whether the Warsaw Convention's
jurisdictional provisions of Article 28, which determine where a
suit under the treaty may be brought, apply to a third-party ac-
tion against an airline for indemnification or contribution when
the underlying action arises out of an international aviation acci-
dent involving death of a passenger. In a case arising out of the
1997 crash in Guam of an international Korean Air Lines (KAL)
flight,6 ° a federal court in the Central District of California
ruled that the venue and jurisdiction provisions of Article 28 did
not apply to a third-party action by the United States govern-
ment and Serco (the air traffic controller contractor) against
the carrier for indemnity or contribution. The court held that
the third-party suit against the carrier could be maintained in
the United States, even though some of the plaintiffs suing the
United States and Serco could not themselves acquire treaty ju-
risdiction over KAL in the United States. 6 ' Some of the passen-
gers who were injured or killed were domiciliaries of South
Korea who were unable to obtain treaty jurisdiction against KAL
in the United States because they had purchased their tickets in
South Korea, and their final destination was South Korea. Thus,
they could sue KAL in Korea only. Nevertheless, these Korean
plaintiffs properly sued the United States government and Serco
in the United States. These defendants in turn filed claims for
indemnity or contribution against KAL in all cases in which they
had been sued, including those which were initiated by the Ko-
rean domiciliaries. KAL moved for a dismissal of the third-party
15) Id. at *15.
160 In re Air Crash at Agana, Guam on August 6, 1997, Case No. 98 ML 7211,
MDL No. 1237 (C.D. Cal. 1999).
16, Id. Article 28 provides that an action for damages under the treaty must be
brought, at the option of the plaintiff, in the place of the carrier's incorporation
or principal place of business, where the ticket was purchased, or in the place of
the final destination. The final destination in round-trip transportation is the
place of departure. See, e.g., Okaneme v. British Airways, 26 Av. Cas. (CCH),
16,495, 16,496 (D. Mass. 1999).
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claims pertaining to the Korean domiciliaries, arguing that
these suits were precluded by Article 28.
In considering KAL's motion, the court first looked to the lan-
guage of the Convention and concluded that the provisions of
the Convention were only meant to apply to suits by passengers
and shippers, since these plaintiffs were parties to the contract
of transportation. 6 2 The court also observed that indemnity or
contribution claims are distinct from the personal injury or
death claims out of which they arise. The court concluded that
the third-party claims were not governed by Article 28 of the
Convention and, because personal jurisdiction existed over
KAL, the United States and Serco could sue the carrier in the
United States. Nevertheless, the court ruled that KAL's liability
on the indemnity claim could not exceed the damages amount
permitted by the Convention. In this litigation, however, the
court had previously ruled that the carrier's liability was gov-
erned by the 1996 IATA Intercarrier Agreements. Conse-
quently, KAL was strictly liable up to 100,000 SDRs, and if it
could not prove that it took all necessary measures to avoid the
accident, its liability under the indemnity claims would be
unlimited.
In Carroll v. United Airlines, Inc., '6 3 a NewJersey appellate court
upheld the trial court's denial of a motion by an independent
contractor third-party defendant to dismiss the airline's third-
party suit against it based on lack of subject-matter jurisdiction.
The court remanded the case to the trial court, however, for a
determination of whether personal jurisdiction over the third-
party defendant was proper in the United States.164 The plain-
tiff in Carroll was a paraplegic. He was on a United Airlines
flight from Newark, New Jersey to Japan. He was injured while
disembarking in Japan. United Airlines had a contract in Japan
with third-party defendantJSS, ajapanese corporation, for pro-
vision of wheelchair services in Japan for United's passengers.
JSS has no contacts with New Jersey or the United States.
Plaintiff brought an action against United in New Jersey state
court under the Warsaw Convention for the injuries sustained.
United in turn brought a third-party action againstJSS, seeking
indemnification pursuant to the contract between JSS and
162 See In reAir Crash at Agana, Guam on August 6, 1997, Case No. 98 ML 7211,
MDL No. 1237 (C.D. Cal. 1999).
13 739 A.2d 442 (NJ. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1999).
164 Id. at 449-50.
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United. JSS moved to dismiss United's third-party action, argu-
ing that the court lacked subject-matter jurisdiction because a
forum selection clause required United to sueJSS injapan. The
court rejected that argument, finding that the forum selection
clause was part of a separate and distinct contract.
The court instead held that Article 28 was the proper "forum
clause" for an action by United againstJSS. The court appeared
to apply Article 28 to the carrier's third-party action for contrac-
tual indemnification against JSS under two theories. The first
theory was that Article 28 (2) leaves questions of procedure to be
determined by forum law. The court noted that under New
Jersey's venue rules, if proper venue lies over the main underly-
ing claim, proper venue also exists for a third-party claim. The
second theory was that Article 28(1) applied directly to the car-
rier's action for contractual indemnification against an indepen-
dent contractor. The court relied on a line of case law holding
that under the theory that the contractor is a part of the car-
rier's enterprise, a suit by the passenger against that contractor
is governed by the treaty when a carrier's contractor performs
services in furtherance of the contract of transportation.,.165
It is submitted that the logic of this line of cases does not ex-
tend to application of the Convention to a carrier's contract suit
against its contractor. Such lawsuits are not governed by the
treaty at all. The Warsaw Convention creates causes of action
against the carrier for accidents involving injury or death to the
passenger (Article 17), for delay damages (Article 18), and for
damages due to loss of or damage to baggage or cargo (Arti-
cle 19). It is these causes of action that are governed exclusively
by the Convention under Article 24. The Convention creates no
cause of action in favor of the carrier against its contractors.
2. Article 28 and Forum Non Conveniens Dismissal
In In re Air Crash off Long Island, New York, on July 17, 1996,166
Judge Sweet of the Southern District of New York ruled that the
Warsaw Convention does not prohibit dismissal based on forum
non conveniens. The plaintiffs advanced several bases for their
argument that Article 28 is inconsistent with forum non conveniens
165 The court cited cases such as Reed v. Wiser, 555 F.2d 1079 (2d Cir. 1977),
cert. denied, 434 U.S. 922 (1977); Waxman v. C.I.S. Mexicana de Aviacion, S.A. de
C.V., 13 F. Supp. 2d 508 (S.D.N.Y. 1998); Baker v. Lansdell Prot. Agency, Inc.,
590 F. Supp. 165 (S.D.N.Y. 1984).
166 65 F. Supp. 2d 207 (S.D.N.Y. 1999).
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dismissal: 1) it gives the plaintiff the "option" of where to sue; 2)
the four venues selected were selected for their prima facie con-
venience to the carrier; 3) the Convention's drafters were prima-
rily civil law legal experts from countries that did not, and still
do not, recognize forum non conveniens dismissal; and 4) Great
Britain had drafted a proposed amendment to add language to
Article 28 that would have permitted courts the discretion to
dismiss based on an inconvenient forum, but withdrew the pro-
posal." 7 Judge Sweet ruled that the treaty did not deprive a
court of the discretion to dismiss based on the inconvenience of
plaintiff's chosen forum. The court ruled, however, that the de-
fendants Boeing and TWA did not meet their burden to show
that the private and public interest factors weighed heavily in
favor of dismissal. 168
3. Jurisdiction Based on Mhere the Carrier Has a Place of Business
Through Which Contact Was Made
Article 28 establishes jurisdiction in those signatory states
where the carrier is domiciled or has its principal place of busi-
ness, where the final destination is located, or at the carrier's
place of business through which the contract was made. In
Singh v. Tarom Romanian Air Transport, "" the plaintiff contracted
for transportation aboard defendant air carrier at a New York
travel agency authorized "to sell and issue tickets" on Tarom Air-
lines. While plaintiff ordered and purchased the tickets
through the New York travel agency, the tickets were issued in
Delhi, India. The court held that the place of issuance of tickets
is the place at which the contract is made, unless plaintiff estab-
lishes that a principal-agent relationship existed between the
agency at which the tickets were paid and the issuing agency or
carrier. The Court found that an affidavit saying only that the
New York agency was "authorized to sell and issue airline tickets
in New York" was insufficient. It is necessary for a plaintiff to
establish that the travel agency is authorized by the specific car-
rier in question to sell and issue tickets.
167 One English court that has addressed this issue has held that Article 28 of
the Warsaw Convention is indeed incompatible with a court's dismissal based on
forum non conveniens. See Milor v. British Airways, 3 W.L.R. 642 (1996).
168 See In re Air Crash off Long Island, 65 F. Supp. at 218; see also infia Part
XIII.A.
16 ? 88 F. Stipp. 2d 62 (E.D.N.Y. 2000).
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J. ARTICLE 29 LIMITATIONS PERIOD Is NOT
SUBJECT TO TOLLING
In the United States, the language of Article 29 has been con-
strued as a condition precedent to suit and not subject to any
tolling under local rules of procedure. In Glavey v. Aer Lingus,1
70
the plaintiff alleged that her wallet was stolen from her checked
baggage during her trip on Aer Lingus. The court ruled that
plaintiff's claim for theft of goods was governed by the Warsaw
Convention. Because plaintiff did not assert her claim until
three years after the event, the action was time-barred under Ar-
ticle 29. The court held that the two-year time period for suit
was not subject to tolling. 171
Similarly, in Husmann v. Trans World Airlines, Inc., 172 the court
ruled that the two-year time period in Article 29 could not be
tolled, as it was a strict condition precedent to suit. Even the
bankruptcy of the airline did not toll the limitations period, Mis-
souri law notwithstanding.
In Kadir v. Singapore Airlines, Inc.,'73 the plaintiff filed a lawsuit
beyond the two-year period and argued that because the carrier
failed to provide plaintiff with a copy of the air waybill, the car-
rier could not assert the Article 29 limitations period defense.
The plaintiff based this argument upon Article 9 of the treaty,
which precludes the carrier from relying on the treaty provisions
which exclude or limit its liability when the carrier fails to pro-
vide a copy of the air waybill. The court disagreed, concluding
that Article 29 is not an exclusion or limitation on liability
within the meaning of Article 9.74 The action was dismissed.
K. LIABILIT' FOR DELAY UNDER ARTICLE 19
The question of when a carrier is liable for delay was raised in
the recent case of Peralta v. Continental Airlines, Inc. 175 In Peralta,
a businessman was prohibited from boarding his scheduled
flight because his ticket appeared to have been altered and
there was no record that he checked in for the flight. He was
escorted off the plane while a security officer investigated. Satis-
fied that the plaintiff belonged on the flight, the security officer
170 1999 WL. 493350 (S.D.N.Y. 1999).
171 See id. at *4.
172 169 F.3d 1151, 1153-54 (8th Cir. 1999).
173 1999 WL 261932 (N.D. I11. 1999).
174 1i. at *4.
175 1999 WL 193393 (N.D. Cal. 1999).
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attempted to stop the plane's departure. The attempt was un-
successful, and the carrier instead arranged for plaintiff to travel
to his destination on the next available flight. Plaintiff alleged
that the delay caused his business negotiations to fail. The court
held that plaintiffs common-law claims for breach of contract
and breach of implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing
were preempted by the Warsaw Convention under El Al Israel
Airlines v. Tseng.'76 Plaintiffs only available cause of action,
therefore, was for delay damages under Article 19. The court
further found, however, that the carrier had met its Article 20
burden to demonstrate that it had taken all necessary steps to
accommodate plaintiff and avoid damage.'77 Based on this
showing, the plaintiff could not recover for delay under
Article 19.
In Minhas v. Biman Bangladesh Airlines,'78 the plaintiff was
"bumped" from a flight as she was attempting to return from
India to New York. Defendant informed plaintiff that it was una-
ble to book her on a flight to New York for the next four
months. After forty-five days, plaintiff finally returned home on
another airline. Plaintiff's state law claim for negligence was
held to be preempted by the Warsaw Convention, and she was
limited to the $400 compensation available for delay under Arti-
cle 19. Additionally, the parties disputed whether the return
flight ticket was timely and correctly reconfirmed, leaving a fac-
tual dispute to be resolved by the jury regarding plaintiff's enti-
tlement to even these minimal damages.
L. LIABILITY UNDER ARTICLE 18 FOR LUGGAGE AND CARGO
Loss OR DAMAGE
Article 4 of the unamended Warsaw Convention requires de-
livery to the passenger of a baggage check with specified infor-
mation. If an airline fails to deliver such a baggage check, the
carrier forfeits liability limits. A number of recent cases raise
this forfeiture issue. In Spanner v. United Airlines,179 the Ninth
Circuit held that the Article 22 limitation of liability provision of
the Warsaw Convention did not apply to plaintiffs claim for lost
baggage, because the baggage check failed to contain the num-
ber and weight of the bags. The court held that this result was
IM" 525 U.S. 155 (1999). See supra Part III.E.1.
177 See Peralta, 1999 WL 193393 at *2.
178 1999 WL 447445 (S.D.N.Y. June 30, 1999).
71. 177 F.3d 1173 (9th Cir. 1999).
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mandated by the plain language of the unamended Warsaw
Convention, despite the fact that the passenger was not
prejudiced by the failure.
The District of Columbia Circuit agrees. In Cruz v. American
Airlines, Inc.,"1 the plaintiffs' suitcases did not arrive in Santo
Domingo. American Airlines's baggage checks did not state the
weight of the suitcases. American Airlines argued that Article
4(4) of the unamended Warsaw Convention operated to forfeit
the liability limits of Article 22 only when the baggage checks
failed to contain any of the three particulars specified at Article
4(3) (d), (f), and (h). The D.C. Circuit disagreed, holding that
even though the requirements of Article 4(3) (d), (f), and (h)
were outdated and served no purpose, Supreme Court case law
required strict adherence to plain treaty language.181 It dis-
agreed with the Second Circuit, which has condoned ignoring
the plain language of Article 4(4).82 The court also held that
Montreal Protocol No. 4, which became law in the United States
in March 1999 and eliminated the baggage weight requirement,
was clearly a treaty amendment that could not apply retroac-
tively. Finally, the court concluded that Article 18, like Article
17, was an exclusive cause of action that preempts state law
claims.'83 The court applied the analysis of the Supreme Court
Tseng decision, discussed supra at Part III.E.I., to Article 18.
Weinerth v. El Al Israel Airlines"8 4 involved plaintiffs who flew
from Miami to New York on American Airlines, where they con-
nected with defendant's flight for Israel. Their luggage, which
had been checked in Miami, did not appear in New York. Plain-
tiffs alleged that an El Al employee in New York assured them
that the baggage had tag numbers and would be sent to Tel
Aviv. The luggage did not appear in Tel Aviv and was never
located. Defendant argued that it never had custody or control
over the baggage. These allegations raised triable issues of fact
on the question of control and precluded summary judgment in
favor of the airline. 185
IS0 193 F.3d 526 (D.C. Cir. 1999).
18, The court cited Chan v. Korean Airlines, Ltd., 490 U.S. 122 (1989).
182 See Republic Nat'l Bank of New York v. Eastern Airlines, 815 F.2d 232 (2d
Cir. 1987).
183 Id. at 235.
184 1999 AWL 390612 (E.D.N.Y. 1999).
185 Id. at *4.
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In a cargo case, Tai Ping Insurance Co. Ltd. v. Expediters Interna-
tional, I 6 errors in the air waybill led to forfeiture of liability lim-
its. In this action by a shipper for the loss of a shipment of
crystal platters, the carrier was not entitled to the protection of
the limited liability provisions of the Warsaw Convention be-
cause the air waybill failed to include the regularly scheduled
stopping points in the flight and indicated the wrong departure
date.
A carrier is required under Article 8(c) to list "agreed stop-
ping places," provided the carrier an alter the stopping places
when necessary. In the Second Circuit, case law allows the car-
rier to indicate the "agreed stopping places" by incorporating by
reference its timetables. 187 Article 8(c) was at issue in a number
of recent cases. In Insurance Co. of North America v. Federal Express
Corp.,'"" a California corporation purchased $638,500 worth of
computer chips from a Canadian company. The shipment dis-
appeared from a Federal Express storage area in Memphis. The
plaintiff argued that Federal Express could not avail itself of the
liability limitations set out in the Warsaw Convention for cargo
because it had failed to comply with Article 8(c) when it omitted
Memphis as an "agreed stopping place." The court rejected the
plaintiffs argument because the air waybill made it clear that
there were no "agreed upon" stopping places, and Federal Ex-
press explicitly reserved the right to route the shipment as it saw
fit. ' Therefore, Federal Express was protected by the liability
limitation.
In Intercargo Insurance Co. v. China Airlines, Ltd., I" the Second
Circuit held that the waybill failed to communicate the "agreed
stopping places" even though the face of the waybill referred to
the timetable schedule for Flight C1317 and the timetable re-
vealed that the flight had a Los Angeles departure and a stop in
Taipei before the destination of Hong Kong. The air waybill,
however, failed to indicate that at Taipei the cargo would be
transferred to Flight C1607 and then carried to Hong Kong.
The timetable did not list this flight number. Accordingly, Arti-
cle 8(c) was not satisfied and the limited liability provisions did
not apply.
1s16 34 F. Supp. 2d 169, 174-76 (S.D.N.Y. 1998).
187 Brink's Lid. v. South African Ainways, 93 F.3d 1022 (2d Cir. 1996).
188 189 F.3d 914 (9th Cir. 1999).
1s - Id. at 918-19.
'9) 208 F.2d 64 (2d Cir. 2000).
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In Sotheby's v. Federal Express Corp.,' the court held that the
carrier's rerouting of art works from Newark to Memphis, on
the ground that Newark had a staff shortage, was not an agreed
upon stopping place and was not a rerouting based on necessity
within the meaning of Article 8(c) because the carrier should
have anticipated the staff shortage.
The scope of the Warsaw Convention as applied to cargo cases
is set out in Article 18. Article 18 precludes liability for damage
caused by transportation by land. However, when transporta-
tion by land takes place for the purpose of loading, delivery, or
transshipment in the performance of a contract for transporta-
tion by air, any damage is presumed, subject to contrary proof to
have resulted during the air transportation. In Read-Rite Corp. v.
Burlington Air Express, Ltd.,9 the court held that when there was
contrary proof to show that the goods were in fact destroyed
during the ground transportation outside of London's
Heathrow Airport, the Warsaw Convention does not apply.
In Mitsui Marine & Fire Insurance Co., Ltd.,19 the plaintiff at-
tempted to get around the liability limit set out in Article 22 for
cargo shipments by alleging that the damage to the computer
equipment shipped from Boston to Tokyo occurred during the
land transportation to Kennedy Airport in New York City and
not during the air transportation. The court noted that at Ken-
nedy Airport the shipment was accepted and a receipt was
signed attesting that the shipment was in "Good Order and Con-
dition." The court rejected plaintiffs argument and applied the
limitation of liability set out in the Warsaw Convention.
M. REMOVABILITY OF WARSAW CONVENTION CASE
In Husmann v. Trans World Airlines, Inc.,194 the court denied
plaintiffs motion to remand the case to state court. The plain-
tiff was injured when he tripped over luggage while boarding a
TWA flight from London, England to St. Louis, Missouri. The
plaintiff filed his complaint based on state law and argued that
the Warsaw Convention did not apply. The Eighth Circuit re-
jected this argument and held that the case was removable be-
cause the cause of action arose under the Warsaw Convention,
19' 97 F. Supp. 2d 491, 498-99 (S.D.N.Y. 2000).
192 186 F.3d 1190 (9th Cir. 1999).
193 55 F. Supp. 2d 308 (S.D.N.Y. 1999).
14 169 F.3d 1151 (8th Cir. 1999).
JOURNAL OF AIR LAW AND COMMERCE
which preempted state law claims." 5 The court also ruled that
because the Article 29 two-year statute of limitation had expired,
the case should be dismissed."9 6 In Donkor v. British Airways
Corp.,' 97 however, the court held that British Airways failed to
support the case's removal to federal court when it failed to sub-
mit factual proof that plaintiff was still in the process of dis-
embarking when she allegedly sustained her injuries.
N. APPLICATION OF WARSAW CONVENTION TO CARRIER'S
AGENTS OR INDEPENDENT CONTRACTORS
In Alleyn v. Port Authority of New York and New Jersey,'0 8 the War-
saw Convention did not apply to plaintiff Alleyn's claims against
an elevator service company. The court noted that although the
service company was acting as a Delta agent, the agent was per-
forming work that Delta was not required by law to perform.
The court concluded that the case law extending the applica-
tion of the Warsaw Convention to the carrier's agents or con-
tractors did so only when the agent or contractor was
performing a service in furtherance of the contract of carriage
or performing a service that the airline was otherwise required
by law to perform."I The agent's services in Alleyn did not fall
within this narrow category.
IV. LAW APPLICABLE TO AIRCRAFT DISASTERS
OCCURRING IN WATER OR ON
OFFSHORE PLATFORMS
A. TERRITORIAL SCOPE OF DOHSA's APPLICATION
By court interpretation, the Death on the High Seas Act2"'
("DOHSA") is the applicable United States law to aviation disas-
ters occurring on the high seas. °  When DOHSA was enacted
in 1920, the high seas were defined in maritime collision cases
as those non-sovereign waters belonging to no nation, which be-
gan beyond a marine league or three miles from a sovereign's
shores. By the 1980s, the international community recognized
each nation's right to a broader sovereign territorial sea of
195 Id. at 1153.
-,; d. at 1154.
197 62 F. Supp. 2d 963 (E.D.N.Y. t999).
198 58 F. Supp. 2d 15 (E.D.N.Y. 1999).
199 Id. at 24.
D10 46 U.S.C. § 761 (1920).
2111 See, e.g., Zicherman v. Korean Air Lines Co., Ltd., 516 U.S. 217 (1996).
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twelve miles, beyond which lay the high seas. This understand-
ing was formalized in many nations by treaty and in the United
States by a 1988 Presidential Proclamation. In 1988, President
Reagan issued the Territorial Sea Proclamation and, in accor-
dance with international law, claimed a twelve-mile sovereign
territorial sea for the United States.
The applicability of the international definition of high seas
to DOHSA became a major issue in two air disasters that have
occurred in sovereign territorial seas. TWA Flight 800 crashed
eight miles off Long Island on July 17, 1996, within the territo-
rial seas of the United States as defined by international and
federal law. Swissair Flight 111 crashed into Canadian territorial
seas approximately seven miles off Peggy's Cove, Nova Scotia on
September 2, 1998. The Canadian government has passed fed-
eral legislation, in conformity with international law, recogniz-
ing that its territorial sea extends to twelve miles from shore. In
both of these cases defendants have argued for the application
of DOHSA, which limited damages awards to pecuniary losses
only until the 2000 amendment to DOHSA.2 °2 The 1920
DOHSA did not permit any recovery for loss of society, grief,
decedent's pre-death pain and suffering, or punitive damages
and could not be supplemented by state or general maritime
law. 2"3 Thus, the territorial scope of DOHSA's application be-
came a central issue in these litigations.
The defendants in both crashes argued that DOHSA applies
to all ocean waters beyond a marine league from the U.S.
shores, whether or not these waters are in fact the international
high seas. Prior to the 2000 DOHSA Amendment, which ex-
pressly made DOHSA inapplicable to commercial aviation acci-
dents occurring within 12 miles of the U.S. shores, Judge Sweet
of the Southern District of New York had held that DOHSA ap-
plies only if death occurs both beyond a marine league from
202 See AIR21, Pub. L. No. 106-181, 114 Stat. 61 (2000).
203 In the 2000 amendment to DOHSA, under AIR21, the statute was retroac-
tively amended to permit recovery of damages for the nonpecuniary loss of dece-
dent's care, comfort, and companionship. This change applies only to
commercial aviation accidents that occur more than twelve miles from U.S.
shores. The statute now expressly provides that DOHSA does not apply to avia-
tion commercial accidents within twelve miles of the U.S. shores. The amend-
ment expressly prohibits punitive damages, and there is still no recovery for the
decedent's pre-death conscious pain and suffering. See infra Part XIII for a more
detailed discussion of AIR21 and the DOHSA Amendment.
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shore and on the sovereignless high seas.2" 4 The district court
examined the legislative history of DOHSA and held that "high
seas," for purposes of the territorial scope of DOHSA, means
international, non-sovereign waters, and that the statute there-
fore does not apply in any United States territorial waters. 0 5
The district court acknowledged that when DOHSA was enacted
the United States territorial sea extended only three miles, or
one marine league, from the shores of United States territories.
The court further found, however, that the 1988 Territorial Seas
Proclamation "established the dividing line between United
States sovereign and international waters at twelve nautical
miles, thereby relocating the 'high seas.' The relocated high
seas, in turn, meant that DOHSA did not apply to deaths occur-
ring within the twelve-mile United States territorial sea. Conse-
quently, the court held that DOHSA did not apply to the deaths
of the passengers of TWA Flight 800, which crashed into waters
that were no longer the high seas.
Just prior to the effective date of the 2000 DOHSA amend-
ment, which retroactively and expressly made DOHSA inappli-
cable to aviation accidents within the twelve-mile territorial sea,
the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit affirmed Judge
Sweet's TWA ruling that the 1920 DOHSA did not apply to the
TWA Flight 800 litigation.2 °7
The Second Circuit, in a split two to one decision, concluded
that the term "high seas" in Section 1 of DOHSA meant interna-
tional, nonterritorial, nonsovereign waters, and therefore did
not apply to accidents occurring within the U.S. twelve-mile ter-
ritorial sea. Since the TWA Flight 800 crash occurred within the
twelve-mile U.S. territorial sea, DOHSA did not apply. The
court based its construction of "high seas" on a number of
grounds:
1. The international definition was adopted by the Supreme
Court in maritime high seas collision cases and these were the
cases that shaped the drafting of DOHSA;
2. This definition of high seas has prevailed over time;
204 In re Air Crash Off Long Island, New York, on July 17, 1996, 1998 WL
292333 (S.D.N.Y. 1998), afjd, 209 F.3d 200 (2d Cir. 2000).
205 See id. at *7-*8.
2o6 Id. at *8.
207 See In reAir Crash off Long Island, New York on July 17, 1996, 209 F.3d 200
(2d Cir. 2000).
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3. The legislative history of DOHSA demonstrates that this was
the meaning that Congress adopted, and the low-water mark
definition was not accepted by Congress;
4. This definition of high seas is consistent with the use of the
term "high seas" in Section 4 of DOHSA and consistent with the
purpose of the statute as a whole.
After publication of the Second Circuit decision, the DOHSA
2000 amendment was enacted on April 5, 2000, , 0 making
DOHSA inapplicable to commercial aviation accidents "occur-
ring on the high seas 12 nautical miles or closer to the shore of
[the United States]." The defendants in TWA Flight 800, Boe-
ing and TWA, have sought rehearing or en banc review, arguing
that the amendment's language clarifies that "high seas" for pur-
poses of DOHSA always meant all waters of the ocean coast to
coast, including the territorial seas. 2 9 Defendants argued that
the 1920 DOHSA excluded application of the act only to that
portion of the high seas which is within a marine league (three
nautical miles) from U.S. shores. Thus, TWA Flight 800, which
occurred about eight miles from the U.S. shore, occurred on
the high seas. The plaintiffs opposed the petition, arguing that
(1) DOHSA 2000 is retroactive to TWA Flight 800 and expressly
excludes application of DOHSA within the twelve-mile territo-
rial sea; and (2) the new language in DOHSA 2000-"on the
high seas 12 nautical miles or close to the shore of [the United
States] "-was extraneous and inadvertently added and did not
clarify or redefine "high seas" for purposes of DOHSA. The pe-
tition for rehearing has been denied.2"
The issue in Swissair/Delta Flight 111 involving the crash of
Flight 111 near Peggy's Cove, Nova Scotia on September 2,
1998, is whether the DOHSA term "high seas" includes foreign
territorial waters. Defendants' briefs argue that "high seas"
mean all ocean waters beyond the low-water mark, or coast to
coast waters. Defendants say that this meaning is underscored
by the DOHSA 2000 amendment, and DOHSA therefore gov-
208 See AIR21, § 404, 114 Stat. at 131.
209, The defendants' petition raised a question about the amendment's retroac-
tivity clause but did not address the issue.
210 In an unpublished decision by the Second Circuit involving the 1983 shoot-
down of KAL Flight 007 over the Sea of Japan, the court held that plaintiff had
waived the argument that the shoot-down occurred in Soviet waters and not over
the international high seas, because plaintiff had admitted in his pre-trial order
that Flight 007 "was shot down over the high seas." Ephraimson-Abt v. Korean
Air Lines, 1999 WL 980959 (2d Cir. 2000). A petition for en banc review was
denied in this case as well.
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erns crashes in foreign territorial waters. A long line of cases
has applied DOHSA to aviation crashes in foreign territorial wa-
ters. 211 Plaintiffs' briefs argue that the legislative history to the
1920 DOHSA and the statute as a whole confirm that Congress
adopted the international meaning of "high seas" as waters
outside the territory of any nation. Plaintiffs pointed to state-
ments in the legislative history to the effect that the DOHSA
drafters left out foreign territorial waters. Plaintiffs argued that
the line of cases applying DOHSA to foreign waters looked only
at the statute's ambiguous text and did not examine the DOHSA
1920 drafting history.
Plaintiffs further argued that DOHSA 2000 never intended to
redefine or clarify the meaning of "high seas" and did not over-
rule the original meaning of "high seas" as international non-
sovereign waters. Plaintiffs examined the legislative history to
DOHSA 2000 and noted that no House or Senate draft bill ever
adopted any new language affecting or modifying the central
term "high seas." The final language was inserted by the confer-
ence committee, which drafted new language to substitute for
the House and Senate bills. The conference committee report
explains the amendment's intent to conform to the 1988 Presi-
dential Proclamation on the 12-mile Territorial Sea and expand
the DOHSA remedy for aviation accidents occurring more than
twelve miles from land.2 12
According to the plaintiffs, the final change in language, in-
serted at conference, was inadvertent and apparently was added
in haste to reconcile the differences between the House bill and
the Senate bill, neither of which ever intended to clarify or rede-
fine the meaning of high seas. The issue is pending before the
MDL court, Chief Judge Giles of the Eastern District of
Pennsylvania.
B. DOHSA's APPLICATION BASED ON LOCATION OF
THE MISCONDUCT
The application of DOHSA also depends on a determination
of the location of the wrong which causes death; under 46
U.S.C. 5761, it is the "wrongful act, neglect or default" that must
"occur on the high seas", not the death. This issue came up in
two decisions authored by Judge Kent of the Southern District
211 The parties' briefs are available upon request. Please contact Blanca I. Rod-
riguez at Kreindler & Kreindler.
212 See H.R. Rep. No. 106-513, at 185 (2000).
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of Texas, both involving a helicopter crash on November 28,
1996, into a fixed oil platform in the Gulf of Mexico. The two
decisions are Williamson v. Petroleum Helicopters, Inc.,213 and Brown
v. Eurocopter, S.A. 214 The plaintiffs in those cases argued that be-
cause the wrong, the tort, occurred when the helicopter crashed
into an offshore platform, which is treated as land under the
Outer Continental Shelf Lands Act (OCSLA), OCSLA, not
DOHSA, should apply to the helicopter crash. The court dis-
agreed, concluding that DOHSA applied.
OCSLA215 provides a federal remedy for accidents occurring
on offshore platforms. The offshore platforms are treated as
federal enclave land. Accidents on the platforms are governed
by federal law which adopts the state law of the adjacent state,
provided it is not inconsistent with federal law. It is not an admi-
ralty remedy.216 In Williamson,217 the helicopter passengers who
worked on the fixed oil platform were killed when their helicop-
ter, which began experiencing mechanical difficulties while fly-
ing over the high seas, crashed into the fixed oil platform in the
Gulf of Mexico while attempting to land and thereafter sank
into the ocean. The court ruled that when, under the factual
circumstances, a remedy for wrongful death exists under both
OCSLA and admiralty law, admiralty law takes precedence and
governs to the exclusion of OCSLA. 21" The court therefore ex-
amined whether this accident involved a maritime tort, which
would create maritime jurisdiction. It applied the Supreme
Court's multi-prong test for determining maritime jurisdiction
as most recently discussed in Grubart v. Great Lakes Dredge & Dock
Co.219 The fact that the aircraft began experiencing mechanical
problems over the Gulf of Mexico and ultimately sank in the
Gulf waters was held sufficient to satisfy the maritime locality
requirement for maritime jurisdiction, which requires a tort in
navigable waters. In addition, the transfer of personnel to and
from offshore drilling platforms was akin to the use of boats to
perform such tasks; therefore, the requirement of traditional
maritime activity for maritime jurisdiction was also met. Finally,
213 32 F. Supp. 2d 456 (S.D. Tex. 1999).
214 38 F. Supp. 2d 515 (S.D. Tex. 1999).
2B 43 U.S.C. § 1331 (1994).
216 See Rodrigue v. Aetna Cas. & Surety Co., 395 U.S. 352 (1969).
217 32 F. Supp. 2d 456 (S.D. Tex. 1999).
218 The court relied on Fifth Circuit law. See, e.g., Smith v. Penrod Drilling
Corp., 960 F.2d 456 (5th Cir. 1992).
21) 513 U.S. 527, 534 (1995).
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the crash of a helicopter into navigable waters has the potential
to disrupt maritime commerce. Thus, the requirement of a con-
nection to maritime activity was also met. Because maritime ju-
risdiction existed, the court applied the relevant admiralty
statute, in this case DOHSA."2 °
In the second case involving this crash, Brown v. Eurocopter,
S.A.,2 1 the court reaffirmed that DOHSA applied. In this deci-
sion, the court directly ruled on whether or not the accident fell
within the language of DOHSA, which requires "death of a per-
son ... caused by wrongful act, neglect, or default occurring on
the high seas ....,222 Here, the plaintiff argued that the death
occurred as a result of a wrong which occurred on land when
the helicopter crashed into the offshore platform. The court
admitted that application of DOHSA is not "immediately dis-
cernible" in cases where death occurs on land. 2 3 The court
concluded, however, that the locus of the death was not deter-
minative; rather, the determinative factor is where the miscon-
duct is "consummated" and reaches its moment of "crisis. 2 24
The court said, "[T]he great weight of courts considering the
question of where the wrongful act 'occurred' have concluded
that the wrong must be 'consummated' upon the high seas for
DOHSA to apply. '12 1
Relying on Lacey v. L. W Wiggins Airways, Inc.,226 the court con-
cluded that when DOHSA speaks of wrongful act occurring on
the high seas "it contemplates the substance of the occurrence
which resulted in death and gave rise to a right to recover. "227
In a product defect case, said the court, it is not the misconduct
or omissions that occurred on land that are pertinent to deter-
mine the scope of DOHSA's application, but rather where those
failures took "full effect." If the product defects were "consum-
mated" on the high seas, DOHSA applies, even if the death from
22,, Note that other courts have applied DOHSA to deaths occurring on the
high seas without regard to whether the traditional multi-prong test for maritime
jurisdiction exists or not. See, e.g., Zicherman v. Korean Air Lines Co., Ltd., 516
U.S. 217 (1996). Under this analysis, DOHSA applies simply when the facts of
the case fall within the language and terms of art of the statute. See also Motts v.
M/V Green Wave, 210 F.3d 565 (5th Cir. 2000), discussed infra.
21 38 F. Supp. 2d 515, 518 (S.D. Tex. 1999).
222 46 U.S.C. §761 (1994).
223 Supra note 215, 38 F. Supp. 2d at 517.
224 [d
225 h
2213 95 F. Supp. 916 (D. Mass. 1951).
227 38 F. Supp. 2d at 517(quoting Lacey, 95 F. StIpp. at 918).
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the misconduct over the high seas occurred on land.228 The
court held that the moment of "consummation" may be sepa-
rate from the moment of death. According to Brown, DOHSA
was triggered because the alleged wrong, the product malfunc-
tion, was "consummated" and reached its point of crisis upon
the high seas. The high seas was the place where the aircraft's
mechanical problems fully manifested themselves. The court
did not define the terms "consummation," "crisis," or "full ef-
fect." It also did not consider that, under generally recognized
tort principles, a personal injury tort does not reach full effect
until injury to the person occurs. In this case the personal in-
jury occurred on the platform, when the helicopter crashed and
the decedents sustained their fatal injuries. A product can mal-
function without causing personal injury, therefore focusing on
when and where the aircraft itself initially manifested mechani-
cal problems is not equivalent to the inquiry of the location of
the fatal injury of the person killed.
A recent Fifth Circuit DOHSA decision in a nonaviation case
may require re-examination of Judge Kent's decisions in Brown
and Williamson. The case, Motts v. M/V Green Wae,229 involved a
seaman who sustained an injury while his vessel was on the high
seas and later died in a hospital as a result of delay of the ship-
master in seeking treatment for the seaman. The Fifth Circuit
in Motts held that DOHSA expands and by itself creates admi-
ralty jurisdiction in the federal courts without regard to the ad-
miralty multi-prong test for jurisdiction. The Motts court also
held that the "'moment of consummation'" approach to deter-
mining the place of fatal injury for purposes of DOHSA's pre-
emptive scope should not be used. Rather, said the court, "the
district court's attention should have been drawn to [dece-
dent's] location when he was injured .. 3.. ,,210 If the place where
the decedent was injured was the high seas, then DOHSA ap-
plies and preempts state law, even if the decedent later died on
land. Thus, in Brown the district court should have focused on
the fact that decedents were not injured until the helicopter
228 The court noted that in Moyer v. Rederi, 645 F. Supp. 620 (S.D. Fla. 1986),
the court applied DOHSA in a case in which the decedent died on land after
sustaining a heart attack while snorkeling.
229 210 F.3d 565 (5th Cir. 2000).
2 30 Id. at 571-72 & n.6.
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crashed onto the platform, which under OCSLA is treated as
land, not the high seas. " '
V. NON-WARSAW CONVENTION LIABILITY OF AIRLINES
AND AIRCRAFT OWNERS OR OPERATORS
A. AIRLINE'S LIABILITY FOR ACTS OF COMMUTER AIRLINE
In Grajales-Romero v. American Airlines,23 2 the First Circuit
ruled that American Airlines, which is owned by AMR Corpora-
tion, can be held liable under the theory of apparent agency for
the negligence of the AMR's commuter or regional airline,
American Eagle. The plaintiff was injured by a collapsing check-
in counter at an airport in St. Kitts. Plaintiff was checking in to
board an American Eagle flight from St. Kitts to Puerto Rico.
The plaintiff sued American Airlines and American Eagle, but
the district court dismissed the claims against American Eagle
for lack of personal jurisdiction. The First Circuit upheld the
lower court's finding that agency by authority existed between
American Airlines and American Eagle, making American Air-
lines, as principal, vicariously liable for the negligence of Ameri-
can Eagle. The court relied on a number of facts, among them
that plaintiff's ticket was issued by American Airlines and identi-
fied the carrier as "AA"; that the telephone information line for
American Eagle flights was the American Airlines information
line; that the check-in counters at San Juan and St. Kitts bore
American Airlines and American Eagle logos; that the in-flight
magazines were the American Airlines magazines; and that
American Airlines lists St. Kitts as one of its destinations. Plain-
tiff relied on such facts to assume that he had chosen to fly on
American Airlines. The court found the existence of a princi-
pal-agent relationship.
B. AIRLINE'S LIABILITY FOR ACTS OF
INDEPENDENT CONTRACTORS
In Maino v. City of New York, 23 the plaintiff alleged that her
injuries were caused by the negligence of curbside check-in per-
23! In a later decision, Brown v. Eurocopter SA, Civ. Action No. G-98-529 *SBK
(S.D. Tex. 2000), the court held that the "air taxi" service involved in this crash
was "commercial aviation" within the meaning of the 2000 DOHSA amendment,
so as to entitle it to receive compensation for loss of decedent's care, comfort and
companionship.
232 194 F.3d 288, 293-94 (lst Cir. 1999).
233 686 N.Y.S.2d 77 (N.Y. App. Div. 1999).
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sonnel. The airline was not held liable for her injuries because
the check-in personnel were deemed to be independent con-
tractors not working under the control of the airline.
C. AIRLINE'S LIABILITY FOR REMOVAL OF A PASSENGER
The circumstances under which an airline may be liable for
requesting a passenger to leave a plane or having a passenger
removed by the police or other authorities has been the subject
of a number of recent cases. In Schaeffer v. Cavallero,234 the court
ruled that there was an issue of fact regarding whether the air-
line properly had the plaintiff passenger removed from the
plane for safety reasons or improperly had plaintiff removed in
retaliation for the passenger's prior verbal arguments. The
court acknowledged that the Federal Aviation Act provides that
an airline may refuse to transport a passenger or property that
the carrier decides is or might be a danger to safety. 235 There-
fore, if the airline acted out of concern for safety, it would not
be liable. However, given the plaintiff's prior verbal abuse di-
rected at a crew member, the court concluded that the airline's
decision may not have been based solely on safety concerns. A
refusal to transport cannot give rise to a claim for damages
under federal or state law unless the carrier's decision was arbi-
trary and capricious.236 The court did, however, dismiss plain-
tiffs claims of battery and false imprisonment. The court
reasoned that it was the passenger's decision to refuse to leave
the aircraft, which resulted in the police escorting him off the
plane.
Another case, Hugger v. Northwest Airlines, Inc.,237 held that the
airline did not commit racial discrimination under Title II of
the Civil Rights Act when it asked the police to escort plaintiff
off the plane. In Hugger, an African American passenger was
removed from the plane after having a verbal dispute with a
white passenger. During the argument, the plaintiff tossed the
other passenger's luggage and verbally threatened him. The pi-
lot asked the plaintiff to leave the plane, citing safety concerns.
The court ruled that the plaintiff was unable to prove that the
pilot's stated safety reason for the airline's action was a pretext
for racial discrimination. The court also ruled that plaintiffs
234 54 F. Supp. 2d 350, 351 (S.D.N.Y. 1999).
235 49 U.S.C. § 44902 (1994).
236 See Schaeffer, 54 F. Supp. 2d at 351.
237 1999 WL 59841 (N.D. Ill. 1999).
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state law tort claims were preempted under the Airline Deregu-
lation Act (ADA) ,23' because the decision to remove a passenger
relates to services, thus precluding state law claims. 239
D. AIRLINE'S FAILURE To RESPOND ADEQUATELY TO IN-FLIGHT
MEDICAL EMERGENCIES
In recent years, the number of in-flight medical emergencies
has increased dramatically, from about three cases a day be-
tween 1986 and 1988 to approximately 30 cases per day in
1996.24o With more people flying every day, this unfortunate sta-
tistic can only go up. Yet the airlines, particularly domestic car-
riers, have been slow to respond by providing expanded medical
device equipment and pharmaceuticals on board their aircraft.
Furthermore, the FAA has not expanded the list of contents re-
quired to be carried in emergency medical kits since the list was
first published in 1986.241 Before that date, airlines were only
required to carry rudimentary first aid kits. Under current stan-
dards, emergency medical kits must contain at least the follow-
ing items: a sphygmomanometer, a stethoscope, three breathing
tubes, syringes and needles, 50% dextrose injections for hypo-
glycemia, epinephrine for asthma, diphenhydramine for allergic
reactions, and nitroglycerin tablets for cardiac chest pain.24 2
The medical equipment on this list is inadequate to allow airline
personnel to cope with many serious medical emergencies.
Since in-flight medical emergencies often involve heart attacks,
the absence of defibrillators from this list has been particularly
important. Recently, in response to increasing public pressure
and a growing number of lawsuits, several domestic carriers have
installed or announced their plans to install defibrillators in
their aircraft.243
A number of lawsuits have charged airlines with negligence
for failure to provide adequate medical aid to a stricken passen-
":I The ADA is discussed infra at Part VI.
239 See also Sanders v. Southwest Airlines Co., 86 F. Supp. 2d 739 (E.D. Mich.
2000) (holding that the airline was not negligent and did not intentionally inflict
emotional distress or violate anti-discrimination laws when it had the police meet
a passenger who had been rude and disruptive on the flight as she exited the
plane).
,111 SeeJohn Manibusan, "In Flight Medical Emergencies: Can Airlines Cope?"
Supplement to TRIAL, July 1998.
2-11 14 C.F.R. § 121 app. A (1996).
2,12 See 14 C.F.R § 121.309 (1997).
2 13 See Somes v. United Airlines, Inc., 33 F. Supp. 2d 78 (D. Mass. 1999).
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ger.244 In Tandon v. United Airlines, Inc.,245 applying New York
law, the court permitted the plaintiff to amend the complaint to
include a claim against the airline for failure to maintain a medi-
cal kit with the equipment necessary for the proper treatment of
a heart attack. Applying New York law, the court in Walker v.
Eastern Airlines, InC.246 allowed the jury to decide the adequacy of
the in-flight medical aid available to a passenger who died
aboard defendant's flight. Plaintiff alleged that defendant
breached its duty not to board a passenger potentially not physi-
cally fit to fly and its duty to render aid to ill passengers in flight.
Because the court concluded that issues involving duty of care
and causation should be decided by the jury, defendant's mo-
tion for summary judgment was denied.
The Ninth Circuit, in Landet v. Air France,2 4 7 ruled that the
Airline Deregulation Act (ADA), which preempts state law
claims that relate to "rates, routes or services of any carrier, ' 24 1
did not preempt plaintiffs claim that the airline caused the
death of her mother by failing to see that she received prompt
medical care for an embolism after her airplane landed in
France.
In Somes v. United Airlines, Inc.,24 9 the widow of an airline pas-
senger sued the airline for the wrongful death of her husband,
who suffered a cardiac arrest and died while traveling aboard
defendant's aircraft. The plaintiff alleged that the defendant
was liable because it failed to equip its aircraft with certain medi-
cal equipment, including an automatic external defibrillator,
which allegedly would have saved her husband's life. The air-
line argued that plaintiffs state law claim was preempted by the
ADA because it sought to impose a duty on the airline that re-
lated to the airline's "services." The court rejected this argu-
ment, holding that the provision of emergency medical
equipment is not an airline "service" as Congress understood
that term. The court also rejected the defendant's argument
that the plaintiffs claim was preempted because FAA regula-
tions did not require the inclusion of a defibrillator in the air-
craft's emergency medical kit. The court noted that the federal
regulations merely set forth minimum requirements and did not
244 See, e.g., id.
245 No. 94 Civ. 7002 (DC), 1997 WL 158365 (S.D.N.Y. 1997).
249 23 Av. Cas. (CCH) 17,904 (S.D.N.Y. 1991).
247 182 F.3d 926 (9th Cir. 1999) (unpublished table decision).
,48 See discussion of ADA infra at Part VI.
249 33 F. Supp. 2d 78 (D. Mass. 1999).
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prevent the airline from carrying supplemental devices to pro-
tect its passengers or preempt state law duties requiring more
from the airlines.
E. AIRLINE'S DUTY TO TRAVEL AGENTS
In Kabo v. UAL, Inc.,25 0 decided under Pennsylvania law, the
plaintiff, a travel agent, suffered a heart attack while assisting in
check-in procedures and baggage handling for a tour group.
The court held that the defendant airline did not breach any
duty to plaintiff by allowing him to handle baggage, despite the
fact that his help violated the airline's FAA approved security
program and the airline's own internal rules. The court ruled
that the airline did not have a duty to warn plaintiff of the dan-
gers of lifting luggage, since these dangers were obvious as a
matter of law.
F. AIRLINE'S LIABILITY TO EMPLOYEE-PASSENGERS AND TO
EMPLOYEES OF INDEPENDENT CONTRACTORS
The exclusivity provisions in state worker's compensation laws
ordinarily bar flight attendant actions against their employers,
even when the airline's employee is deadheading aboard a flight
and has been issued a ticket by the airline. The issuance of a
ticket to an airline employee is not, by itself, determinative of
whether the employee is traveling purely as a passenger or as an
employee. In In re Air Crash Off Long Island, New York, on July 17,
1996,251 the court ruled that because the flight attendants were
on board the flight to Paris to resume their duties as flight at-
tendants and were required by their employment to travel on
TWA, they were traveling as employees, not passengers. Their
suits against the airline were dismissed.
According to Waite v. American Airlines, Inc.252 an airline will
not be held liable for injuries sustained by the employee of an
independent contractor unless one of the following conditions
is met: 1) the airline assumed a specific duty under the contract
with the independent contractor that the airline breached; 2)
the airline breached a common-law or statutory duty to maintain
safe premises; or 3) the airline had a statutory or common-law
duty to control or perform the work. In Waite, a baggage han-
dler employed by an American Airlines independent contractor
250 762 F. Supp. 1190 (E.D. Pa. 1991).
25, 30 F. Supp. 2d 631 (S.D.N.Y. 1998).
252 73 F. Supp. 2d 349 (S.D.N.Y. 1999).
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was injured when he tried to adjust a piece of luggage on a mov-
ing conveyor belt. The court held that the plaintiff could not
recover damages against the airline for the following reasons: 1)
the airline never assumed a specific duty to train the plaintiff in
the proper method of handling baggage; 2) the airline did not
create or tolerate a known dangerous condition on its premises;
and 3) the airline did not have a statutory or common-law duty
to control the work.
G. EFFECT OF RELEASE FROM LIABILITY
Scrivener v. Sky's the Limit, Inc.253 involved a skydiving student
who had signed a release from liability prior to taking skydiving
lessons. Injured while taking a lesson, the plaintiff brought an
action against the school to recover damages for his injuries.
The court granted summary judgment to the defendant because
the language of the release and the indemnification signed by
the plaintiff prior to his lessons expressed in unequivocal and
clear terms the parties' intent to relieve the defendant and its
instructors from negligence liability. Plaintiff was not entitled to
the protection of a New York statute which deems void any re-
lease signed in connection with a recreational center because
the activity here was instructional, not recreational.
H. LIABILITY OF AIRCRAFt OWNER
In the recent case of White v. Inbound Aviation,254 an aircraft
owner leased an aircraft to a partnership, which then rented
the aircraft to pilots. The aircraft was rented to an inexperi-
enced pilot who crashed while attempting to take off from a
high-altitude airport surrounded by mountains. The owner of
the airplane was also an employee and manager of the partner-
ship and in charge of day-to-day operations. The court held that
the owner could be found vicariously liable under a state statute
because he personally benefited from each rental of his airplane
and he personally released the airplane to the pilot, and thejury
could have inferred that he was not acting solely as an employee
of the partnership when he entrusted the plane to the pilot.
The owner's vicarious liability for the pilot's negligence was lim-
ited by statute to $15,000.
The owner was also held directly liable to the aircraft's passen-
gers on the theory of negligent entrustment. The defendant
253 68 F. Supp. 2d 277 (S.D.N.Y. 1999).
254 82 Cal. Rptr. 2d 71 (Cal. Ct. App. 1999).
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knew that the pilot had flown only five times since receiving his
license two years earlier. Rejecting the argument that the pilot
was "competent" as a matter of law because he possessed a pi-
lot's license, the court ruled that there was sufficient evidence to
support the conclusion that the lessor knowingly leased the air-
craft to an individual who lacked the ability to use it safely for a
trip that involved a take-off and landing at a dangerous airport.
In Lawson v. Management Activities, Inc.,255 spectators to an air-
plane crash who were not physically injured could not recover
for emotional injuries they sustained as a result of viewing the
crash, even if, for a brief moment, they experienced reasonable
fear for their own safety. The owners and operators of the air-
plane had no duty of care to these spectators. The court stated
several reasons for declining to extend the duty of care under
these circumstances: 1) no moral blame attached to the defen-
dant's conduct; 2) the extension of liability in such cases would
not help to prevent future harm; 3) the burden on aircraft own-
ers and operators could be great; and 4) the actuarial unpredict-
ability of emotional distress damages could add significantly to
the cost of insuring air transportation.
VI. PREEMPTION OF STATE LAW CLAIMS AGAINST
AIRLINES UNDER THE AIRLINE
DEREGULATION ACT
In 1978, Congress enacted the Airline Deregulation Act
("ADA") to maximize reliance "on competitive market forces to
determine the quality, variety and price of air services. '256 Prior
to the passage of the ADA, the airline industry was heavily regu-
lated. To ensure that state regulation would not replace the old
federal regulation, the ADA provides that "no state ... shall en-
act or enforce any law, rule, regulation, standard, or other provi-
sion having the force and effect of law relating to rates, routes,
or services of any air carrier. ' 257 Since the 1992 Supreme Court
opinion in Morales v. Trans World Airlines, Inc.,258 defendants
have argued that the ADA preempts state law tort claims in a
variety of different settings. The current prevailing view in the
2,55 81 Cal. Rptr. 2d 745, 758-68 (Cal. App. 1999).
25" Airline Deregulation Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-504, 92 Stat. 1705 (1978).
257 Airline Deregulation Act § 105, 92 Stat. at 1708, codified at 49 U.S.C.
§ 41713(b)(1) formerly 49 U.S.C. App. § 1305(a)(1).
258 504 U.S. 374 (1992).
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federal courts is that the ADA does not preempt run-of-the-mill
state tort law claims.
A. THE ADA DOES NOT PREEMPT RUN-OF-THE-MILL STATE
LAW TORT CLAIMS
The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals, sitting en banc, held in
1998 that in enacting the ADA "Congress intended to preempt
only state laws and lawsuits that would adversely affect the eco-
nomic deregulation of the airlines and the forces of competition
within the airline industry." '259 The court concluded that Con-
gress had no intent to preempt run-of-the-mill personal injury
claims:
Congress used the word "service" in the phrase "rates, routes, or
services" in the ADA's preemption clause to refer to the prices,
schedules, origins and destinations of the point-to-point trans-
portation of passengers, cargo or mail .... To interpret "service"
more broadly is to ignore the context of its use; and, it effectively
would result in the preemption of virtually everything an airline
does.... Nowhere in the legislative history, or in what remains of
the federal airline regulatory statutes, does Congress intimate
that "service," in the context of deregulation, includes the dis-
pensing of food and drinks, flight attendant assistance, or the
like.26 °
The Ninth Circuit's Charas decision also concluded that Con-
gress's intent not to displace state tort law is demonstrated in
the fact that federal law still requires commercial airlines to
maintain insurance to cover bodily injury and death claims.26 1
Also, the FAA's savings clause 262 expressly preserves state tort law
remedies already existing at common law.
The Ninth Circuit in Newman v. American Airlines, Inc.,2 6 3 rely-
ing on its Charas decision, overturned a prior ruling and held
that the plaintiffs state law claims for her personal injuries were
not preempted by the ADA.
•259 Charas v. Trans World Airlines, Inc., 160 F.3d 1259 (9th Cir. 1998) (en
banc) (expressly overruling Harris v. American Airlines, Inc., 55 F.3d 1472 (9th
Cir. 1995); Gee v. Southwest Airlines, 110 F.3d 1400 (9th Cir. 1997)), cert. denied,
522 U.S. 915 (1997).
260 Charas, 160 F.3d at 1261,1266.
261 49 U.S.C. § 41112(a) (1994).
262 49 U.S.C. § 40120 (1994).
263 176 F.3d 1128 (9th Cir. 1999).
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In Lewis v. Continental Airlines, Inc.,"' a plaintiff who missed
his connecting flight from Houston to Atlanta, allegedly because
of the negligence of the airline, entered into an argument with
an airline employee during which the employee called a security
officer who turned the plaintiff over to the Houston Police De-
partment. Plaintiff was interrogated and searched, incarcerated
for twelve to fourteen hours, deprived of his epilepsy medica-
tion, and charged with aggravated assault against an airline em-
ployee and making terrorist threats. Plaintiff brought an action
against the airline, charging it with negligence, malicious prose-
cution, false arrest, intentional infliction of emotional distress,
assault, and violation of his right to be free from unwarranted
seizure of his person under the Constitution. The court held
that the plaintiff's state law claims were not preempted by the
ADA, because the activities in question did not constitute airline
services; they did not arise from ticketing, boarding, or baggage
services. 265 The effect of the lawsuit on the airline's services was
at best incidental. Furthermore, plaintiff contended that defen-
dant's actions were outrageous, and such claims have been
found to fall outside the scope of ADA preemption.
In Glavey v. Aer Lingus,266 a plaintiff alleged that her wallet was
stolen from her checked baggage during her trip on Aer Lingus.
She reported the loss to defendant's employees, who were alleg-
edly outraged that plaintiff, herself the employee of an airline,
should "'have the audacity to make such a Report.' ,267 Ten days
later, when she attempted to board her flight for home, employ-
ees of the airline would not allow her to board the flight unless
she wrote an apology to the airline. When plaintiff refused, she
was not permitted to board. The next day she returned home on
another airline. The court ruled that plaintiffs claim for theft
of goods was governed by the Warsaw Convention and was time-
barred. Plaintiff's claim for negligent exclusion was not pre-
empted however, by the ADA because her particular situation
did not fall under traditional boarding procedures so as to con-
stitute a "service" under the ADA.268
2634 40 F. Supp. 2d 406 (S.D. Tex. 1999).
265 Id. at 414.
266(' No. 98 Civ. 7003 (LAP), 1999 WL 493350 (S.D.N.Y. 1999).
27 Id. at *1.
268 The Glavey case does not discuss why plaintiff's claim for exclusion from
boarding did not fall within the scope of Article 17 as a boarding event.
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In Duncan v. Northwest Airlines, Inc.,2 69 the Ninth Circuit held
that the ADA did not preempt a class action suit for personal
injuries to flight attendants from defendant carrier's policy of
permitting smoking on certain flights. Applying the Charas test,
which interprets the word "services" in the ADA in its "public
utility sense" of "provision of air transportation to and from vari-
ous markets at various times, ' ' 27 ° the Duncan court held that al-
lowing smoking on certain flights does not constitute a service
because it does not relate to the frequency of scheduling of
transportation or the selection of markets to or from which
transportation is offered. Instead, smoking deals with "ameni-
ties" offered by the carrier, which are not within the scope of the
ADA's preemption.
B. ADA DOES NOT PREEMPT CLAIM FOR INADEQUATE
MEDICAL ASSISTANCE
In Landet v. Air France,271 the court held that the ADA did not
preempt plaintiffs claim alleging that the airline caused the
death of her mother by failing to see that she received adequate
medical care for an embolism after her airplane landed in
France.
Another case, Somes v. United Airlines, Inc.,27 2 dealt with an air-
line's failure to provide adequate emergency medical equip-
ment aboard its aircraft. In Somes, the widow of an airline
passenger sued the airline for the wrongful death of her hus-
band, who suffered a cardiac arrest and died while traveling
aboard defendant's aircraft. The plaintiff alleged that the air-
line negligently failed to equip its aircraft with certain medical
equipment, including an automatic external defibrillator. The
Somes court ruled that the provision of emergency medical
equipment is not inherent in the nature of an airline's opera-
tions and is typically not a "bargained-for or anticipated '271 ser-
vice. Therefore it did not fall within the ADA's meaning of
"service" as defined in the case law of the Ninth Circuit, to which
the court referred for guidance.
269 208 F.3d 1112 (9th Cir. 2000).
270 Id. at 1115.
271 182 F.3d 926 (9th Cir. 1999) (unpublished table decision).
272 33 F. Supp. 2d 78 (D. Mass. 1999).
273 Id. at 83 (quoting Hodges v. Delta Airlines, Inc., 44 F.3d 334, 336 (5th Cir.
1995)).
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In the unpublished decision Gulley v. American Airlines,"74 the
plaintiff-passenger was injured while descending the stairway of
a nineteen-seat commuter airplane. Plaintiff alleged that she in-
formed the airline that she was disabled and she needed assis-
tance in disembarking, yet the airline's employees provided no
help. The court held that the plaintiff's claim was not pre-
empted by the ADA.
C. ADA AND DIscRIMINATION CLAIMS
The plaintiffs in Woodson v. US Ainvays, Inc.2 75 filed suit assert-
ing federal discrimination claims and violation of the anti-dis-
crimination provision of the Federal Aviation Act ("FAA").276
They also asserted numerous state claims. US Airways filed a
motion to dismiss the FAA and state law claims.
The plaintiffs were an African-American couple who boarded
a US Airways plane going to San Juan, Puerto Rico. They pur-
chased their tickets electronically and received pre-assigned
seatings for the flight. An employee of US Airways told the
plaintiffs to board the plane. Once plaintiffs boarded, they no-
ticed that the plane was full and that two passengers, who were
white, were standing in the aisle without seats. The plaintiffs
had been in their assigned seats for about fifteen or twenty min-
utes when a second US Airways employee approached them and
told them that there was a "weight and balance" problem and
that because the Woodsons were the last two people to board
the plane, they would have to leave. The Woodsons explained
that they had to meet their cruise ship in San Juan that evening.
The employee assured them that there were other flights that
would get them there in time.
As soon as the plaintiffs left the plane, the two white passen-
gers who were previously standing in the aisle took plaintiffs'
seats. After leaving the plane, the plaintiffs also learned that
there were no flights that would allow them to meet their cruise
ship. The same employee that had told the Woodsons to board
the plane was rude, telling the plaintiffs that because they had
violated the "ten-minute rule" their tickets had been canceled.
Eventually, the plaintiffs met their cruise ship at its second port
of call, St. Thomas.
271 176 F.3d 483 (9th Cir. 1999) (unpublished table decision).
275 67 F. Supp. 2d 554 (1999).
276 49 U.S.C. § 41310 (1996).
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The court acknowledged that the ADA prohibits states from
regulating "price, route, or service" associated with commercial
air travel. In reviewing the case law, the court found inconsis-
tency in the application of ADA preemption to discrimination
claims. The court noted that the Second Circuit had previously
held that preemption issues must be decided on a case-by-case
basis. 277 The court denied defendants' motion to dismiss the
state law claims because the case was still premature, no factual
record existed, and the court did not find a prima facie impact
on services. The court also noted that the case would continue,
in any event, under the federal claims. The court did dismiss
the FAA anti-discrimination claim because the travel at issue was
not foreign air travel.
In Huggar v. Northwest Airlines, Inc.,2 78 the court held that the
ADA preempted plaintiff's state law claim for improper removal
from the plane because the airline's decision to remove the
plaintiff related to boarding services, even if the claim would
not have a significant economic impact on that service, Huggar
appears to be inconsistent with the Ninth Circuit's definition of
"services" for purposes of ADA's preemptive scope, since negli-
gence in treatment of a passenger boarding does not relate to
the selection of transportation markets or the economics of air-
line services.
D. ADA DOES NOT PREEMPT ROUTINE CONTRACT CLAIMS
Recent cases applying the Supreme Court decision in Ameri-
can Airlines, Inc. v. WolenS279 have held that routine breach of
contract claims are not preempted when the claims do not re-
quire anything more than interpreting the contractual terms to
which the airline itself stipulated. In Breitling U.S.A., Inc. v. Fed-
eral Express Corp.,28 the court held that a breach of contract
claim that relies on the equitable doctrine of waiver is pre-
empted under the ADA because such a claim relies on applica-
tion of state law equitable principles.
In In re Air Transportation Excise Tax Litigation,281 the District
Court of Minnesota held that plaintiff could bring a breach of
contract claim that solely involved duties self-imposed by the
277 See Abdu-Brisson v. Delta Airlines, Inc., 128 F.3d 77 (2d Cir. 1997).
278 No. 98 C 594, 1999 WL 59841 (N.D. Ill. 1999).
279 513 U.S. 219 (1995).
28) 45 F. Supp. 2d 179 (D. Conn. 1999).
28, 37 F. Supp. 2d 1133 (D. Minn. 1999).
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parties to the contract. Such breach of contract claims are
based on duties voluntarily assumed, not legally imposed by op-
eration of state law. The court also held that plaintiffs claims
for unjust enrichment against Federal Express were not pre-
empted because such claims would not adversely impact the eco-
nomics of the airline industry. The court stated that "Congress
surely did not pass the ADA to give airlines carte blanche to con-
vert property or unjustly enrich themselves willy-nilly, immu-
nized from state law consequences. '28 2
The court in Greer v. Federal Expres28- held that because the
contract claims were not preempted, removal to federal court
was in error. Therefore, the court affirmed its earlier decision
remanding the case to state court. In Greer, plaintiffs took a
sealed contractor's bid to a local delivery company and re-
quested delivery by a certain time. This company in turn hired
Federal Express to deliver the package. The package arrived
late, the bid was not considered, and the plaintiffs filed suit al-
leging that but for the failure of delivery, their low bid would
have won. Defendants removed to federal court, arguing that
the ADA preempts the state law claims. The court held that the
ADA does not preempt routine breach of contract claims.
The defendant also argued that removal was appropriate be-
cause federal common law will be applied to govern the limita-
tion of liability provisions in its contract. The court rejected this
argument, holding that a defense based on federal law is an in-
sufficient basis for federal question jurisdiction.
In Parra v. Tower Air, Inc.,284 the court found that the bumping
of passengers related to boarding services and that the plaintiffs'
claim affected services directly within the meaning of the ADA.
Therefore, the plaintiffs' breach of contract and breach of cove-
nant of good faith and fair dealing claims were preempted by
the ADA.
VII. IMPLIED FEDERAL PREEMPTION BY
PERVASIVE REGULATION
There is currently a conflict among the Circuit Courts
whether the Federal Aviation Act (FAA) and the regulations
promulgated thereunder (FARs) preempt state law on the the-
ory of "field preemption." The FAA has no express preemption
282 Id. at 1140.
283 1999 WL 803591 (W.D. Ky. 1999).
284 N.Y.LJ. July 22, 1999, pg. 30, col. 1 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1999).
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clause other than Section 105 (a) (1) of the 1978 ADA, discussed
supra at Part VI, which preempts state regulation of "rates,
routes and services," but not garden variety state tort claims.
Under the federal preemption doctrine, federal statutes pre-
empt state law only under certain conditions: 1) the federal law
expressly declares state law to be preempted (express preemp-
tion); 2) the federal law has no express preemption clause, but
state law "actually conflicts" with federal law or "stands as an ob-
stacle to the accomplishment of the full purpose and objectives
of Congress" (conflict preemption); or "Congress evidences an
intent to occupy a given field," thus preempting "any state law
falling within that field (field preemption)."285 The touchstone
of the federal preemption analysis is whether it was Congress's
intent to displace state law.286 In Wardair Canada, Inc. v. Florida
Department of Revenue, the Supreme Court held that for field pre-
emption to exist "we have required that there be evidence of a
congressional intent to pre-empt the specific field covered by the
state law."' 287 In Wardair, the court rejected the argument that by
enacting the Federal Aviation Act, Congress left no room for
local control over foreign air travel. The court upheld the valid-
ity of a state tax on aviation fuel.
In Cleveland v. Piper Aircraft Corp.,288 the Tenth Circuit ruled
that federal law neither expressly nor impliedly preempted com-
mon-law claims for the negligent design of an aircraft, even
though the design fully complied with FAA guidelines and the
aircraft received a certificate of airworthiness. Similarly, in Pub-
lic Health Trust of Dade County v. Lake Aircraft, Inc.,289 the Elev-
enth Circuit held that a state law negligent design claim could
progress despite the fact that, at the time of the crash, the air-
craft had a valid airworthiness certificate and was in compliance
with federal design regulations. Courts have observed that when
Congress ordered the FAA to develop aviation safety regula-
tions, it used the term "minimum standards" to describe these
regulations. These courts determined that a common-law duty
285 Silkwood v. Kerr-McGee Corp., 464 U.S. 238, 248-56 (1984). In Silkwood,
the Supreme Court held that despite the federal government's exclusive author-
ity over the safety and proper method of disposal of nuclear materials, state tort
law was not preempted and punitive damages could be awarded for personal in-
jury resulting from plutonium contamination.
286 See Wardair Canada, Inc. v. Florida Dep't of Revenue, 477 U.S. 1 (1986).
287 Id. (emphasis added).
288 985 F.2d 1438 (10th Cir. 1992), cert. denied, 510 U.S. 908 (1993).
289 992 F.2d 291 (11th Cir. 1993).
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of safety may be owed beyond the minimum standards of the
FAA regulations. 21
The Tenth and Eleventh Circuits concluded that there was no
implied preemption on various additional grounds:
1. There is a strong presumption against implied preemption,
absent clear proof of Congressional intent or an express pre-
emption clause;
2. Any Congressional intent to preempt state law is rebutted
by the FAA Act's express saving of state remedies existing at
common law and establishment of only "minimum standards;"
3. The express preemption clause in the 1978 ADA implies
that no other preemption of state law exists; and
4. There is also no "conflict preemption," because it is not
impossible to meet both state common law standards of safety
design and the federal regulations. 91
Going against what it acknowledged was the prevailing case
law, however, the Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit has
ruled that in enacting the FAA law and authorizing relevant reg-
ulations to be promulgated, Congress intended generally to pre-
empt state and territorial regulation of aviation safety. In
Abdullah v. American Airlines, Inc.,29 2 applying the theory of "field
preemption," the court concluded that the standards of care in
aviation accident cases must be based solely on federal statutes
and regulations because federal regulation of this area is perva-
sive and leaves no room for inconsistent state standards of care.
The Third Circuit held that 14 C.F.R. Section 91.13(a), which
provides that " [n] o persons may operate an aircraft in a careless
or reckless manner so as to endanger the life or property of an-
other," establishes a "complete and thorough" standard of safety
in operation of aircraft, and this standard preempts supplemen-
tation or variation by state law standards of care.293 The court
looked to the legislative history of the FAA and the statements
29) See, e.g., In reAir Disaster at Lockerbie, Scotland, 37 F.3d 804, 815 (2d Cir.
1994), cert. denied, 513 U.S. 1126 (1995); Cleveland v. Piper Aircraft Corp., 985
F.2d 1438, 1445 (10th Cir. 1992); cert. denied, 510 U.S. 908 (1993); Sunbird Air
Services, Inc. v. Beech Aircraft Corp., 789 F. Supp. 360, 362-63 (D. Kan. 1992);
Holliday v. Bell Helicopters Textron, Inc., 747 F. Supp. 1396, 1401 (D. Haw.
1990); see also In reAir Crash Disaster atJFK Int'l Airport, 635 F.2d 67, 74-75 (2d
Cir. 1980); Trinidad v. American Airlines, 932 F. Supp. 521 (S.D.N.Y. 1996); In re
Air Crash Disaster at Stapleton Int'l Airport, 721 F. Supp. 1185, 1187 (D. Colo.
1988).
291 See Cleveland, 985 F.2d at 1441-45; Public Health Trust, 992 F.2d at 294-95.
292 181 F.3d 363 (3d Cir. 1999).
291 Id. at 365.
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there emphasizing the need to have one agency issue safety reg-
ulations. The court relied also on cases that had concluded that
the FAA regulations in such discrete areas as pilot regulations or
airspace management preempted state law.294
Because the standard of care in 14 C.F.R. Section 91.13(a) is a
general one, the Abdullah court held that when a jury is consid-
ering whether or not a pilot acted "carelessly or recklessly," ex-
pert testimony may help the jury to understand whether the
pilot's actions "constituted careless or reckless operation. 295
Although the Third Circuit found federal preemption of the
standards of aviation safety, it went on to conclude that tradi-
tional state law remedies will continue to apply to redress viola-
tion of those standards. Thus, if an airline violates the standard
of care set forth in federal statutes and regulations, state law will
determine the availability and amount of damages. 9 6
In Somes v. United Airlines, Inc.,297 the court rejected the argu-
ment that the plaintiffs claim for failure to provide adequate
emergency medical equipment aboard its aircraft was pre-
empted under the federal doctrine of field preemption on the
ground that FAA regulations did not require the inclusion of a
defibrillator in the aircraft's emergency medical kit. The court
noted that the federal regulations merely set forth minimum re-
quirements, which did not prevent the airline from carrying sup-
plemental devices to protect its passengers or preempt state law
from requiring more from the airlines.2 9  The court also re-
jected the airline's argument that the plaintiffs claim was im-
pliedly preempted under a conflict theory. The court ruled that
the defendant's argument on this issue was premature, because
no conflict could exist between state and federal requirements
unless and until the FAA declined to approve the fulfillment of
the state requirement. There was nothing in the record to sug-
294 Plaintiffs would argue, however, that these cases are reflective of either ac-
tual "conflict preemption," or discrete areas of specific "field preemption," in
which Congress did indicate its intent to "pre-empt the specific field covered by the
state law," such as airspace management. Wardair Canada, Inc. v. Florida Dep't
of Revenue, 477 U.S. 1, 6 (1986).
295 Abdullah, 181 F.3d at 371-72.
296 For a case applying Abdullah, see Margolies-Mezvinsky v. U.S. Air Corp., 2000
WL 122355 (E.D. Pa. Jan. 2000); see also Retzler v. Pratt and Whitney Co., 723
N.E.2d 345 (Il1. App. Ct. 1999) (interpreting as preempting state standards of
aviation safety, but not state remedies; accordingly, plaintiffs could assert a claim
for relief under state law).
297 33 F. Supp. 2d 78 (D. Mass. 1999).
298 Id. at 85-87.
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gest that the FAA had denied or would deny approval for an
enhanced emergency medical kit. Indeed, the court observed
that this argument was disingenuous, because several airlines,
including the defendant, had actually installed or announced
plans to install defibrillators in their aircraft.
The Somes court additionally relied on the facts that federal
law still required commercial airlines to obtain insurance for in-
jury and death claims, consistent with the nonpreemption of
state tort claims; the FAA law contains a savings clause preserv-
ing state tort law remedies; and the ADA preemption clause
neither refers to claims relating to safety of passengers nor cre-
ates an alternative remedy for tort damages.299
In In re Commercial Airfield,3° ° the Supreme Court of Vermont
phrased the "field preemption" question differently from the
Third Circuit in Abdullah: "Appellant frames the question as
whether federal law has fully occupied the field of aircraft opera-
tion. The appropriate and narrower question is whether the
federal government has fully occupied the field of land use as it
relates to aircraft operation. '"-' Framing the question in this
fashion appears to be more in tune with the Supreme Court de-
cision in Wardair Canada, Inc., °2 which held that "field preemp-
tion" requires proof that Congress intended "to pre-empt the
specific field covered by the state law" and which validated a
state tax on aviation fuel.""3 The Vermont Supreme Court con-
cluded in Commercial Airfield that "although the federal govern-
ment has preempted certain aspects of aircraft and airport
operation, it has not preempted land use issues such as zoning
and environmental review.""" 4 Thus, in that case, the court held
that the airport owner was required to comply with local permit
requirements regarding land use, even for certain airport im-
provements and associated flight activities.
299 See also Avemco Ins. Co. v. Elliott Aviation Flight Serv., Inc., 27 Av. Cas.
[CCH] 17,569 (C.D. I11. 2000), which held that the FAR's, in particular 14 CFR
§ 91.13, which prohibits operation of an aircraft in a careless or reckless manner,
could be considered to determine whether the pilot breached the standard of
care he owed to his student pilot and was "[i] n addition to the ... [state law] duty
to act as a reasonably prudent pilot."
-o 752 A.2d 13 (Vt. 2000).
301 Id. at 14.
302 Wardair Canada, Inc. v. Florida Dep't of Reserve, 477 U.S. 1 (1986).
,W9 Id. at 6.
304 Commercial Airfield, 752 A.2d at 15.
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VIII. LIABILITY OF MANUFACTURERS
A. THE 1994 GENERAL AVIATION REVITALIZATION ACT
The 1994 General Aviation Revitalization Act (GARA)3 °5 is a
statute of repose that, with limited exceptions, bars actions
against aircraft manufacturers and aircraft component part
manufacturers for passenger product defect claims that arise
more than eighteen years after the manufacture of a plane or
any component involved in an accident.
In Campbell v. Parker-Hannifin Corp.,3 °6 an action for wrongful
death arising out of an airplane crash in Australia, GARA barred
plaintiffs suit against Cessna, because the aircraft had been
manufactured more than eighteen years before the crash. The
fact that the gyroscopic artificial horizon and vacuum pumps
were replaced less than eighteen years before the crash did not
revive the cause of action against Cessna because Cessna submit-
ted proof that it had nothing to do with the manufacture of the
replacement components. Plaintiffs argument that Cessna
should be liable on a failure to warn theory rather than as the
manufacturer of the replacement components was not viable,
held the court, because GARA could not be circumvented by
merely relabeling the claim.30 7
In Burroughs v. Precision Airmotive Corp.,3"' a California state ap-
pellate court held that GARA also covers a successor manufac-
turer which assumes the obligations and duties of the actual
manufacturer.
B. ADMISSIBILITY OF EVIDENCE ISSUES
In Lawhon v. Ayres Corp.," ' evidence of prior accidents was ad-
missible where the plaintiff established that the prior events
arose out of substantially similar circumstances. The evidence
was introduced in the context of proof that the accidents in
question all involved defendant's aircraft and the prior acci-
dents were followed by warnings and recommendations regard-
ing corrective measures.
The court held, however, that the service bulletin issued by
the manufacturer after the subject crash should have been ex-
cluded because it was evidence of a subsequent remedial mea-
305 49 U.S.C. § 40101 (1996).
306 82 Cal. Rptr. 2d 202 (Cal. Ct. App. 1999).
307 Id. at 1545-46.
308 93 Cal. Rptr. 2d 124 (Cal. Ct. App. 2000).
309 992 S.W.2d 162 (Ark. Ct. App. 1999).
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sure. The bulletin required inspection of the wing spar to detect
cracks in the lower spar of the wing assemblies. The plaintiff
alleged that the crash was caused by wing structure failure or by
pilot error. The evidence served only to show the culpability of
the manufacturer and was not offered for any other purpose.
The court also held that it was reversible error for the trial court
to admit testimony that the decedent-pilot had a reputation for
being reckless. The rules of evidence preclude the admission of
evidence of a trait or character to conclude that a person acted
in conformity with that trait on the occasion in question."')
In Smith v. Beech Aircraft Corp.,"'' the Ninth Circuit held that
the district court did not abuse its discretion in admitting other
accident evidence at trial. After the parties vigorously briefed
and argued the issue of "substantial similarity" of the prior acci-
dents, the district court found that it could not determine the
exact nature of the accident in this case and decided to permit
the jury to decide whether this accident occurred in the same
manner as the prior accidents. Special interrogatories indicated
that the jury found that the other accidents had occurred in the
same way.
In an unpublished decision, an appellate court in Ohio ruled
that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in allowing defen-
dant Hartzell Propeller to add expert witnesses after discovery
cut-off dates."12 The plaintiff rejected the court's offer of a con-
tinuance in order to depose the expert witnesses. On appeal,
the court held that plaintiff could have cured any prejudice by
accepting the continuance. In this case, defendant Hartzell was
found not liable for a product defect in a case involving separa-
tion of propeller blades from the propeller assembly. The de-
fendant's experts had testified that the blade separation was
caused by prior blade damage.
C. GOVERNMENT CONTRACTOR DEFENSE
In Arnhold v. McDonnell Douglas Corp.,313 a Missouri appellate
court stretched the limits of the government contractor defense,
which immunizes, in certain instances, a government contractor
who provides a product to the government according to specific
31o Id. at 164.
"1' 178 F.3d 1300 (9th Cir. 1999).
312 See Stokes v. Hartzell Propeller, Inc., 1999 WL 1034461 (Ohio Ct. App.
1999).
'-3 992 S.W.2d 346 (Mo. Ct. App. 1999).
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government-selected specifications. The court applied the de-
fense to the actions of a government contractor who was test
flying aircraft for the government at supersonic speeds. In this
case, a landowner alleged that the sonic booms from military
aircraft flown by the defendant caused severe damage to his
building. The plaintiff did not claim that the aircraft had been
defectively designed and argued that the court should not "ex-
tend" the government contractor defense to the contractor's
conduct and performance during the contractor's contractual
relationship with the government. The court rejected the plain-
tiff's argument.
The government contractor defense was adopted by the Su-
preme Court in 1988 in the case Boyle v. United Technologies
Corp." 4 The Boyle decision reasoned that if the government can-
not be sued under the Federal Tort Claims Act for its discretion-
ary decisions in selecting military products because these
choices involve protected social, economic, political and military
decision-making, then its contractors should also be immunized
when they build the product in accordance with government-
approved, reasonably precise specifications, provided that the
government had full knowledge of any potential risks or dan-
gers. The court concluded that if the contractors are not immu-
nized, the cost of liability would ultimately be borne by the
government as a matter of contract pricing.
In Arnhold, the question involved extending the defense to
the conduct of the contractor in conducting supersonic flights
for the government. The court found that the defendant's per-
formance of military test flights at supersonic speeds, per the
government's requirements, still involved a uniquely federal in-
terest. The government's requirements and procedures for air-
craft testing involved the performance of a governmental
discretionary function that was immune from liability under
FTCA.1  Thus, the threshold issue for the application of the
government contractor defense had been met. After conclud-
ing that portions of Boyle's three-prong test were inappropriate
to a case dealing with negligent performance, the court applied
a modified version of the Boyle test and ruled that the defendant
had met its evidentiary burden by showing that 1) the govern-
314 487 U.S. 500 (1988).
315 In Ward v. United States, 471 F.2d 667 (3d Cir. 1972), the court held that
the government's decision regarding the necessity of supersonic flights was a dis-
cretionary act, but the court did not rule out the possible liability for negligence
in operating the flight contrary to the government's procedures.
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ment approved reasonably precise documented procedures for
the contractor's supersonic test flights; 2) the test flights were
flown by the defendant's pilots in strict conformance with those
procedures; and 3) the government had full knowledge of the
potential adverse consequences of the supersonic flights.
In Bragg v. United States,31" the court held that the Navy was
not liable for the death of a worker who was crushed by a swing-
ing hangar door at a Naval Air Station. The designer of the
hanger door also moved for summary judgment, claiming it was
protected from liability by the government contractor defense.
The design company argued that the Navy had approved the
design of the door and the switch that operated it. In applying
the Boyle test, the court concluded that while the government
conducted a "substantive review of the overall design for the
hangar," the evidence did not indicate whether the government
reviewed and approved the design feature in question. 17 The
Bragg court held that under Boyle, the government contractor
defense only protects government contractors from liability for
design defects when the government has "approved reasonably
precise specifications" for the design feature at issue.3 1 There-
fore, given the lack of evidence to show that the government
reviewed and approved the design feature in question, summary
judgment was denied.
Similarly, in Shurr v. Siegler,"1 9 the court held that defendants
Hydro-Aire and Crane-Hydro-Aire, Inc. were not entitled to
summary judgment on the government contractor defense be-
cause the Air Force did not approve reasonably precise specifica-
tions for all the design features in question.
The Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals in the recent case Kerstetter
v. Pacific Scientific Co. 3 21 also confirmed that to satisfy prong one
of the Boyle test, the government must have actually evaluated
the design feature alleged to be defective. The specifications
approved by the government need not address the specific de-
sign "defect" alleged to exist, but they must address the "design
feature" in question. z'
116 55 F. Supp. 2d 575 (S.D. Miss. 1999).
117 Id. at 591.
318 Id.
1 1999 WL 1029528 (E.D. Wis. 1999).
920 210 F.3d 431 (5th Cir. 2000).
321 In Kerstetter, the court affirmed the ruling below that the contractor was
immune from liability for alleged design defects in the alleged aircraft's pilot
restraint system.
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IX. LIABILITY OF THE UNITED STATES
A. LIABILITY FOR INCORRECT INTERPRETATION OF
FAA REGULATION
The United States government may be sued only to the extent
it has waived its sovereign immunity. The Federal Tort Claims
Act ("F[CA")322 provides for a broad waiver of immunity that is
subject to specified statutory exceptions and a judicially created
exception known as the Feres doctrine, which bars suit by mili-
tary service members injured while on active duty. The FTCA
does not create causes of action against the U.S. government.
Rather, it permits suit according to the law of the place where
the misconduct occurred, including its choice of law rules, but
limits the scope of liability of the government to actual negli-
gence and to instances when a private individual would be liable
under like circumstances. Thus, if the government agency is
performing a peculiarly governmental task not performed by
private individuals, courts will not permit suit.
In Central Airlines, Inc. v. United States,3 23 the plaintiff-carrier
filed a negligence suit against the Federal Aviation Administra-
tion (FAA) under the FTCA for economic loss due to negli-
gence in interpreting federal regulations. The FAA had
informed the plaintiff, a commercial air freight carrier, that its
planes did not comply with federal regulations governing flights
in icing conditions. The carrier protested the FAA's interpreta-
tion of the relevant regulations. Faced with threats and fines,
however, the carrier subsequently complied with the FAA's de-
mands by installing the requested equipment. The FAA later
admitted that it had incorrectly interpreted the regulations.
The carrier subsequently filed the negligence suit against the
FAA. The law of Missouri, the place of the wrong, did not recog-
nize a negligence cause of action analogous to the carrier's
claim for misinterpretation of regulations. Therefore, the car-
rier's claim was dismissed.
B. EXCEPTION TO GOVERNMENT LIABILITY FOR
DISCRETIONARY FUNCTIONS
The FTCA discretionary function exception to the waiver of
immunity 24 was at issue in Carter v. Bell Helicopter Textron, Inc.125
3'22 28 U.S.C. § 2674 (1940).
323 169 F.3d 1174 (8th Cir. 1999).
324 28 U.S.C. § 2680(a) (1940).
325 52 F. Supp. 2d 1108 (D. Az. 1999).
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In this case, the discretionary function exception barred suit
against the United States based on the Forest Service's conduct
during the investigation into a helicopter crash. The plaintiff
and defendant Bell Helicopter, after settling the case between
them, sought to hold the government liable for spoliation of evi-
dence. After the helicopter crash, the Forest Service inivesti-
gated, took pictures, and removed the wreckage. After the
wreckage was removed, the swivel hook, which was crucial to the
determination of fault between Bell Helicopter and the manu-
facturer of the alleged defective part, was lost. Various statutes,
policies, and regulations authorize the Forest Service to organ-
ize, conduct, and control aviation accident investigations. The
plaintiff and manufacturers argued that the Forest Service was
mandated by regulation to release the wreckage at the appropri-
ate time and that therefore the government could be held liable
for spoliation of evidence because the obligation to release the
wreckage was not performance of a discretionary function. The
court rejected this argument, holding that in conducting the
crash investigation, the Forest Service did have to make choices
and decisions that effect social, economic, and political pol-
icy.:" The court noted that none of the Federal Regulations
and nothing in the Forest Service's "Aviation Accident Investiga-
tion Report Manual" dictated the manner in which the investiga-
tor must conduct the accident investigation. Thus, the court
concluded that the scope and manner of the investigation of the
crash was discretionary.
The court went on to note that even when the conduct of an
investigator indicates "poor judgment and a general disregard
for sound investigative procedure,3 2 7 the discretionary function
may still apply. The court found that the primary purpose of
the accident investigation was to prevent similar accidents and
to obtain and preserve factual evidence. Therefore, an investi-
gation must take into consideration broad social and economic
policies, and these were the type of decisions Congress intended
to shield from tort liability. 28 The court's decision does not ap-
pear to take into account that while there may be discretion in
performance of the investigation, the specific duty to release the
wreckage does not involve discretion of a social, economic, or
political type and should not be immunized.
326 Id. at 1112.
,'27 Id. at 1116.
328 See id. at 1117.
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X. LIABILITY OF FOREIGN NATIONS: THE FOREIGN
SOVEREIGN IMMUNITIES ACT
A. LIABILITY FOR A FOREIGN STATE'S TERRORIST ACTS
Many foreign air carriers and foreign manufacturers of air-
crafts are owned by foreign states. When suit is brought against
a foreign state-owned entity, the Foreign Sovereign Immunities
Act (FSIA) 329 applies. The FSIA determines under which cir-
cumstances a foreign state can be sued in the United States.
The scope of liability is determined by the extent of the excep-
tion to foreign state sovereign immunity. In 1996, the FSIA was
amended to provide another exception to immunity. The new
exception to immunity is for a foreign state's terrorist acts di-
rected at United States citizens. This amendment has been ap-
plied against Cuba in a lawsuit arising out of the international
shoot-down of two United States civilian airplanes that were fly-
ing over international waters. Cuba was designated as a foreign
state sponsor of terrorism, and the court found that the shoot-
ing constituted extra-judicial killings for which no immunity
exists.33
Plaintiffs in the Cuban shoot-down case successfully con-
cluded their case and obtained a judgment against the Republic
of Cuba. However, Cuba's Ministry of Foreign Relations ex-
pressed its intention to reject the court's mandate, and it re-
fused to compensate the victims. Thus, the victims were
required to seek other means to satisfy their judgment. Once
victims of terrorism have obtained a judgment against a foreign
government by virtue of the anti-terrorism provision of the FSIA,
the statute further strips the foreign government of immunity
and allows the victims to attach any property belonging to the
foreign government located in the United States."' Following
the action of the Cuban Ministry in this case, Congress again
amended the FSIA to require the Secretaries of the Treasury
and State to assist any judgment creditor under this section in
"identifying, locating, and executing against the property of the
foreign state or any agency or instrumentality of such state. 332
The statute further provides, however, that the President may
waive the requirements of this section in the interest of national
12, 28 U.S.C. § 1602 (1994).
330 Alejandre v. Republic of Cuba, 42 F. Supp. 2d 1317 (S.D. Fla. 1997), vacated
on other grounds and remanded, 183 F.3d 1277 (11th Cir. 1999).
131 28 U.S.C. § 1610 (1994 & Supp. 2000).
332 Id.
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security. 333 On the same day that the President signed this
amendment into law, he invoked the waiver provision in the Cu-
ban shoot-down case. Following the President's action, the Cu-
ban government argued that the President's waiver prevented
the plaintiffs from attaching blocked assets to satisfy the judg-
ment. In the most recent district court decision involving this
litigation, the court rejected Cuba's argument, holding that this
provision only gave the President the authority to waive the re-
quirement that the Secretaries of Treasury and State assist the
judgment creditor in locating and executing against property
and did not affect the right of the judgment creditor to attach
assets.
3 34
B. LIABILITY FOR COMMERCIAL ACTIVITY
A foreign state is not immune under the FSIA when the action
"is based upon a commercial activity carried on in the United
States by a foreign state." ' 5 In Moses v. Air Afrique,3"6 this excep-
tion to immunity was held not to apply to a personal injury ac-
tion arising from an Air Afrique flight that departed from New
York, bound for Senegal, with a destination of Nigeria, in which
the plaintiff claimed that the carrier's employees accosted him
in the airport baggage claim area in Senegal. Despite the fact
that the alleged wrongful conduct of the employees occurred in
connection with the New York flight's arrival in Senegal, and
despite the fact that a carrier's duty of care to its passengers ex-
tends to the baggage claim area and throughout the entire flight
relationship, the Moses court held that plaintiffs cause of action
was not "based upon" the flight's commercial activity in the
United States. The court held that the phrase "based upon" re-
quires that elements of the plaintiffs right to relief must require
proof of the defendant's commercial activity in the United
States.3 7 While this is indeed true, other courts have held that
this "based upon" requirement is met when the "proof comes in
the form of some duty owned to the plaintiff as a result of defen-
dant's commercial activity in the United States."3 Under this
standard, the result in Moses should have been different. In
333 Id.
334 Alejandre, 42 F. Supp. 2d at 1330-31.
335 28 U.S.C. § 1605(a) (2) (1994).
336 No. 99-CV-541, 2000 WL 306853 (E.D.N.Y. Mar. 21, 2000).
337 Id. at *3 (citing Nelson v. Saudi Arabia, 507 U.S. 349, 357 (1993)).
338 Nazarian v. Compagnie Nationale Air France, 989 F. Supp. 504, 508
(S.D.N.Y. 1998).
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Owolabi v. Air France,39 the court held that Air France was not
immune from liability for breach of contract in a transport of
cargo case where the contract was entered into in New York,
although the damage was sustained in Nigeria. However, plain-
tiff's claim for intentional infliction of emotional distress, ex-
tending from conduct which occurred in France, was said not to
be "based upon" commercial activity in the United States, be-
cause proof of that claim did not require any proof that Air
France sold plaintiff the transportation in New York.
C. No JuRY TRIAL UNDER THE FSIA
Actions against foreign states pursuant to the FSIA are tried to
the federal court without a jury whether the suit is instituted in
federal court or removed by the foreign state to that forum.
Thus, in Laor v. Air France,34 ° involving an action against an air
line that was an instrumentality of the French government,
there was no right to a jury trial.
XI. LIABILITY OF MAINTENANCE COMPANIES
An unpublished decision from a Texas appellate state court
upheld a finding of liability for compensatory and punitive dam-
ages against a maintenance company doing work for the United
States Air Force.34 The case involved the crash of a military
Learjet C-21A near Mobile, Alabama en route from Andrews Air
Force Base to Randolph Air Force Base. All eight service mem-
bers on board were killed. A severe fuel storage imbalance in
the wings caused the left wing to hold 1,800 pounds more fuel
than the right wing, forcing the plane to go into a spin and
crash. When the pilots landed at Andrews, they reported electri-
cal and fuel system problems. The government's contract with
the maintenance outfit Serv-Air required that the mechanic fill
out a particular form and, in this instance, place a red "x" to
denote the seriousness of the reported condition. The red "x"
would have meant that the plane could not be released as air-
worthy until the repairs were made and the "x" removed. The
mechanic did not fill out the form and had not finished
troubleshooting the plane when the pilot asked to defer further
maintenance until the plane reached home base at Randolph.
339 No. 99 Civ. 0017, 2000 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 3208 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 15, 2000).
340 51 F. Supp. 2d 505 (S.D.N.Y. 1999).
341 See Serv-Air, Inc. v. Profitt, 18 S.W.3d 652 (Tex. App. § San Antonio 1999,
pet. abated) (unpublished table decision).
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Had the red "x" been recorded, the pilot would not have been
allowed this option. The mechanic released the plane, and it
crashed before reaching Randolph.
The jury found no negligence against the pilots and no liabil-
ity against the manufacturer. It found the government contrac-
tor negligent for its failure to train the pilots on a procedure
that could have possibly prevented the crash. This defendant
settled with the plaintiffs after trial. The maintenance outfit
Serv-Air appealed the finding of liability for compensatory and
punitive damages. The appellate court upheld the jury's ver-
dict, concluding that from a subjective perspective the mechanic
was consciously indifferent to the safety of the pilots when he
released the aircraft after completely ignoring documentation
procedures, knowing that the aircraft had a problem that he
had not fixed, and knowing that he had not told this to anyone.
The court also found sufficient evidence to uphold punitive
damages against Serv-Air's management. There was evidence of
system-wide failures in training and supervision, including
nondocumentation of unresolved maintenance problems.
XII. JURISDICTIONAL AND PROCEDURAL QUESTIONS
A. FORUM NON CONVENIENS
Defendants' motion for dismissal of French plaintiff cases
based on forum non conveniens in In re Air Crash Off Long Island,
New York, on July 17, 1996, 142 was denied in the Southern District
of New York. The case involves the disaster of TWA Flight 800
on July 17, 1996, which crashed into the U.S. territorial seas off
Long Island, New York, shortly after its departure from Kennedy
Airport in New York City for a flight to Paris and Rome. More
than half the passengers were American, and the remaining pas-
sengers were primarily European. The largest number of for-
eign passengers on Flight 800 were from France. The motion by
defendants TWA and Boeing sought dismissal of the actions
brought on behalf of the French domiciliaries killed in the
crash. If successful on that motion, the defendants then in-
tended to seek dismissal of all foreign plaintiffs' claims.
The court noted that at "first blush" one would wonder why
the defendants would file such a motion, given that the accident
occurred over United States territorial waters, all defendants are
342 65 F. Supp. 2d 207 (S.D.N.Y. 1999).
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United States corporations, and "most-if not all-of the evi-
dence pertaining to liability is located in the United States." '343
Defendants TWA and Boeing supported the motion with a
conditional promise that if the court dismissed the French ac-
tions and the actions were subsequently filed in France, these
defendants would agree not to contest liability in the French
courts. The court acknowledged that with this conditional
promise France could provide an adequate alternative forum.
The court nonetheless found that the private interest factors did
not strongly support dismissal of the French actions and were in
equipoise. For example, the plaintiffs had invested time and
money on discovery, independent investigations, experts, con-
sultants, and pretrial proceedings in the United States. The
court also noted that in France contingency fee arrangements
are not permitted, and plaintiffs may face difficulties retaining
replacement counsel in France.
As to the public interest factors, the court concluded that they
weighed strongly against dismissal. The court began its discus-
sion of the public interest factors by noting that the defendants
had failed to cite a single case arising from a catastrophic event
that happened in United States territory that was dismissed on
forum non conveniens grounds. The court concluded that the
public interest factors favored suit in the United States because
the United States had expended great resources and had a
strong interest in such a large disaster occurring in its territory
and because the court found it desirable to avoid piecemeal liti-
gation. The court did not believe it would be fair to burden
courts throughout Europe when it would still have to resolve the
remaining American plaintiff cases.
In In re Air Crash Disaster Near Palembang, Indonesia,344 the dis-
trict court denied defendant Boeing's motion for dismissal
based on forum non conveniens in a case in which the air disaster
took place in Indonesia. Other considerations were that the
crash involved a Silk Air flight, a foreign carrier; Silk Air was not
amenable to suit in the United States; and the foreign investiga-
tion was considering whether the cause of the crash was pilot
homicide or suicide. The court denied the motion to dismiss
plaintiffs' cases because plaintiffs' claims against Boeing were
based on design defect in the Boeing 737 rudder control and
the evidence of that alleged defect was all in the United States.
1 3 1d.
'144 MDL No. 1276, slip op. (W.D. Wash. 2000).
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The court also emphasized the public interest in the State of
Washington concerning any potential design defect to an air-
craft popularly flown in the U.S. and the presumption in favor
of retaining the action in a plaintiffs chosen forum.
A foreign plaintiff defeated a forum non conveniens motion in
Woods v. Nova Companies Belize, Ltd.. 45 In Woods, a resident of
Belize was injured in an aircraft accident in Costa Rica. The
passenger was on an aircraft owned by a Belizean corporation,
and there was no significant question of liability. In evaluating
the private interests of the litigation, the court concluded that
Florida was an appropriate forum since the majority of the
plaintiffs medical treatment occurred in the United States, with
a substantial amount of treatment taking place in Florida, and
the majority of the damages testimony and evidence would in-
volve witnesses located in Florida.
In contrast, in Campbell v. Parker-Hannifin Corp.,'46 an action
for the wrongful death of Australian citizens arising out of an
airplane crash in Australia, the appellate court upheld the deci-
sion granting defendant's motion for forum non conveniens on
the ground that all plaintiffs were from Australia and virtually all
of the evidence relating to damages was located in Australia.
The court acknowledged that all of the evidence relating to the
design and manufacture of the airplane was in the United States
but held that California's interest in the case was not sufficient
tojustify the commitment ofjudicial time and resources that the
case would require.
B. SUBJECT MAITER JURISDICTION
In Gschwind v. Cessna Aircraft Co., 47 the plaintiff, a citizen of
Belgium, filed a wrongful death action in Ohio state court
against defendants for the death of her husband, a French na-
tional residing in Belgium at the time of his death. Death oc-
curred while the decedent piloted a Cessna aircraft near
Cannes, France. The defendants included Cessna, a Kansas cor-
poration, Pratt & Whitney, a Canadian Corporation, and Hart-
zell Propeller, Inc., an Ohio corporation. Cessna removed the
case to district court, asserting diversity. The plaintiffs claim
was dismissed based on forum non conveniens, and the Tenth Cir-
cuit affirmed. Subsequently, plaintiff filed a motion for rehear-
345 739 So. 2d 617 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1999).
341 82 Cal. Rptr. 2d 202 (Cal. Ct. App. 1999).
347 189 F.R.D. 643 (D. Kan. 1999).
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ing and for the first time argued that the District Court did not
have diversity jurisdiction over the case. The Tenth Circuit de-
nied the motion without opinion and plaintiff filed a petition in
the Supreme Court, which was denied. 48
The plaintiff then filed a motion to vacate the district court's
previous order pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Proce-
dure 60 (b) (4), arguing that because the district court never had
diversity jurisdiction it was without power to dismiss the action.
The district court held, however, that once the Supreme Court
denied plaintiff a writ of certiorari the issue of subject-matter
jurisdiction became res judicata and could not be collaterally
attacked.
At the outset the court acknowledged that if the court did not
have subject-matter jurisdiction over the case, then its dismissal
based on forum non conveniens was an erroneous exercise ofjuris-
diction. However, the court held that an erroneous judgment
does not render the order a nullity and does not justify plain-
tiffs' collateral attack. The court held that a court has the power
to determine its own jurisdiction and an error in that determina-
tion will not render the judgment void. Thus, a judgment based
upon an erroneous finding of diversity is not void and is im-
mune from collateral attack. Similarly, the Second Circuit held
that a defendant in a multi-district litigation case who failed to
argue lack of diversity jurisdiction until after a jury verdict in
plaintiff's favor forfeited the defense of lack of subject matter
jurisdiction.'4
In a diversity case, Luckett v. Delta Airlines, Inc.,35 a plaintiff
brought an action in state court alleging that her heart failure
was caused by the fact that defendant lost the luggage which
contained her prescription medicine. Defendant had the case
removed to federal court, where the court dismissed the action
because the prescriptive period had run. The plaintiff argued
that the federal court did not have subject matter jurisdiction
because the amount in controversy did not exceed $75,000.
The Fifth Circuit held that the trial court did not err in finding
that the plaintiffs claim exceeded $75,000 because plaintiff al-
leged in her complaint damages for loss of property, travel ex-
penses, an emergency ambulance trip, a six-day stay in the
348 Gschwind v. Cessna Aircraft Co., 526 U.S. 1112 (1999).
349 See Hamilton v. Atlas Turner, Inc., 197 F.3d 58 (2d Cir. 1999).
350 171 F.3d 295 (5th Cir. 1999).
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hospital, pain and suffering, humiliation, and temporary inabil-
ity to do housework.
In Montanez v. Solstar Corp., 3 5' the court denied plaintiffs' mo-
tion for remand on the ground of lack of complete diversity,
because the plaintiffs had fraudulently joined a travel agency in
an attempt to defeat diversity. The court held that in a case in-
volving personal injury from an altercation with a flight attend-
ant, there was no basis for a claim against the travel agent who
sold the tickets. Accordingly, the court concluded that the
plaintiff fraudulently joined the travel agent to defeat the diver-
sity between the plaintiffs and the defendant airline. Plaintiffs'
motion for remand was therefore denied.
C. IN PERSONAM JURISDICTION
In the 1987 case Bearry v. Beech Aircraft Corp.,5 2 the Fifth Cir-
cuit ruled that there was no basis for personal jurisdiction over
defendant Beech in Texas simply because Beech's products
flowed into Texas. In a more recent case, however, a Texas ap-
pellate court ruled that, in the years following the Fifth Circuit's
ruling in Beany, Beech Aircraft's contacts with the state had
evolved to the point that the exercise of long-arm jurisdiction
was no longer precluded."' : The court noted that Beech is a
wholly-owned subsidiary of Raytheon Company and that
changes had recently been made to the corporate structure at
Raytheon. The activities of other Raytheon subsidiaries, and
Beech's close relationship to them, were sufficient to allow the
court to conclude that Beech does business in Texas through
the activities of these subsidiaries. In addition, the court ob-
served that Raytheon has a web site that includes a Beech home
page, which the court characterized as "somewhat interactive."
Although the web site alone would not have been sufficient to
establish jurisdiction in Texas, the court found that it was a fac-
tor to be considered along with the other contacts. Finally, the
court noted that the aircraft in the current case had been modi-
fied in Texas, including the installation of engines and a Beech-
made part. This also distinguished the case from Beary, where
the lawsuit did not in any way relate to Beech's contacts in
35, 46 F. Supp. 2d 101 (D.P.R. 1999).
352 818 F.2d 370 (5th Cir. 1987).
353 See Jones v. Beech Aircraft Corp., 995 S.W.2d 767 (Tex. App. § San Antonio
1999, pet. dism'd w.o.j.).
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Texas. Taken together, these factors were sufficient to subject
Beech to general jurisdiction in Texas.
In Woods v. Nova Companies Belize Ltd.,' 54 a resident of Belize
was injured in an aircraft accident in Costa Rica while a passen-
ger on an aircraft owned by the defendant, a Belizean corpora-
tion. The court had to determine whether Florida could
exercise general jurisdiction over the defendant. Specific juris-
diction principles did not apply because the tort did not occur
in Florida. Furthermore, the defendant did not own property in
Florida, was not registered to do business in Florida, did not
advertise in Florida, and did not maintain a mailing address,
telephone listing, or bank account in Florida. The court none-
theless ruled that jurisdiction was proper because the defendant
engaged in continuous and systematic business activities with
Florida and derived great pecuniary benefit from its transactions
there. The defendant, a shrimp farmer and distributor, sold ap-
proximately eighteen percent of its product to Florida import-
ers, moved nearly all of its product through the state, purchased
equipment and supplies from Florida suppliers, utilized storage
facilities in the state, and established essential business relation-
ships in the state.
The First Circuit, in an unpublished decision,355 agreed with
the District Court of Massachusetts that there was no in personam
jurisdiction in Massachusetts over ICALM, the insurance claims
adjuster for American Eagle. ICALM is a New York Corporation
with its principal place of business in North Carolina. It was
conducting an investigation into plaintiffs claim for injury as
she deplaned an American Eagle flight at Boston's Logan Air-
port. Plaintiff sued ICALM in Massachusetts alleging deceptive
insurance practices in that plaintiff was lulled into believing that
ICALM was extending the Warsaw Convention statute of limita-
tion while it was conducting its pre-suit investigation into the
incident. After requesting and receiving from the plaintiff addi-
tional information and authorizations for release of medical and
employment records as part of its investigation, ICALM subse-
quently denied the claim on the ground that it was time-barred
under the Warsaw Convention. The First Circuit ruled that no
personal jurisdiction existed under Massachusetts's long-arm
statute based merely on ICALM's acts of adjusting claims
154 739 So. 2d 617 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1999).
355 See Louis v. Flagship Airlines, 181 F.3d 79 (1st Cir. 1999) (unpublished table
decision), available in 1999 WL 525947 (1st Cir. 1999).
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brought by Massachusetts residents against ICALM's clients lo-
cated elsewhere. ICALM had no office in Massachusetts and was
not registered to do business there. Its work of adjusting claims
was done from its North Carolina offices.
D. BIFURCATION OF TRIALS
Rule 42(b) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure permits
the court to order separate trials on any specific claim or issue to
further convenience and economy or to avoid prejudice.
In Houseman v. United States Aviation Undenriters,56 a passen-
ger who was injured in the crash of a small plane alleged that he
had been prejudiced by the trial court's order to bifurcate his
claims against the pilot and the aircraft manufacturer. The or-
der was granted because the plaintiff attempted to add a new
theory of products liability against the manufacturer shortly
before the trial was set to begin. The court concluded that the
manufacturer would have been unable to fully prepare for the
new claim in the time remaining before trial, and the pilot
should not have to wait until the manufacturer was prepared. In
the first trial, the jury found that the pilot's negligence was not a
cause of the crash. The plaintiff dismissed his claim against the
manufacturer and appealed the bifurcation order.
The appellate court noted that under Rule 42(b) bifurcation
may be granted to avoid prejudice to a party or to promote judi-
cial economy. The court found that the plaintiffs attempt to
amend his complaint for the second time just prior to trial,
along with the resulting prejudice and inconvenience that this
would have caused to the other defendant, created a sufficient
basis for the trial court's decision to bifurcate. However, the
court observed that even if a sufficient basis exists, a court may
not grant such a motion if bifurcation will unfairly prejudice the
non-moving party or if the order will violate the Seventh Amend-
ment, which bars two separate juries from passing on the same
essential questions. 357
The plaintiff argued that any time a court decides to order
separate trials as to separate defendants that decision allows
each defendant to blame the absent defendant and deprives
plaintiff of the opportunity to raise the theory of alternative lia-
bility, by which the plaintiff can shift to the defendants the bur-
den of proving causation. Alternative liability, when applicable,
-156 171 F.3d 1117 (7th Cir. 1999).
357 Id. at 1121.
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requires the joinder of all potential culpable parties. The court
rejected plaintiffs argument because it found that the alterna-
tive liability theory did not apply in this case. Alternative liability
applies in cases in which only one of two or more defendants
could have caused the injury, plaintiff cannot prove which de-
fendant caused the harm, and the defendants have a better abil-
ity than plaintiff to prove causation. In this case, it would have
been entirely possible for ajury to find that the conduct of the
pilot and the manufacturer jointly resulted in the plaintiff's inju-
ries. Furthermore, the court noted that there were other possi-
ble responsible parties who were not joined in the case.
Therefore, burden shifting would not have been appropriate.
Finally, the court noted that burden shifting is only appropriate
if the plaintiff is not in a position to prove causation, which was
not the case here. Consequently, the court concluded that the
plaintiff did not suffer prejudice as a result of bifurcation. 5
Plaintiff also argued that the bifurcation order violated the
Seventh Amendment because it created a situation in which two
juries would decide the causation issue. The court rejected this
argument, noting that the claims against each defendant were
based on different legal theories and involved distinct causation
inquiries. The fact that the two juries would each examine
much of the same evidence was not sufficient to raise a constitu-
tional concern. The court concluded that the trial court's bifur-
cation order, while possibly not the best decision under the
circumstances, did not represent an abuse of discretion.
In the unpublished decision Smith v. Beech Aircraft Corp.,359 the
Ninth Circuit ruled that the district court did not abuse its dis-
cretion by refusing to bifurcate the trial to ask the jury to first
reach a preliminary determination on the issue of the substan-
tial similarity of prior accidents.
XIII. WENDELL H. FORD AVIATION INVESTMENT AND
REFORM ACT FOR THE 21ST CENTURY (AIR21)
A. HIGHLIGHTS OF AIR21
On April 5, 2000, the Wendell H. Ford Aviation Investment
and Reform Act for the 21st Century ("AIR21") became law.36 °
AIR21 is a five-year comprehensive reauthorization of the Fed-
358 Id. at 1122-24.
359 178 F.3d 1300 (9th Cir. 1999) (unpublished table decision).
360 Wendell H. Ford Aviation Investment and Reform Act for the 21st Century
(AIR21), Pub. L. No. 106-181, 114 Stat. 61 (2000).
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eral Aviation Administration and the Airport Improvement Pro-
gram and addresses many of the perceived problems in the
aviation system. AIR21 provides substantially more money for
safety programs relating to airport facilities and personnel and
aviation security. AIR21 also addresses various liability, competi-
tion, environmental and passenger rights issues.
Among the highlights of AIR21 are the following:
" It makes it an unfair practice to fail to notify a purchaser of
an electronically transmitted ticket of any expiration date
that the e-ticket has. (Section 221);
* It increases the penalty to $2,500 per violation for viola-
tions of the various consumer protection provisions of the
Federal Aviation Act. (Section 222);
* AIR21 requires that each U.S. carrier member of the Air
Transport Association (ATA), all of whom have entered
into ATA voluntary customer service commitments, provide
a copy of its individual customer service plan to the DOT,
which in turn transmits a copy to Congress. The DOT will
monitor implementation of the plans and prepare a report
to Congress by June 15, 2000, evaluating carriers' commit-
ments to the Plan. A final DOT report is due to Congress
by December 31, 2000 on the effectiveness of the individual
carrier plans and commitments and recommendations to
improve accountability, enforcement, and customer protec-
tion. (Section 224);
* The DOT is required to initiate rule-making to increase do-
mestic baggage liability limit. The domestic baggage liabil-
ity limit was increased in December 1999 to $2,500 per
passenger. (Section 225);
* AIR21 revises air carrier plans for domestic and foreign air
carriers that provide assistance to the families of passengers
involved in aircraft accidents to require them to include the
following minimum assurances: (1) upon request of the
family of a passenger, the air carrier will inform the family
whether the passenger's name appears on the preliminary
passenger manifest for the flight involved in the accident;
(2) the air carrier will provide adequate training to air car-
rier employees and agents to meet the needs of survivors
and family members following an accident; and (3) in the
event that the air carrier volunteers assistance to U.S. citi-
zens within the United States, in the case of an aircraft acci-
dent outside the United States involving major loss of life,
the air carrier will consult with the NTSB and the Depart-
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ment of State on the provision of such assistance. (Sections
402, 403);
* ALR21 amends DOHSA. (Section 404)61;
* ALR21 prohibits unsolicited communications by attorneys to
individuals regarding potential personal injury or wrongful
death claims arising from domestic air carrier accidents and
foreign air carrier accidents in the United States for the first
forty-five days following the accident. It also prohibits local
level attempts to prevent non-profit organizations with ex-
perience in disasters from rendering counseling services
within thirty days after an accident. (Section 481);
* AIR21 increases the civil penalty to up to $25,000 for acts by
unruly passengers that pose an imminent threat to the
safety of the aircraft or individuals on the aircraft. (Section
511);
" AIR21 provides protection in cases involving aeronautical
charts and related products and services. Section 603 pro-
vides that the FAA may arrange for the publication of neces-
sary aeronautical maps and charts using U.S. facilities and
agencies as far as practicable. The Government is also re-
quired to indemnify any person that publishes an aeronau-
tic map or chart from any part of a claim arising out of the
depiction of a defective or deficient flight procedure or air-
way, provided the flight procedure or airway was prescribed
by the FAA Administrator, was depicted accurately on the
map or chart, and was not obviously defective or deficient.
(Section 603);
" AIR21 prohibits a domestic or foreign air carrier from sub-
jecting a person in air transportation to discrimination on
the basis of race, color, national origin, religion, sex, or an-
cestry. (Section 706);
* AIR21 extends to foreign air carriers the requirements of
the Air Carrier Access Act, providing rights and protection
to physically disabled passengers. (Section 707);
" AIR21 prohibits smoking on scheduled flights in the United
States, subject to certain exceptions relating to foreign air
carriers. (Section 708); and
* AIR21 provides for the implementation of Article 83 of the
Convention on International Civil Aviation relating to air-
craft registration. (Section 714).
-' See infra Part XIII.B.
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B. AIR21's AMENDMENT TO THE DEATH ON THE
HIGH SEAS ACT
The AIR21 amendments to DOHSA will have significant and
immediate impact on the liability of air carriers. Ever since the
Supreme Court decision in Zicherman v. Korean Air Lines Co.,362
applying the admiralty statute DOHSA to aviation accidents on
the high seas, there has been an effort to amend DOHSA by
either rendering it inapplicable altogether to aviation accidents
(the House version of proposed amendments) or expanding the
types of recoverable damages (the Senate version of the pro-
posed amendments). In 2000 the two houses resolved their dif-
ferences in conference committee and came up with a substitute
version which incorporated some of what each house had pro-
posed. The enacted law amends DOHSA by making DOHSA
inapplicable to commercial aviation accidents within the U.S.
twelve-mile territorial sea and providing that federal, state and
"other" law applies in that twelve -mile sea, the same as it already
applies within the three-mile belt of territorial sea.363 Secondly,
the enacted law expands the types of recoverable damages in
those commercial aviation accidents occurring beyond twelve
nautical miles from U.S. territory.
AIR21 amends DOHSA as follows:
1. Within Twelve Miles: DOHSA does not apply to a "commer-
cial aviation accident" occurring "on the high seas 12 nautical
miles or closer to the shore" of the United States. Rather, "the
rules applicable under Federal, State, and other appropriate law
shall apply."
2. Beyond 12 Miles: DOHSA applies to a commercial aviation
accident "occurring on the high seas beyond 12 nautical miles
from the shore" of the United States, but
a. additional compensation for nonpecuniary damages (de-
fined as compensation for loss of decedent's care, comfort, and
companionship) is recoverable, and
b. punitive damages are expressly made not recoverable.
3. Effective Date: The amendments made shall apply to any
death occurring after July 16, 1996. This is the day before TWA
Flight 800 crashed off the shore of Long Island.
362 516 U.S. 217 (1996).
363 See H.R. Rep. No. 106-513, at 185 (2000).
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The amendments to DOHSA are made expressly retroactive.
While DOHSA 2000 expressly addresses some key issues, it raises
many questions.
Issues will certainly arise with respect to the fact that the
amendment not only expressly renders DOHSA inapplicable to
accidents within US territorial waters (i.e., twelve nautical miles
from shore), but also provides that within the twelve-mile terri-
torial sea the applicable law can be "the rules applicable under
Federal, State, and other appropriate law. . . ." By using the
word "and," the amendment raises the question whether it per-
mits plaintiffs to argue that they are entitled to aggregate the
various provisions of state law, federal common law and "other
appropriate law" to assemble the most favorable package of
rights (that is, types of damages and class of beneficiaries). This
amalgam approach, however, creates a law that does not exist in
any jurisdiction and would seem to conflict with the separation
of powers doctrine and due process of law. A more reasonable
interpretation is that the amendment gives the parties a choice
of options among state, federal or foreign law, to be selected
based on choice of law principles or the better rule of law. In
non-DOHSA, non-seafarer death cases, courts hold that while
Yamaha Motor Corp., U.S.A. v. Calhoun. 4 allows state law to apply
in territorial waters in lieu of general maritime law, the Calhoun
decision does not, however, restrict plaintiff to state law. There-
fore, plaintiffs have been successful in arguing that whichever
law, state law or general maritime law, provides a more generous
recovery, that is the law on damages that should apply. 65
Where DOHSA 2000 does apply, the only nonpecuniary dam-
ages authorized are for loss of decedent's care, comfort, and
companionship. Unlike earlier Senate bills, no cap on this com-
pensation is provided. Such damages are recoverable by the
class of beneficiaries for whom DOHSA creates a remedy: dece-
dent's spouse, child, or parent, or a "dependent relative." Case
law holds that a "dependent relative" is one who is financially
dependent on the decedent at the time of decedent's death. A
future promise of support is not sufficient, nor is emotional de-
pendency sufficient.366 Therefore, while parents need not prove
364 516 U.S. 199 (1996).
365 See Kelly v. Bass Enters. Prod. Co., 17 F. Supp. 2d 591 (E.D. La. 1998);
Brateli v. United States, 1996 A.M.C. 1980 (D. Ala. 1996).
366 See Ephraimson-Abt v. Korean Air Lines Co., 199 F.3d 1322 (2d Cir. 1999)
(unpublished table decision); see also Oldham v. Korean Air Lines Co., 127 F.3d
43 (D.C. Cir. 1997).
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economic dependency in order to recover for loss of their
child's care, comfort and companionship-because the DOHSA
schedule of beneficiaries says "parents," not "dependent par-
ents"-a sibling, however, would be required to prove financial
dependency. Significantly, nonpecuniary damages for pre-
death pain and suffering are still not allowed. Therefore, the
Supreme Court's decision in Dooley v. Korean Air Lines Co. "67 re-
mains valid with respect to a death beyond twelve miles. The
amendment also expressly denies punitive damages under
DOHSA.
With respect to retroactivity, the general rule is that, unless
stated otherwise, legislation is not given retroactive effect. Of
course, here, the amendment specifically provides for retroac-
tive application. The legislative history placed specific reliance
on Plaut v. Spendthrift Farm, Inc.,3"' in which the Supreme Court
acknowledged Congress's power to enact retroactive civil laws." 9
The following chart compares the old (DOHSA 1920) and the
new (DOHSA 2000):
DOHSA 2000-Commercial
DOHSA 1920 Aviation Accident
Applicability Applies to a death caused by wrongful Within 12 Miles: DOHSA does not apply
act "occurring on the high seas beyond to a "commercial aviation accident"
a marine league friom the shore of any (which is not defined), occurring "on
State" (approx. 3 nautical miles). 46 the high seas 12 nautical miles or
U.S.C. app. § 761. closer to the shore" of the United
States. See discussion infra at 1.2 on the
questions raised by this new language.
Beyond 12 Miles: DOHSA still applies to
a "commercial aviation accident occur-
ring on the high seas beyond 12 nauti-
cal miles from the shore" of any State.
Who Can Sue Action must be brought by the author- Beyond 12 Miles: Same as in DOHSA
ized personal representative. 46 U.S.C. 1920
app. § 761.
Who Can Recover- Action by the "personal representative" Beyond 12 Miles: Same as in DOHSA
The Beneficiaries for the "exclusive benefit of the dece- 1920
dent's wife, husband, parent, child, or
dependent relative." 46 U.S.C. app.
§ 761. The term "commercial aviation
accident" is not defined, but there is no
dispute that it covers commercial flights
such as 'I, A flight 800.
167 524 U.S. 116 (1998).
514 U.S. 211 (1995).
See H.R. Rep. No. 106-32, at 2 (1999).





Beyond 12 Miles: In addition to all pecu-
niary damages allowed tinder DOHSA
1920, DOHSA 2000 allows additional
compensation in commercial aviation
cases for nonpecuniary damages
(defined as damages for loss of dece-
dent's care, comfort, and companion-
ship).
Beyond 12 Miles-Compensatory damages
not allowed:
* Grief damages
" Pre-death pain and suffering damages
Punitive Damages Not allowed by case law. Beyond 12 Miles: Not allowed by statute.
XIV. MISCELLANEOUS ISSUES
A. IMMUNITY FOR COMMUNICATIONS MADE DURING
NTSB INVESTIGATIONS
It has been held that an NTSB accident investigation is a
quasi-judicial proceeding, and as such, any communications
made by the manufacturer during an investigation are abso-
lutely immune from being the subject of any law suit. In Shanks
v. Allied Signal, Inc.,371 ' an aircraft mechanic brought an action
under Texas law against an aircraft manufacturer, alleging that
the manufacturer conspired to manipulate the NTSB investiga-
tion and contributed to the NTSB's allegedly false accident re-
port, which concluded that the probable cause of the crash was
improper maintenance of the aircraft. The Fifth Circuit Court
of Appeals predicted that the Texas high court would rule that
communications made in the course of NTSB investigations are
quasi-judicial and absolutely immune from suit.
370 169 F.3d 988 (5th Cir. 1999).
DOHSA 1920
Only pecuniary loss damages are
allowed, such as:
" Loss of stipport
" Loss of services
" Loss of parental ntrture. Recovery of
loss of nurture into adult years is lin-
ited to specific evidence of the pectini-
ary valtie of nIrture extending heyond
the child's minority. See Solomon v. War-
ren, 540 F.2cd 777, 788 (5th Cir. 1976).
But cf Sea-Land Services, Inc. v. Caudet,
414 U.S. 573, 588 n.23 (1973) (court
disapproved of lower federal court cases
disallowing loss of society and services
to adult children).
" Loss of inheritance
" Funeral/Burial expenses (46 U.S.C.
app. § 762)
Compensatory damages not allowed:
* Loss of society or loss of care, com-
fort and companionship
" Grief damages
* Pre-death pain and suffering damages
Dooley v. Korean Air Lines Co. Ltd., 524
U.S. 116 (1998)
Zicherman v. Korean Air Lines, 516 U.S.
217 (1996)
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B. PUNITIVE DAMAGES
The Supreme Court has ruled that the Seventh Amendment
requires that the plaintiff be given the option of a new trial in
lieu of a remittitur 7 ' There is now a conflict in the circuits
concerning whether the Seventh Amendment right is impli-
cated when punitive damages are found to be constitutionally
excessive.
The Second and Tenth Circuits have ruled that when punitive
damages are adjudged to be constitutionally excessive, the plain-
tiff has the choice of accepting the remittitur or a new trial. 72
These courts reason that, by doing so, they "avoid any conflict
with the Seventh Amendment. ' 73
To the contrary, the Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit
in Johansen v. Combustion Eng', Inc.' 74 ruled that a court may
order a "constitutional reduction" of a punitive damages award
without offering the plaintiff the opportunity for a new trial.
The Johansen court reasoned that a constitutionally reduced ver-
dict is not really a remittitur at all; rather, it is a "mandatory duty
to correct an unconstitutionally excessive verdict so that it con-
forms to the requirements of the due process clause. ' 7 5 The
court observed that the cautious approach taken by the Second
and Tenth Circuits is not prohibited by the Constitution, but
that, in its opinion, such an approach is not required.
The Johansen court concluded that the punitive damages
award of $15 million was "grossly disproportionate" to both the
actual damages and the administrative penalty. The ratio of pu-
nitive damages to actual damages was 320:1. The ratio of puni-
tive damages to the administrative penalty was 1500:1. The
court further noted that the degree of reprehensibility of the
defendant's conduct was not very severe. 76 The final award, as
determined by the district court and affirmed by the Court of
Appeals, represented a ratio of 100:1 with respect to the com-
pensatory award and 400:1 with respect to the administrative
371 See Hetzel v. Prince William County, Va., 523 U.S. 208 (1998).
372 See Lee v. Edwards, 101 F.3d 805, 813 (2d Cir. 1996); Cont'l Trend Res., Inc.
v. OXY USA Inc., 101 F.3d 634, 643 (10th Cir. 1996), cert. denied, 520 U.S. 1241
(1997).
373 Continental, 101 F.3d at 643.
374 170 F.3d 1320 (11th Cir. 1999), cert. denied, 120 S.Ct. 329 (1999).
375 Id. at 1331.
376 Jd. at 1337-39.
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sanction. Both courts agreed that such an award was the maxi-
mum that would be constitutionally acceptable in this case.11
C. INSURANCE QUESTIONS
In Ranger Insurance Co. v. Kovach,37 the court held that a pilot
certified to fly aircraft under only visual flight rules (VFR) was
unambiguously excluded from coverage under the insurance
policy's pilot qualification clause when he flew a plane under a
filed and activated instrument flight rules (IFR) flight plan. The
court, following the majority view, ruled that under Connecticut
law it was not necessary to establish any causal relationship be-
tween the crash and the pilot's lack of IFR certification. Moreo-
ver, the insurance policy was void ab initio because the pilot had
misrepresented on his application that he had never had a cer-
tificate revoked, and this misrepresentation was knowing and
material.
In an unpublished Seventh Circuit decision, the court held
that an insurance contract provision that provided that the in-
surer would have no duty to defend the insured if it deposited
the applicable limit of liability with a court of competent juris-
diction was unambiguous and enforceable. 79
D. EVIDENTIARY ISSUES
The doctrine of res ipsa loquitur was used recently to render
American Airlines liable for a collapsing check-in counter that
resulted in injury to a passenger attempting to check in. In
Grajales-Romero v. American Airlines, Inc.,38 the First Circuit, ap-
plying the law of Puerto Rico, held that res ipsa loquitur applied
to the sudden collapse of a ticket counter because ticket coun-
ters do not ordinarily collapse absent negligence, and the
counter was within the exclusive control of the defendant. Also,
the court held that the plaintiff could not be held responsible
for the accident merely because the counter collapsed after the
plaintiffs' companion reached onto the counter top and
grabbed a built-in ashtray in order to gain leverage to lift lug-
gage. The court held that the companion's action was normal
usage of the counter by a passenger.
377 Id.
378 63 F. Supp. 2d 174 (D. Conn. 1999).
379 See Reliance Nat'l Ins. Co. v. Imber, 182 F.3d 922 (7th Cir. 1999) (unpub-
lished table decision).
380 194 F.3d 288 (1st Cir. 1999).
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E. NUISANCE
In Seale v. Pearson,38" ' a homeowner living near Moundville Air-
port in Alabama alleged that the planes taking off from the air-
port and flying low over his home were a nuisance. The airport
operated planes for skydiving, and the jury found that planes
taking off from the airport routinely were flown fifty to 150 feet
over the plaintiffs homes. The owner of the planes admitted to
flying some low flights over the home but argued that the home-
owner had not proven he flew all the relevant low flights. The
jury heard evidence from fact witnesses and uncontested expert
testimony that there was no legitimate reason to fly below 500
feet. The homeowner had asked defendant numerous times,
both verbally and in writing, to stop the low flights, explaining
that his wife was suffering from a brain tumor and the flights
were very disturbing. For a short time the low flights stopped
but resumed after about two weeks. When further complaints
were unavailing, the homeowner filed suit. The jury awarded
plaintiff $23,000 in compensatory damages and $29,000 in puni-
tive damages. The court found that the jury could properly base
its compensatory award on the plaintiff's own testimony regard-
ing his estimated value of rental property during the time of
nuisance. Moreover, the court concluded that the punitive
damages award was not excessive. The plaintiff had met his bur-
den by producing evidence that the low flights were "wanton,
malicious, or attended by circumstances of aggravation. 38 2
In Benton v. Savannah Airport Commission,38 3 the plaintiff
owned unimproved real estate near Savannah International Air-
port operated by the Savannah Airport Commission. Plaintiff
sued the commission, claiming that the air traffic and noise in
the immediate vicinity of their property had increased signifi-
cantly, leaving them with property that could not be used pro-
ductively. The plaintiffs sued under Georgia law for inverse
condemnation and nuisance and under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for un-
lawful taking. The court affirmed the lower court's ruling that
the state claims were time-barred. The court held that the air-
port should be considered a permanent nuisance because the
extension of a runway and increase in traffic had been steady
since 1992. Moreover, the traffic at the airport had actually de-
creased in the last four years. Therefore, any injury to plaintiff's
:'8l 736 So. 2d 1108 (Ala. Civ. App. 1999).
382 Seale, 736 So.2d at 1113.
1--" 525 S.E.2d 383 (Ga. Ct. App. 1999).
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property had accrued over four years before suit was filed.
Thus, plaintiff's state law claims were time-barred. The trial
court erred, however, in dismissing the § 1983 claim.
F. FALSE CLAIMS ACT
In United States v. Boeing Co.,' 84 the United States filed suit
against Boeing for, among other things, a violation of the False
Claims Act38 5 in manufacturing and selling defective gears to the
government on Boeing's CH-47(D) Chinook Army helicopters.
The Government's complaint also alleged that the Speco Corpo-
ration manufactured defective gears in Ohio, and Boeing in-
stalled the gears in the helicopters and provided them to the
U.S. Army. The complaint was originally filed under seal but
was unsealed in May 1997.
The Government alleged that one of the Speco-made gears
failed in 1991, leading to the total loss of a CH-47(D) helicopter
and all its contents at an estimated loss of $10 million, and that
in 1993 a Speco-made gear failed in another helicopter, result-
ing in approximately $1 million dollars in damages.
In its summary judgment motion, the Government sought to
strike Boeing's affirmative defense based on the High Value
Items Clause ("HVIC"), set forth in C.F.R. § 46800 and incorpo-
rated into the contract between the government and Boeing.
Boeing argued that in the 1VIC clause the government agreed
to hold Boeing harmless for loss or damages to high value gov-
ernment property, including any defects or deficiencies that
may have been present in the helicopters Boeing sold to the
Government.
The Government argued that the HVIC clause should not ap-
ply when there is proof of "willful misconduct" or "lack of good
faith" by Boeing's managerial personnel. The court agreed with
the Government and granted its motion for summary judgment
dismissing Boeing's affirmative defense based on the HVIC
clause.
G. PASSENGER LIST IS DISCOVERABLE TO CREATE CLASS FOR
CLASS ACTION SUIT
A plaintiff filed suit against Tower Air claiming personal in-
jury, mental anguish, and loss of consortium in Wallman v. Tower
'18- 73 F. Supp. 2d 897 (S.D. Oh. 1999).
_15 31 U.S.C. § 3729 (1983 & Supp. 2000).
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Air, Inc." ' The plaintiff boarded a Tower Air flight scheduled to
fly from New York to San Francisco. The plane was delayed at
Kennedy Airport in New York City while the crew attempted to
repair the engine on the Boeing 747. Eventually all of the pas-
sengers were moved to another aircraft which took off four
hours late. After flying for about fifteen minutes, the passengers
observed a bright red light, and the plane lurched violently to
the left. At that point, flight attendants began shouting hysteri-
cally and the passengers were informed over the intercom "to
remove jewelry and glasses and prepare for an emergency land-
ing." The plane landed without incident. Tower Air personnel
called the New York Police Department to handle the near-riot
by the passengers. The next day, plaintiff was placed on a TWA
flight to San Francisco.
The district court bifurcated the action, ordering the parties
to focus first on discovery related to possible certification of a
plaintiff class. Plaintiff requested a copy of the passenger list for
the flight, and the defendant objected. Pursuant to the Aviation
Security Improvement Act of 1990, the Department of Transpor-
tation requires that certified air carriers and large foreign air
carriers collect the full names of United States citizens traveling
on segments to and from the United States, along with passport
numbers and information on a contact person. In the event of
an aviation disaster, this information is used to contact the desig-
nated contact person. The passenger list and contact informa-
tion may not be released except to the family of a passenger, the
State Department, or the National Transportation Safety Board.
The court held that despite the confidentiality provisions of the
statute, there was adequate justification within the rules of civil
procedure for producing the list. Plaintiff wanted the passenger
list so that he could contact fellow passengers as potential wit-
nesses and/or plaintiffs and possibly to establish a class action.
The court held that the airline was obliged to allow the produc-
tion of the passenger list under the Federal Rules of Civil Proce-
dure but would allow it produced subject to a protective order.
H. EXPERT TESTIMONY
In Weisgram v. Marley Co.,38 7 the Supreme Court held that Rule
50 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure permits an appellate
court to direct the entry of judgment as a matter of law in favor
38i 189 F.R.D. 566 (N.D. Cal. 1999).
387 120 S. Ct. 1011 (2000).
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of an appellant when the court determines on appeal that ex-
pert evidence was erroneously admitted at trial and when that
evidence there was not a legally sufficient evidentiary basis for a
reasonable jury to find for the opposing party. In Weisgram, the
evidence erroneously admitted was expert testimony regarding a
defect in a heater, which allegedly caused decedent's death by
carbon monoxide poisoning. The appellate court concluded
that the expert testimony failed to meet the Daubert 8 s standard
for admission of expert opinions and should have been ex-
cluded. Without this testimony, the verdict in favor of the plain-
tiff could not stand. The Supreme Court held that in such a
case the appellate court is not limited to reversal and remand
for a new trial and may enter judgment as a matter of law in
favor of the appellant. The Supreme Court rejected any argu-
ment of unfairness, pointing out that it is implausible to suggest,
after Daubert, that parties will present anything less than their
best expert evidence in the expectation of a second chance at
trial should their first try fail.
388 Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharm., Inc., 509 U.S. 579 (1993).
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